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Unlike in most other destination countries of Jewish emigration from the 
former Soviet Union (FSU), Israelis with an FSU family background have 
founded several political parties on the national level. One of the still existing 
ones is the Yisra’el Beitenu party (Hebr., Our House Israel, hereinafter also 
IB). 
Avigdor Lieberman, who had immigrated to Israel from Moldova in 
1978, back then a Soviet Republic, founded the Yisra’el Beitenu party in 
1999. Lieberman became a member of the Likud party, served as the “former 
director-general of the prime minister’s office [Netanyahu]” and was a 
“long-term associate of Benjamin Netanyahu” (Khanin 2010: 106). 
According to Khanin, Lieberman left the Likud party because of a “major 
conflict with the traditional Likud establishment” (ibid.). The Yisra’el 
Beitenu party was founded as a “Russian right-wing political movement” 
(ibid.); the party’s founding members comprised basically of four different 
groups: “former Likud members, previous members of the Yisra’el baAliyah 
party [another sectoral party representing the interests of Israelis with an 
FSU background], municipal activists of Ashdod Beitenu, and former Soviet 
Zionist activists” (ibid.). In 2006, Lieberman’s party first entered the 
governing coalition of the former Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert; the 
party’s political leader, Avigdor Lieberman, was appointed to the new post 
of Minister for Dealing with Strategic Threats. In the 2009 general elections 
for the 18th Knesset, the Israeli parliament, the Yisra’el Beitenu party won 
11.7 per cent of the total votes, i.e. 15 seats; among its voters were Russian-
speaking immigrants as well as Israeli-born voters. The party became the 
third largest parliamentary group in the Knesset, and Lieberman was 
appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Benjamin 
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Netanyahu. Within ten years of its existence, Lieberman’s party had 
succeeded in expelling the Labour party, one of the two oldest and biggest 
Israeli political parties, from the first ranks. 
Yet, ever since Lieberman’s appearance in the front lines of Israeli 
politics, several voices in Israeli and international media as well as the public 
have discussed whether this would provoke a trend in Israeli politics toward 
a more ultra-nationalist and extreme right policy. In this context, Lieberman 
and his political party have been characterised as “right-wing extremist”, 
“nationalist” or “racist”; and Israeli media have shown concern especially 
about Lieberman’s verbal attacks against Palestinian citizens and concrete 
political actions, particularly law initiatives introduced by party 
representatives in the Knesset.1  
Previous research papers that deal with the Yisra’el Beitenu party have 
adopted some of the attributes ascribed to the party or its leader in the media 
discourse, e.g. by referring to the party as an “extreme right-wing party 
headed by a West Bank settler, Avigdor Lieberman” (Peled 2011: 278), or a 
“Russian party” (Meller 2010: 1). Against the background of the emergence 
of the Yisra’el Beitenu party, in particular the degree of political adaptation 
of Israelis with an FSU family background to the patterns of the Israeli 
majority has been questioned. Newspaper articles, but also scientific 
research, have taken for granted a certain inclination or predisposition of 
those immigrants (not only in Israel) for “conservative” or even extreme 
right political attitudes. Quantitative studies on political attitudes of (1st 
generation) Russian-speaking Israelis suggest a certain stable set of those 
attitudes described as more right-wing and conservative than those of other 
Jewish segments in Israeli society (e.g. Philippov/ Knafelman 2011; 
Philippov/ Bystrov 2011; Arian et al. 2010). The authors imply that as a 
group they carry a particular “collective habitus”, namely that of a “Soviet 
man” (Horowitz 1989), which is distinct from that of native-born Israelis and 
which can be explained by their socialisation in the former Soviet Union, or 
by post-Soviet realities. Those empirical studies struggle with the seemingly 
contradictory findings that those Israelis on the one hand claim an increasing 
                                                             
1  However, interestingly, as I am writing up the analysis of my material the Yisra’el 
Beitenu party is no longer considered the most dangerous party of Netanyahu’s 
government, but Naftali Bennett’s HaBait haYehudi (Hebr.: The Jewish Home) 
is—though Lieberman’s approaches have not changed.  
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sense of belonging (Arian et al. 2010: 81-3), yet, on the other hand, display 
political attitudes, which are interpreted as hints to the maintenance of a 
“Soviet legacy” (Khanin 2011: 56). However, there are few voices, who 
acknowledge that the electoral success at the national level also shows the 
party’s ability to take on sentiments of (the Jewish) Israeli society and gain 
political use of it. Against the background of the party’s electoral success, it 
is no longer true that its constituents are recruited mainly among Israelis with 
a Russian-speaking family background.  
On the contrary, the party has become a mainstream phenomenon—and 
problem. Thus, the idea for the present study stems from the observation that 
despite several consecutive electoral successes of Yisra’el Beitenu in Israel 
since 2006, the media discourse about the party is rather negative. The point 
of departure was the question of how young Israelis with an FSU family 
background (the so-called “1.5th” and second generations), who engage in 
the framework of IB, speak about their civic engagement in a broader sense 
and about their political engagement with IB in particular. In this context, I 
argue that previous research has asked the wrong questions about the 
phenomenon of the emergence of the Yisra’el Beitenu party, but also the 
party’s passive and active supporters. I argue that questions like the 
following two examples from previous studies—whether the Yisra’el 
Beitenu party is a “Russian party”, or whether IB voters support strong 
leadership because of their “Soviet legacy”, do not help to understand the 
phenomenon. This is true for the younger generation of Israelis with an FSU 
family background who have lived in Israel for most of their lives, as much 
as for Israeli-born supporters of the party. Instead, an approach which delves 
into the underlying reasonings of the IB constituents’ political choice is 
needed.  
In addition, looking for possible explanations in adjacent areas of 
research does not offer much in understanding the phenomenon at hand. 
Most empirical studies on civic engagement either concentrate on an 
individual’s current psychological state of mind or belief system, or on the 
process of socialisation, in which the individual belief system that motivates 
engagement develops; yet, they rarely combine both aspects. Besides, 
previous studies—to my best knowledge—hardly answer the question of 
how people rationalise their civic engagement.2  
                                                             
2  One of the few exceptions is Helen Haste’s lay theory approach. 
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Rather, previous empirical studies usually look at civic engagement from 
an entirely positive angle. Ever since Almond and Verba’s classical study on 
civic engagement, citizens, who are actively engaged, are considered as 
representing a civic ideal and to show particular features like political 
interest or democratic values. Studies on civic engagement agree that the 
active involvement of citizens in public matters is essential for the 
establishment and maintenance of stable democracies. In the normative eyes 
of society as well as of the researchers, active engagement is presented as “a 
civic virtue” (Almond/ Verba 2016). Engagement with a political party that 
by considerable portions of society is considered to not represent those 
democratic values, is not addressed in those studies. 
Yet, this is just the case with the interviewees taking part in the present 
study. Immigrant (political) adaptation, again, is usually looked at from the 
angle of structural adaptation to the host society, or single aspects or 
resources but not with a holistic approach combining the macro and micro 
levels. Moreover, it is rather an exception that immigrants are considered 
architects of their own fortune. 
Departing from the current state of research just described, I suggest a 
different approach to understand the (political) adaptation of immigrants in 
the present study. Taking Israelis with an FSU family background, who 
engage with the Yisra’el Beitenu party, as a case study, I suggest taking their 
perspective, and, above all, regarding them as active in their process of 
adaptation. The initial research interest of the present study was to 
understand how the participants had become engaged with the Yisra’el 
Beitenu party. I organized the research by applying a grounded theory 
approach, which has two advantages: a) it enables the researcher to take a 
micro-sociological perspective or the perspective of the individual as a social 
actor, and b) it equips the researcher with a flexible methodological 
framework, which is open to developing new theoretical insight. In-depth 
interviews about the individual paths of the participants toward civic 
engagement with IB served as the main data material; I conducted these 
interviews in 2009 and 2010. I applied a snowball system-approach and 
targeted young Israelis who, at the time the interviews were conducted, were 
active in various forms in the framework of the party. I interviewed party 
activists as well as those engaged in community activities and programmes, 
which co-operated in one way or another with a local branch of the party. In 
order to outreach to potential interviewees, I initially approached party 
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officials at different levels: national (i.e. members of the Knesset) as well as 
local representatives. In addition, I contacted student cells of the party within 
the students’ councils at the Universities of Haifa and Tel Aviv. Yet, the most 
successful way to find interviewees was through a personal network of 
colleagues in Israel or German colleagues with contacts in Israel. When I 
approached the potential interviewees, I explained I would be interested in 
their story about how they had become engaged. I did not explicitly say, 
however, that I approached them because of their connection to the Yisra’el 
Beitenu party but instead only made the engagement with IB as well as the 
public discourse about the party and its political leader, Lieberman, a topic 
in the interview itself.  
I conducted interviews with young Israelis (aged 18-29) with an FSU 
family background. Most of them had immigrated as children (the then oldest 
interviewee immigrated to Israel at the age of 11) from the former Soviet 
Union. The interviews were conducted in two field phases: in 2009—by 
chance not too long after the IDF (Israeli Defence Forces) operation Cast 
Lead in the Gaza strip—I approached young activists who acted clearly in 
the framework of the party (members of the Knesset, parliamentary 
assistants, local spokesmen as indicated on the website of the party etc.). The 
participants I had interviewed in 2009 lived all over the country: in Bat Yam 
near Tel Aviv, in Ashdod (in the south, close to the Gaza Strip), Haifa, 
Jerusalem and in Ari’el in the Occupied Territories. In 2010, coinciding with 
the Gaza flotilla raid, I concentrated on Haifa and Natserat Illit (a 
neighbouring Jewish town of the Christian Nazareth).  
In the course of the analysis of the interview material it became obvious 
that the interviewees first made their presentation of Israeli citizenship a 
central point of reference in their narratives, and second and used the notion 
of citizenship they presented as a discursive strategy to construct a sense of 
belonging to Israeli society. In particular, I have examined how the 
interviewees put their engagement in the context of their view of Israeli 
citizenship and the role they play as citizens, and they do so in two ways: on 
the one hand, they do it indirectly through narratives referring to personal 
experiences and/ or collective knowledge such as the public discourse about 
the political party they are engaged with. On the other hand, the interviewees 
do so directly by way of lining up their arguments, for example by 
reproducing or modifying the public discourse. Thus, in the further process 
I developed more detailed questions, in particular about how the 
18 | Inclusion through Exclusion 
 
interviewees frame their engagement a) indirectly, through the reference to 
personal experiences and collective “reservoirs of knowledge” (Keller 
2011a: 78), e.g. the public discourse about the political party they are 
engaged with, and b) directly, through argumentative strategies, such as the 
reproduction or modification of that public discourse, with their 
interpretation of Israeli citizenship and the role citizens have, and which are 
the goals they pursue by doing so. In a further analytical step, Pierre 
Bourdieu’s concepts of social space, field, habitus, capital, and social 
practice serve as a theoretical-methodological framework, or, as introduced 
by Strauss (1987), a coding paradigm. In order to answer questions about 
immigrant’s political incorporation, I argue that the various levels can be 
integrated into what Edgerton and Roberts called a “‘structure-disposition-
practice’ explanatory framework” (Edgerton/ Roberts 2014). Their aim is to 
open up Bourdieu’s key concepts of social space, capital, habitus, field, and 
practice for quantifiable research.  
However, I suggest integrating Bourdieu’s concepts into qualitative 
research on the political adaptation of immigrants—or rather one particular 
way of incorporation—in order to get a more comprehensive picture of how 
immigrant adaptation can work. Thus, in order to make Bourdieu’s concepts 
applicable, I combine them with different approaches of discourse analysis. 
A sociology of knowledge-based approach to discourse analysis (SKAD), as 
suggested by Keller (e.g. 2011a), shall help to grasp objective structures 
because with the help of this method it is in particular possible to analyse 
collectively shared amounts of social knowledge, e.g. for instance in the form 
of patterns of interpretation. I understand social practice here as discursive, 
as Helen Haste (1992) in particular emphasises the impact of the situative 
context on an individual’s line of argument. 
In the present study, I can show how the interviewees actively construct 
a sense of belonging to Israeli society based on a particular reading of Israeli 
citizenship: perceived citizen’s duties of contribution and loyalty condition 
the allocation of citizen’s rights. The interviewees present Israeli citizenship 
as a conditional relationship between citizen’s duties and rights. They 
identify several segments, Jewish and non-Jewish in Israeli society, which—
in their eyes—do not fulfil one (Jewish ultra-orthodox, “draft dodgers”) or 
any (Palestinian citizens) of their duties as citizens. In contrast to those other 
segments, the interviewees claim to have fulfilled their citizen’s duties and 
hence to be good citizens. Alongside with the adaptation of migrated and 
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Israeli anti-Muslim racism as rooted in the society’s ethno-nationalist 
discourse, the interviewees feel legitimized to decide who belongs to the 
collective and who are the ultimate (national) others. Based on their 
individual strategies of coping with personal experiences, their perception of 
Israeli society and the Israeli ethno-nationalist discourse as well as their 
engagement with the Yisra’el Beitenu party, the interviewees construct three 
arguments:  
 
• that the ultimate (national) others—non-Jewish, in particular the 
Palestinian, minorities—should be deprived of their basic citizen’s rights 
and, consequently, their Israeli citizenship, 
• that Palestinian citizens and non-citizens are an ultimate threat to Israel’s 
security, and 
• that Israel’s security situation is directly linked to broader processes of 
what the interviewees present as an “Islamisation of the Western world”.  
 
The book is structured as follows: in the theoretical-methodological part 
(chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5) I will first outline the grounded theory methodology 
as developed by Glaser and Strauss in 1967, which serves as the 
methodological basis for the present study (chapter 2). In chapter 4, I will 
describe the process of data collection and analysis and describe the data 
material. Finally, I will explain the necessity to adapt the approach, in 
particular the coding paradigm, to the needs of the present study and offer an 
extension to it based on Bourdieu’s work and different approaches to 
discourse analysis in chapter 5. In order to frame the empirical findings, 
chapters 3 and 6 review the state of research on three aspects I regard as 
important to contextualise the present empirical study: previous research on 
civic engagement, features of the Israeli society, the Yisra’el Beitenu party. 
Part II outlines a material theory of belonging, as developed from the 
systematic analysis of the empirical material. In chapters 7 and 8, I will 
provide a descriptive analysis of the interviewees’ objective position in 
social space as well as their sense of place, and their narratives of personal 
civic engagement, i.e. their motivation, sources, and (lack of) resources for 
becoming engaged. In chapters 9 and 10, I will show how the interviewees 
frame their narratives of civic engagement with a particular interpretation of 
Israeli citizenship and Israeli society. They present a conditional reading of 
citizenship, consisting of two dimensions of a citizen’s duties—contribution 
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and loyalty to the Jewish state—, allocating citizen’s rights. I will discuss 
these dimensions in detail. In chapters 11 and 12, I will show a) that and how 
the interviewees construct their belonging to the Israeli society on the basis 
of being good citizens and against the constructed notion of Palestinians as 
the other, and b) how the interviewees consider the Yisra’el Beitenu party as 
the rightful political representative of those good citizens. In the final chapter 
(chapter 13), I will summarise the main empirical findings and critically 













As outlined in the introduction, some confusion arose from the previous 
research, usually with respect to the role of the individual. In order to deal 
with this confusion and the related open questions it was necessary to use a 
research approach that is open to the categories, which would emerge from 
the field rather than testing the hypotheses of existing theories. Thus, in order 
to pursue one of the goals of the present study, namely to take the perspective 
of the individual, a flexible and open approach was required, that enables the 
researcher to enter the field with a vaguely formulated research interest and 
develop more precise research questions and categories of analysis, or revise 
them in the course of the research process rather than imposing stiff 
constraints on the project. In this context, the present study is a suitable 
example of the basic claim of GTM: the necessity of discovering new 
(middle-range) social theories because the existing ones cannot explain 
every social phenomenon (Glaser/ Strauss 1968: 20).  
In the present chapter, I will redraw the basic implications of a Grounded 
Theory methodology (GTM) for qualitative research.  
 
 
 THE GROUNDED THEORY METHODOLOGY AS 
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
 
The Grounded Theory methodology, originally developed by Anselm 
Strauss and Barney Glaser in 1967 (Glaser/ Strauss 1968), for research 
design, data collection and data analysis, and presentation of empirical 
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results meets these needs.1 The approach is an explorative way of doing 
research, and it is a style rather than a method (Mey/ Mruck 2011a: 22). It 
allows the “controlled and verifiable discovery of theory grounded in the 
data, governed by rules” (Mey/ Mruck 2011a: 11).  
The emphasis on the grounding, or the discovery of theory in empirical 
data demands a particular approach to data collection and analysis. Glaser 
and Strauss emphasise several main elements of a methodology in their 
original book The Discovery of Grounded Theory (1967) that would ensure 
that this goal was reached, and the quality of research maintained at the same 
time:  
 
• data collection, data analysis and the development of a grounded theory 
happen in a cyclical process and in relation to each other, 
• the analysis transcends empirical description through abstraction or 
conceptual thinking; the methods applied here are specific modes of 
coding and constant comparison, 
• “the theory should fit the data” (Glaser/ Strauss 1968: 261); this is ensured 
through the process of relating the emerging theory back to the empirical 
data by modes of theoretical sensitivity, theoretical sampling, and the 
constant writing of memos. 
 
Based on their general critique of established empirical research before 
GTM, Glaser and Strauss suggest an alternative approach: in contrast to a 
deductive way of testing hypotheses, of  “adapt[ing] some ideas, derived from 
a somewhat established formal theory, to the area under study” (Glaser/ 
Strauss 2010: 51), the researcher should “[enter] the field and investigate[...] 
the area under study by taking a particular sociological perspective, a focus, 
by having a general question or problem in mind” (ibid.). Thus, in the very 
beginning it is not necessary, but rather helpful not to have an elaborate 
theoretical concept, but to enter the field with an “open-mind” instead 
(Breuer 2010: 144). In this context, the discoverers state that the “generation 
of theory [...] [is] a process” (Glaser/ Strauss 2010: 49), in the course of 
                                                             
1  I can neither go into detail about the  epistemological origins of the grounded 
theory approach, nor about the further developments of GT-methodologies here. 
The reader may find a broad and detailed introduction for example in Breuer 
2018; Strübing 2014; Mey/ Mruck, 2011b; Clarke 2011; Bryant/ Charmaz 2008. 
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which the researcher goes back and forth between data collection, data 
analysis, and conceptual thinking by way of constant comparison.  
The authors implicitly describe a hermeneutic circle, or, as Breuer  put 
it, a “hermeneutic spiral” (Breuer 2010: 55), at the end of which (i.e. at the 
time of going public with the empirical results) stands an integrated theory. 
The idea that the “generation of theory [...] [is] a process” (Glaser/ Strauss 
2010: 49) is also true for the emerging theory itself: it can only be of 
temporary validity and is rather an “ongoing theoretical discussion” (ibid.).  
There are two forms of theory, which can be generated by way of the 
grounded theory methodology: material theory is bound to a particular 
subject studied. Formal theory, in turn, goes beyond a particular subject, and 
rather deals with “formal or conceptual areas of the social sciences” (Glaser/ 
Strauss 2010: 50). Glaser and Strauss insist that it is important to decide for 
one or the other because that decision has major implications for the 
theoretical sampling, i.e. the cases which should be compared (cf. ibid.). 
 
 
 MAJOR RIFTS AND DEVELOPMENTS 
 
Since Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss published their original book The 
Discovery of Grounded Theory, the approach has undergone major changes, 
both due to the need for its specification or applicability to the research 
reality, but also due to major rifts about central questions among its 
discoverers. As a consequence of these rifts, the critique of the original book, 
and the work the two discoverers continued individually or in other teams to 
date, it would be more precise to speak of several “grounded theory 
methodologies” (Mey/ Mruck 2011a: 12; cf. also Clarke/ Keller 2014: para. 
49).  
In the present study, I refer to the work(s) of the original authors, but I 
have also added my own considerations, in particular concerning the idea of 
a coding paradigm. Steinhardt identified two major differences between 
Glaser and Strauss of how to deal with issues inherent in the original version. 
One of them concerns the issue of theoretical sensitivity, the other one, 
connected to this, is that of the question of how to verify the theory in the 
data (Steinhardt 2015: 32).  
A major point of criticism of the approach suggested by Glaser and 
Strauss was that of an “inductivist self-misunderstanding” (Kelle 2005: para. 
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24; e.g. also Kelle/ Kluge 2010: 18-21), inherent in the concept. This critique 
was at least partly possible because the Discovery was rather a 
“Kampfansage” (Mey/ Mruck 2011a: 13) than an elaborate and fully 
applicable methodological concept. With regard to that critique, several 
authors state that Glaser and Strauss were “aware of the [methodological] 
limits of a strictly inductive approach” (Mey/ Mruck 2011a,: 31). Glaser and 
Strauss state: “of course, the researcher does not approach reality as a tabula 
rasa, he must have a perspective that will help him see relevant data and 
abstract significant categories from his scrutiny of the data” (Glaser/ Strauss 
1968: 3).  
In the Discovery book, the authors demonstrate the concept of theoretical 
sensitivity as follows: “[...] the sociologist should be sufficiently 
theoretically sensitive [emphasis in the original], so that he is able to 
conceptualise and formulate a theory, which is emerging from the data. [...]  
But the theoretical sensitivity of a sociologist is defined by two further 
factors: first, his personal interests and his character come into play, second 
it demands him to theoretically penetrate the field he studies and to 
systematise his insights” (Glaser/ Strauss 2010: 62). As a consequence, 
“[being] ‘highly sensitive’ and a ‘systematic approach’ can be translated in 
the way that the researcher has ideas, from which he [...] can fetch the most 
by means of systematic comparative analysis” (Glaser/ Strauss 2010: 263).  
Thus, the concept can be understood in two complementary ways. On the 
one hand, it can mean “the availability of useful heuristic concepts that make 
possible the identification of theoretically relevant phenomena in the data 
material” (Kelle 1996: 32). On the other hand, Glaser (2011) adds more 
precisely: “[first, the researcher’s] personal and temperamental bent to 
maintain analytical distance, tolerate confusion and regression, while 
remaining open, trusting to preconscious processing and to conceptual 
emergence [...] [and second, his or her] ability to develop theoretical insight 
into the area of research combined with the ability to make something of 
these insights” (Glaser 2011, p. 147-8; c.f. also Mey/ Mruck 2011a: 31). 
Glaser (1978) was the first to react to the inductivist critique and made a 
suggestion of how to apply the idea of theoretical sensitivity. As an attempt 
to make the GTM-approach more applicable, Glaser (1978) developed his 
concept-indicator-model, which is based on the epistemological assumption 
that empirical phenomena that we can observe are carriers of social 
meaning—a meaning that we can understand through our interpretation of 
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them a) as social beings on the basis of our everyday knowledge as members 
of a certain Lebenswelt (Schuetz 1974), and b) as researchers through an 
interpretation based on our professional sociological knowledge, which is 
laid out on a more abstract level.  
In order to grasp the complexity of the potential directions, Glaser (1978) 
developed theoretical codes, which shall guide the researcher’s attention in 
the course of dealing with the data. Interestingly, this is what Stru¨bing rather 
ascribes to Strauss’s further work on the methodology and labels with the 
term “abductive thinking” (Strübing 2008: 52-4). Strauss (1987) adapted 
Glaser’s underlying concept-indicator-model, which the latter had 
developed ten years earlier (cf. Mey/ Mruck 2011a: 24). However, in 
contrast, Strauss’s coding paradigm, giving clear heuristic instructions about 
what to pay attention to, has been received as a solution to original ambiguity 
and vagueness in the German tradition of GTM-reception. It would allow the 
researcher to approach his or her data material with the necessary openness, 
yet take (sociological) pre-knowledge into account (Steinhardt 2015: 32). 
This reflects the basic controversy between Glaser and Strauss in the 
course rather well and also the different perception and reception of the 
continuous work of both authors, which has been much about the role of 
previous knowledge in present research. Glaser’s position that a grounded 
theory must emerge from the empirical data (Glaser 1978) has been rejected 
as an “empiricist idea” (Kelle 2005: para. 48), at least in the German-
speaking reception of Glaser’s individual work after the Discovery. In my 
view, the controversy between Glaser and Strauss is not so much about 
whether to incorporate pre-knowledge into the analysis or not, but rather 
about when to do so. Whereas Glaser accepts this adaptationonly at a later 
stage of the analysis in order to give a grounded theory space to emerge, 
Strauss incorporates pre-knowledge as a heuristic concept in the form of his 
suggested coding paradigm from the very beginning of data analysis. 
Accordingly, Kelle identifies the concept of emergence of theory from the 
data as “rather problematic” (Kelle 2005: para. 48) as well; and also Kelle 
and Kluge state that “Glaser appears  to hold to the inductivist rhetoric” 
(Kelle/ Kluge 2010: p. 21; emphasis added). However, in addition to this, 
Kelle hints to the alternative laid out already in the original book: the concept 
of theoretical sensitivity. As a consequence, Kelle suggests to handle the 
issue with regard to the need of the researcher: Glaser’s approach of the 
“emergence” of grounded theory from the empirical data through theoretical 
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coding opens the analysis to an experienced researcher’s “broad knowledge 
of social theory [...] [and] his combination of theoretical concepts from 
different schools of thought” (Kelle 2005: para. 51). On the other hand, 
Strauss’s coding paradigm provides inexperienced researchers with a clear 
guideline of what to pay attention to in the coding process, but at the same 
time may limit his or her attention to the individual, the micro-level of 
sociological analysis (Kelle 2005: para. 50). 
 
 
 THE TOOL KIT 
 
In order to systematically analyse the collected data, Glaser and Strauss 
suggest a method of constant comparison, the first step of which is coding 
(Glaser/ Strauss 2010: 119-120). In this context, Glaser and Strauss criticise 
other qualitative methods but remain very vague about their own way of 
coding. In order to bridge this gap, after their split-up Strauss (1987) 
developed a coding paradigm based on Glaser’s (1978) concept-indicator-
model. Against his own background as a pupil of the Chicago School (cf. 
Breuer 2010: 75), Strauss suggested a paradigm, which consisted of 
theoretical categories focussing on the individual and its actions, the 
conditions, strategies of action and the outcome of these actions. Strauss 
(1987) further suggested organising the analysis in several steps, namely 
open, axial and selective coding. The analysis is laid out as an iterative 
process, but the individual analytical steps of coding build on each other and 
the step to begin with is called open coding.  
In the GTM literature, open coding is often described as “to pry open the 
data” (Mey/ Mruck 2011a: 25), usually with the help of W-questions (who, 
what, where, when, etc.) as well as the application of codes (in the form of 
either sociological terms or in-vivo) as a means to get a feeling for the 
structure of the material. Axial coding, in contrast, takes place on a more 
abstract level and shall help to create an order between the codes or to find a 
relationship between them that can be integrated into analytical categories. 
The development of categories is already in the centre of the methodological 
approach in the Discovery book: categories are abstract concepts which 
derive from the analysis through the researcher’s ability of abstract thinking 
and they have features which fill the categories with empirical content 
(Glaser/ Strauss 2010: 54). In order to guide the analytical process, the 
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researcher should develop working hypotheses and more detailed questions 
about the field of study; these hypotheses are necessarily derived from the 
data. Working hypotheses are to make assumptions about the “relationship 
between categories” (Glaser/ Strauss 2010: 49). Constant comparison on 
different levels of thinking—the comparison between data (“incidents”; 
Glaser/ Strauss 1968) and codes, between codes, between codes and 
categories, between categories—shall help the researcher to find similarities 
and differences and to integrate the findings into an explanatory theoretical 
concept, (a) key category(ies). The final step of the coding process is 
selective coding, in which the researcher looks for further empirical evidence 
or features to describe those key category(ies). 
According to Glaser and Strauss, the emergence of an integrated theory 
from the empirical data shall be ensured through several criteria of quality. 
The writing of memos (“stop coding and write a memo about your ideas” 
(Glaser/ Strauss 1968: 113) shall help to gather flashes of inspiration 
immediately and in relation to the data they have emerged from, to reflect on 
these ideas, and to organise and reduce confusion, frustration, or other 
emotions related to the research process (Glaser/ Strauss 2010: 121). A 
second criterion is the concept of theoretical sampling, which describes the 
process of data collection and shall help control which further data is needed; 
the emerging theory here serves as a guideline (Glaser/ Strauss 2010: 53). 
The sampling, or the choice of “groups of comparison” (Glaser/ Strauss 
2010: 56), is organised by creating minimal and maximal contrast groups on 
the basis of a previous analysis of the data material, which is aimed at finding 





3 Theoretical Sensitivity I:  




Breuer suggests that researchers reflect on their position toward the study 
throughout the process in order to be aware of any pre-concepts of 
knowledge, personal experiences, or feelings that may influence their way 
of thinking (cf. Breuer 2010: 131). I agree with him, and thus I am going to 
describe here how I have come to study the issue at hand. In the present 
chapter, I will reflect on those pre-concepts of knowledge, personal 
experiences, or feelings that may influence my way of thinking, as Breuer 
suggests. Besides, I will outline major directions of previous research on 
civic engagement. With regard to the issue of theoretical sensitivity, I have 
assumed the position suggested by Kelle (2005), and applied Strauss’ coding 
paradigm. However, in parallel to entering the field, I used “broad reading” 
(cf. Breuer 2010: 135) of previous research to get an idea of how to start data 
collection and organise the theoretical sampling (cf. Steinhardt 2015: 37).1  
 
The present study has come a long way. My first personal encounter with 
how immigrants see their place in a new cultural environment was when I 
conducted biographic interviews with non-Jewish immigrant women in 
                                                             
1  In their latest, revised edition, Breuer, Muckel and Dieris (2018) suggest a two-
step procedure for the review of literature relevant to the present research. At the 
very beginning of the process, one should get a broad and general overview, while 
later on—as part of the verification of grounding the present theory in the 
empirical data—the researcher should get a deeper knowledge of relevant 
previous concepts on the issue at hand (Breuer 2018: 145). 
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Israel, (1st generation) immigrants from the former Soviet Union2 for my 
master thesis (Schmidt, 2006). Before these encounters, migration had been 
something very abstract for me: I grew up in a small town in the former GDR 
and remember just two single “Ausländer [foreigners]” because they were 
black. After school I studied close to home, and the picture I had of my social 
environment stayed very much the same. Occasionally, I heard a mixture of 
German and a foreign language, suggesting that the speaker had immigrated, 
but my network of personal acquaintances and friends was exclusively 
German. Thus, I was astonished and fascinated at the same time to hear 
personal stories of migration, the difficulties, those women had encountered 
in the process of leaving and adapting, particularly those in maintaining a 
consistent and stable identity and the individual strategies these women had 
developed to cope with them.  
Yet at the same time I was shocked, for instance, by the—in my eyes— 
extreme right opinions those women uttered with respect to the peace process 
between Israelis and Palestinians, or the cultural superiority they displayed 
towards Palestinian-Israeli citizens. Continuing to study migration, or rather 
immigrant adaptation, against this background, I became interested in the 
political dimension of this process as well as in the 2nd generation, i.e. those 
who have already grown up in their parents’ country of destination.  
However, when I wanted to return to the immigrant group I had already 
encountered, I was told there was no need to study their political attitudes 
and blame them for being right-wing extremists as they had enough problems 
“here in Israel”. However, I did not agree; on the contrary, I do think there 
is a need to study the political adaptation of immigrants; and, again, Israelis 
with an FSU family background can serve as a case study. Hence, my initial 
interest was to understand who engages with the Yisra’el Beitenu party. 
Based on what I knew from previous research about the adaptation of FSU 
immigrants, I decided at the very beginning that I wanted to know more 
about the children of those immigrants, who very often immigrated with their 
adult parents but were usually not the focus of previous research. Thus, I 
decided to focus on how young Israelis with an FSU immigrant background 
become engaged with the Yisra’el Beitenu party. I started to collect data at a 
very early stage of the research process.  
                                                             
2  A short introduction to that immigrant group is Gitelman 2004; in more detail cf. 
Glöckner 2011. 
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At that point, I had only a general knowledge of Israeli society in general 
and FSU immigration to Israel in particular. This context knowledge came 
from two sources: from my previous research on non-Jewish Russian 
spouses who had immigrated with their Jewish husbands (Schmidt 2006) on 
the one hand, and from overview reading about research on civic engagement 
in order to identify research gaps for the preparation of a Ph.D. proposal. 
Since I was interested in the individual’s perspective on civic 
engagement and thought of it as rooted in the individuals’ biographies, in-
depth interviews with politically engaged people about their civic 
engagement were my first choice. Such kind of data would allow the 
interviewees to set their own focus and at the same time I would be able to 
work with a framework of open questions concerning civic engagement 
based on assumptions retrieved from the literature on civic engagement.  
 
 
3.1 A TYPOLOGY OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 
 
One can identify three main dimensions of research investigating civic 
engagement: publications in the first research dimension deal with 
theoretical and conceptual questions of a typology of civic engagement. 
Researchers of the second dimension are more concerned with aspects of 
citizenship education; in this context, they particularly study the motivation 
of engaged individuals to participate in democratic activities. A third line of 
research concentrates on the empirical variety of political participation 
focussing on different aspects (e.g. resources for civic engagement, or civic 
engagement of immigrants). Figure 1 shows the approaches of previous 
empirical studies on civic engagement. 
Recent empirical studies appeal for a conceptual turn when looking at 
civic engagement, especially with regard to the younger generations. In this 
context, these studies affirm that those voices in the discussion are wrong 
who warn that participation is declining. On the contrary, the argument goes 
that the variety of activities has grown and especially young people (in the 
U.S.) today are not less active, but active in different ways than the 
generations before them. Dalton (2008) shows in his study that it is not so 
much engagement in general that is declining; instead, he can show a change 
in citizenship norms. He identifies two dimensions of citizenship, namely 
citizen’s duties and citizen’s rights (Dalton 2008: 80-1), and with the shift in 
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emphasis from the former towards the latter over the last two decades or so, 
informal forms of political participation have become more relevant (Dalton 
2008: 83); social research has only started to take these phenomena into 
consideration. though.3 As a first step, recent studies have tended to expand 
their concept of civic engagement. In this respect, various authors call for a 
broader definition of participation, i.e. to not solely understand it in strictly 
political terms (such as voting or formal membership in a political party) but 
to include also a whole (new) range of informal or extra-parliamentary 
political activities.  
Several authors (e.g. Marsh et al. 2007; Miller 1992) demand a turn in 
the approach to civic engagement, which would take into account that 
nowadays especially young people become engaged in informal contexts of 
politics rather than joining for instance a political party. Haste and Hogan 
(2006) argue in a similar way based on empirical findings showing that lay 
                                                             
3  Research in this area builds on the empirical finding that the concept of 
citizenship has been contested (e.g. Haste/ Hogan 2006) and shows that notions 
of who a “good citizen” is have changed. Nowadays, young people still consider 
obeying the law the most important civic duty, but at the same time seem to rate 
e.g. community engagement as equally important as voting and even more 
important than partisanship (e.g. Haste/ Hogan 2006; Lister et al. 2003; Torney-
Purta et al. 2001). The underlying conclusion of this contested concept is that 
what citizenship stands for should be left to the citizen under examination (Haste/ 
Hogan 2006). In this context, Torney- Purta and Klandl Richardson explored 
anticipated future civic engagement. They looked at how adolescents’ 
conceptualisations of a “good citizen” can be predicted by various contextual 
factors of political socialisation; those predictor variables include school-related 
(political information, political efficacy), family-related (political discussions 
with parents (and peers), trust in the government), and organisation-related (pre-
adult activities) (Torney-Purta/ Klandl Richardson 2004: 51). The authors can 
show that depending on different strengths of these factors a different outcome in 
anticipated civic engagement can be predicted: they find that informed voting is 
highly influenced by school-related factors as well as political discussions at 
home, whereas a high interest in current politics predicts future partisanship, 
volunteering in the local community is highly influenced by everyday experiences 
and a high level of perceived efficacy, and protesting is highly encouraged by 
political discussions with parents.  
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people do not follow the strict distinction between the political and moral or 
social spheres that is common in the political sciences. Ekman and Amnå 
(2009) developed or revised a typology in order to “map [...] the totality of 
different types [emphasis in the original] of political and civic participation” 
(Ekman/ Amnå 2009: 15). Furthermore, the authors introduced the 
distinction between non-participation and participation, distinguishing 
within the latter between pre-political and manifest forms of action, and 
added the category of attention as a necessary pre-condition for action. 
 
 Figure 1.: Previous Empirical Studies on Civic Engagement 
Source: Author’s Own Presentation 
 
 
3.2 MOTIVATION AND MORAL VALUES 
 
Although the typology presented above suggests something different, 
empirical studies on civic engagement tend to answer the question why 
young people do not engage rather than the question why they become 
engaged. Motivation research has identified three areas of political 
participation: some are more value-orientated (ideology: “conventional 
(political)”, i.e. voting behaviour, partisanship, political discussions etc.), 
some are more action-orientated (issue/ concern: “civic”, i.e. helping the 
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community, engagement in a social movement4 etc. or “make one’s voice 
heard”, i.e. protest etc.) (Haste/ Hogan 2006: 480).  
Berger suggests an alternative approach and conceptualizes motivation 
in the context of individual moral development. In his theoretical paper he 
maintains that research must consider the motivation for engagement and 
argues in favour of submerging “civic engagement” into political, social or 
moral forms of engagement; he calls the very merging of social and moral 
engagement into social-moral engagement “civil” (Berger 2009). This is to 
elaborate a clear distinction between the various forms in which individuals 
can become engaged in, with or by something (Berger 2009: 340). Yet, as 
Bruter and Harrison empirical study5 (2009) shows, it is not so easy to link 
the different theoretical concepts of motivation with a particular form of civic 
engagement. Motivation for civic engagement affects an individual’s belief 
system as well as the particular situation in which the activity takes place. 
Berger, however, does not give hints on how to determine these aspects. Yet 
research on motivation based on survey data cannot answer the question 
whether political interest, “civic awareness” (Haste/ Hogan 2006) or 
“sensitivity” (Ekman/ Amnå 2009) lead to civic action or vice versa or, in 
other words, “[whether] sensitisation [is] a consequence of pre-existing 
socio-political or moral values and action patterns, or sensitisation [does] 
arise from some personal experience that engages the individual and then 
extends the domain of concerns” (Haste/ Hogan 2006: 490). The major 
critique of Berger’s approach is that he left the relationship of the latter 
(political participation) with the two former (non-participation and civil 
participation) dimensions unclear (Ekman/ Amnå 2009: 18). 
And I would like to add a further point of criticism here: Berger mentions 
that some people might act according to “indefensible [for democratic 
citizens] moral codes [e.g. extremist of all kinds]” (Berger 2009: 343). He 
only implicitly claims that moral values, as he understands them, are not 
universal, but distinctively democratic, “relating to moral principles such as 
toleration, reciprocity and law-abidingness” (ibid.). What does this mean for 
                                                             
4  “Engagement in a social movement” is considered as informal political activity 
elsewhere (Ekman/ Amnå 2009).  
5  In their empirical study on party activists they identified three different types of 
activists: moral-, social-, and professional-minded.  
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empirical research on engagement in a non-democratic context, as the 
present study is going to do?6 
 
 
3.3 RESOURCES FOR CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 
 
A third line of research is concerned with the concrete resources an 
individual has at his or her disposal. But why are those so important to 
investigate? The empirical answer those studies give is that not only do 
different kinds of participation put different demands on the participant but, 
as Verba et al. (1995) pointed out, this will lead to different people engaging 
in different kinds of acts, and, according to Klandermans, with different 
“motivational dynamics” (Klandermans 2004: 361). Within this line of 
research, researchers put emphasis on the relationship between civic 
engagement and different variables, mainly previous engagement and social 
capital:  
 
Previous engagement Quintelier explored the relationship between 
previous memberships in various voluntary associations–cultural, deliberate, 
help organisations vs. expressive, religious-ethic or youth organisations–
,particular skills acquired in such associations and different forms of political 
participation (Quintelier 2008: 362). Summarising, Quintelier defined civic 
engagement as the “socialisation of attitudes [i.e. decision-making, political 
efficacy, social trust] and skills [deliberation, compromise, cooperation]” 
(Quintelier 2008: 356-7). She distinguished between “traditional” and 
“civic” forms of engagement as well as “political consumerism” (Quintelier 
2008: 359).7 Either way, Quintelier found that the type of organisation in 
which one participates matters as much as the number of the individual’s 
                                                             
6  Möller (2016) suggested–similar to the present study–to change to perspective 
and to ask about how the social actors make sense of their engagement. 
7  Yet the distinction (if there is one) between those forms seems arbitrary here; 
according to the typology developed by Ekman/ Amnå, all three forms suggested 
by Quintelier contain activities of manifest (formal and informal) political 
participation. Besides, it is important to note that the direction of relationship is 
unclear, i.e. whether membership in a voluntary association facilitates political 
participation or vice versa. 
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actual memberships in organisations as well as the skills that members are 
able to develop during their activities; all of these factors influence the 
various forms of political participation.  
 
Social capital Putnam’s influential study (2000) about social capital and 
political participation, his conclusions about declining social capital in the 
U.S. and the ensuing discussion about democracy at stake, introduced a new 
concept under an old name. In contrast to Bourdieu’s concept (e.g. Bourdieu 
1986), Putnam’s social capital consists of three main components: the moral 
obligation to participate, social trust as an underlying condition that, again, 
is provided by individuals’ social networks as more or less institutionalised 
opportunity structures. However, Putnam’s work and particularly his 
concept of social capital, or rather its theoretical shortcomings, have 
provoked highly controversial critique; among the most severely criticised 
points was Putnam’s conception of social capital as producing an entirely 
positive outcome (Braun 2001). Thus, a research line concentrating on the 
relationship between political participation (in its manifest and latent 
dimensions) and social capital (e.g. Teney and Hanquinet 2012; Berger 2009; 
Braun 2001) rather applies Bourdieu’s concept.8  
Bjørnskov (2006) proposed that different forms of social capital should 
lead to different forms of political participation, mediated by factors like 
socio-economic status (SES). Building on this, Teney and Hanquinet (2012) 
identified six types of social capital, which they connected to very different 
types of political participation. As expected, those with various social 
contacts also highly participated in all kinds of activities of manifest as well 
as latent forms (Teney and Hanquinet 2012: 9). However, the result that 
astonished the authors most was that another group with mainly one-
dimensional contacts, above all within a religious community, also showed 
                                                             
8  Interestingly, in contrast to empirical studies on civic engagement of “citizens”, 
research on the engagement of immigrants rather employs a social capital 
approach based on Putnam’s work about the “civic community” (e.g. Putnam 
2000; Putnam et al., 1994). Many empirical studies on the subject build on the 
work of Fennema/ Tillie (e.g. Fennema/ Tillie, 1999; 2001; Tillie 2004) about 
immigrant political participation in Amsterdam and test the “amount of ‘ethnic’ 
social capital (participation in ethnic associational life)” (Jacobs/ Tillie, 2004: 
419) of a certain ethnic minority. 
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high numbers in political participation, yet again mainly within a religious 
community (Teney/ Hanquinet 2012: 10). Besides, the latter showed little 
hints to activities of latent forms of participation (ibid.). La Due Lake and 
Huckfeldt also started from a critique of Putnam’s “excessive focus on 
organisational involvement and its consequences for the production of social 
capital” (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998: 582). They concluded that 
“social capital [is] a by-product of social interactions [with other people who 
are similarly engaged] that enhances individual civic capacity and political 
expertise, thereby allowing individuals to become more fully engaged in 
politics” (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998: 581-2). Besides they find that 
these interactions produce certain types of “politically relevant” social 
capital “because of the expertise of discussants, the frequency of political 
discussion, and network size” (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998: 583). 
 
 
3.4 IMMIGRANTS AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 
 
As shown in the previous sections, certain predispositions (i.e. motivation) 
and resources are considered major conditions for becoming engaged. Verba 
et al. (1995) employ a third necessary condition: the moment of recruitment. 
With regard to the political participation of immigrants, de Rooij added the 
dimension of “integration” and immigration-specific features, in particular 
patterns of mobilisation and time of residence (de Rooij 2012: 455). 
Accordingly, she stated that immigrants become engaged in conventional 
rather than unconventional and low rather than high-cost activities (de Rooij 
2012: 457). 
 
Structural factors But with regard to immigrants, one must consider not 
only individual but also structural factors, the most important one being 
citizenship. Bäck and Soininen (1998) considered an individual’s citizenship 
status as the main reason for “significant exclusion” of immigrants from 
political participation (e.g. also Schönwälder et al. 2011). With regard to 
conventional political engagement, i.e. party activism, one approach is what 
Bird (2003) coined “descriptive representation” and refers to the role of 
political parties in selecting immigrant candidates. She studied ethnic 
minorities on the macro- + micro-levels as well as additional factors and 
found that a candidate’s selection depends on several factors: supply-side + 
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demand-side + ethnic voting behaviour + the individual level of integration 
+ practices of consociational accommodation + the electoral system. 
Sobolewska (2013) added that legal structure, ideological climate and intra-
party organisation or party strategies also have to be considered. 
 
Resources or capital? Verba et al. (1995) referred to (social) capital as 
a resource for civic engagement.9 Empirical studies on civic and political 
engagement employ not only social, but also other forms of capital as 
distinguished by Bourdieu (e.g. 1983). On the basis of a former study, which 
showed that “that Irish political parties made minimal efforts to attract the 
support of immigrant voters and did little or nothing to encourage these to 
become party members” (Fanning/ O’Boyle 2010: 417), in a follow-up study 
Fanning/ O’Boyle explored “individual motivations for political 
participation, status factors (i.e. residency/ citizenship) and finally, how 
social capital interacts and combines with other forms of capital (human and 
cultural capital) in affecting the political agency of immigrants” (Fanning/ 
O’Boyle 2010: 418). They employed the term “socio-political capital” 
(ibid.), based on Bourdieu’s concept of capital, in order to “reflect the 
interrelationship of these various forms of capital” (ibid.).10 Besides the 
influence of political socialisation on the development of a “distinct political 
habitus” of the immigrant candidate interviewees, the authors found that a 
candidate’s social relationships, especially “outside the community of origin, 
would foster political participation” (Fanning/ O’Boyle 2010: 433; cf. also 
Softic 2016).  
 
                                                             
9  Anthias (2007) argues in favour of using the term “capital” over the term 
“resource” with regard to the “mobilisability” of the former across borders and 
contexts. 
10  As examined here, it includes the educational qualifications of respondents and 
their socio-economic status; prior political socialisation; membership of 
immigrant and Irish organisations; and religiosity (Fanning/ O’Boyle 2010: 419). 
 




In the present chapter I will describe the process of data collection and data 
analysis in the present study.  
 
When I approached the potential interviewees, I explained to them that I 
would be interested in their story about how they had become engaged. I did 
not explicitly say, however, that I approached them because of their 
connection to the Yisra’el Beitenu party; but made the engagement with IB 
as well as public discourse about the party and its political leader, Lieberman, 
an issue in the interview itself. In the interviews, I used this framework as 
guiding questions or rather topics that I would adjust to the course of the 
interview and in the process of data collection, if necessary. However, I 
asked every interviewee an opening question (cf. Schuetze 1983): “Please 
tell me how you have become engaged [further, depending on the current 
engagement of the participant] in your community, with the students’ 
council, with IB, etc.”. 
The empirical data is mainly based on in-depth interviews about civic 
engagement in general, and engagement with the Yisra’el Beitenu party in 
particular.1 Besides, I collected context data that I also have included into the 
analysis: material from the Yisra’el Beitenu party’s 2009 electoral campaign, 
material from the party’s official website in English, Russian and Hebrew 
(newsfeed, the party programme, screenshots of their website), newspaper 
articles on FSU immigrants and on the Yisra’el Beitenu party, information 
obtained from informal interviews and talks, fragments of discussions in 
                                                             
1  All the names in this work were made anonymous, unless marked otherwise. 
However, I tried to keep the original “sound” and chose names accordingly. 
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social media on the Yisra’el Beitenu party and Israeli politics, workshop and 
conference proceedings on the Israeli society.  
 
 
4.1 THEORETICAL SAMPLING OF THE DATA 
 
Before I started the actual fieldwork in June 2009, I had made contacts with 
two young political activists in Israel through a colleague who herself had 
immigrated to Germany from the former Soviet Union as a child. One of 
these activists referred me directly to a member of the IB Knesset faction 
(Max), the other contact referred me to a former activist of the party who had 
been engaged on the local level (Nitsan). After initial contact with potential 
interviewees, I proceeded via the snowball system-approach and asked the 
interviewees whether they could forward me to further people affiliated with 
the party. Through Max I reached out to Katya, Ilan and Ljuba, who were all 
parliamentary assistants to Knesset members of the IB faction.  
Furthermore, I directly contacted party representatives on different 
levels: national (member(s) and the party’s secretary general)2 as well as 
local representatives.3 Figure 2 shows the sample of interviewees.  
When I contacted people in the party’s local or central administration 
over the phone, I asked them to connect me to young Russian-speaking 
Israelis who are actively involved in political or civic activities in the 
framework of the party. In most cases, I was rejected; in other cases, people 
agreed to meet me in person or referred me to potential interviewees. In 
Haifa, the local representative declined my request because she could not 
think of anyone who would meet the profile. Yet the most successful way to 
find interviewees was through mutual friends or acquaintances. I obtained 
the contacts through a personal network of colleagues in Israel or such 
colleagues with contacts in Israel.   
                                                             
2  Members of the Knesset were listed according to their party affiliation on the 
parliamentary website. 
3  For this purpose, I used the section “Our people in the city” on the official IB 
party website (Partija “Yisra’el Beitenu” (“Our House Israel”) 2013); besides, I 
contacted student cells of the party within the students’ councils at the 
Universities of Haifa and Tel Aviv. 
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 Figure 2: The Sample 
Source: Author’s Own Presentation  
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This went surprisingly very well. However, after giving it some thought, I 
reached two conclusions. On the one hand, I am certain that being referred 
to a friend was a sign of trust toward me that is not to be underestimated. 
This also explains, at least partly, why my request was more commonly 
rejected on the phone. On the other hand, I realised that the party officials 
had become increasingly confident about their political position after the 
2009 electoral success of the party and its inclusion in Netanyahu’s 
governing coalition.  
Micha, a local IB representative from Ma’ale Adumim–one of the largest 
Jewish settle-ments in the West Bank, near Jerusalem–, for instance, agreed 
to meet me after I had contacted him through a local police officer, the 
husband of an acquainted Ph.D. student at the Hebrew University. At short 
notice, Micha set up a meeting with the secretary general of the party in 
Jerusalem. That meeting in particular opened many, many doors since the 
secretary general functioned as one of the gate-keepers in the present study; 
among other things, it paved the way to the local party branches in Natserat 
Illit and Ari’el (another large settlement in the northern part of the West 
Bank). 
The participants I had interviewed in 2009 lived all across the country: 
in Bat Yam near Tel Aviv (Katya, parliamentary assistant), in Ashdod, i.e. 
in the south, close to the Gaza Strip (Ilan, parliamentary assistant), in Haifa 
(Nitsan, who founded his own political party after leaving IB), in Jerusalem 
(Ljuba, parliamentary assistant) and in Ari’el (Max, member of the Knesset, 
Ben, member of the student’s council at Ari’el University). Additionally, I 
had the chance to interview Viktoria, Dima, and Rafi — three party activists 
who were not engaged with IB but with the Shinui party (Viktoria, whom I 
had “found” through the student’s council of Tel Aviv University), or the 
Likud (Dima, a friend of Viktoria’s, and Rafi, Ben’s roommate at Ari’el 
college).  
In 2010, I concentrated on Haifa, where I spoke with young people who 
would regularly visit a youth club in the Hadar neighbourhood of Haifa. I 
got in touch with these young people through local colleagues during my 
time as a visiting scholar at Haifa University (e.g. Boris and Emmanuel, IB 
voters, and Zeev, a local activist). The Natserat Illit contacts were established 
thanks to the help of Denis (e.g. Avi, Vicky, Igal, Zhenja—local activists). 
In particular during my second field trip, data collection and analysis 
were geared to the principles of theoretical sampling and of minimal and 
The Data Material | 45 
 
maximal contrasting (e.g. Glaser/ Strauss 2010; Kelle 2005), which Glaser 
and Strauss suggest for data organisation. When I had entered the field, I had 
just a vague research interest in 2009 and started to analyse the first 
interviews with open coding. Moreover, I began to read about previous 
research on civic engagement. The focus of my analysis was still on the 
individual stories about ways into civic engagement, which differed 
depending on the proximity of the interviewees to the organisational centre 
of the party: based on the first circle of coding I assumed that those closer to 
the centre had come from previous political engagement, while those further 
away from the centre had been more concerned with community or social 
issues. Thus, when I returned to the field about ten months later, I conducted 
interviews according to the following criteria of minimal and maximal 
contrasting with regard to the interviewees’ engagement with the Yisra’el 
Beitenu party:  
 
• active v. passive political engagement, 
• formal v. informal political engagement, 
• party work on national v. local level, 
• party office-holder vs. voluntary engagement, 
• engaged with IB v. other political party. 
 
However, I was not able to satisfy the theoretical sampling completely; and 
the reasons for this are twofold. For one thing, it was due to difficulties in 
respect of limited time and money for the data collection, especially in view 
of the geographical distance, secondly, there was the problem of the 
availability of potential interviewees during field phases. As mentioned 
above, in some areas or cities there were just not (enough) young people 
engaged within the framework of the party. Aleks, a local IB office holder in 
Natserat Illit, was the only (young) person I was able to establish contact 
with on the regional level, and he did not agree to an interview. As a result, 
I was not able to fill the matrix with interviewees who hold a party office on 
a local level. 
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4.2 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF  
THE INTERVIEWEES 
 
I conducted 29 interviews with young Israelis (aged 18-29) with an FSU 
family background. Most of them had immigrated as children (the then oldest 
interviewee immigrated to Israel at the age of 11) from the former Soviet 
Union. Igal’s parents — he was one of the two interviewees who were born 
in the country to immigrants from FSU countries — had come to Israel as 
early as in the 1980s, thus in a previous immigration wave from the Soviet 
Union.4 The interviewees form two groups: one, which is actively involved 
in party work and one, which in its mainly local engagement is only loosely 
connected to an IB representative.  
 
Previous civic engagement Civic engagement often serves as the 
starting point for engagement in general and political engagement in 
particular. In accordance with previous empirical studies, engagement with 
the Yisra’el Beitenu party is rarely the starting point for active engagement. 
Only a small minority among the participants had not been actively engaged 
prior to their IB engagement. If the interviewees were engaged before, it was 
in one of the following scenarios:  
 
1. formal engagement 
• ideological membership: Zionist institutions or youth movements (Vicky), 
• students’ council (Max), 
 
2. informal engagement 
• community work (Ilan, Katya).  
 
Recruitment Various empirical studies (e.g. de Rooij 2012; Verba et al. 
1995) have pointed to the fact that most engaged people have become 
recruited at a certain point. This is also true for the interviewees in the present 
study. Based on the analysis of the interview material, I interpret this moment 
of recruitment a little broader and included not only those interviewees who 
were approached by a particular person, but also those cases of rather indirect 
                                                             
4  For more details on this wave, see e.g. Beizer 2005 
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ways of recruitment, e.g. a job offer in the course of which the interviewees 
actively entered the IB framework. 
 
Generally, the interviewees described two main ways of becoming engaged 
with the party. Either they had been active before in one way or another and 
had been recruited by an IB representative on the basis of these activities. On 
the local level, those who recruited them were people already active in the 
party, very close to the interviewees in their everyday lives–e.g. friends 
(Nitsan) or kin (Igal, Lukas, Vicky, Igal, Avi)–, and had asked for help with 
a certain issue. This kind of recruitment is of very informal character, it is 
often not ideological but rather a gesture of friendship and mutual support. 
In contrast, on the national party level it was rather a Yisra’el Beitenu 
party official who could win the individual over. The usual pattern of 
recruitment here is to get to know to an IB representative through working 
on a specific project (Ilan, Max, Katya). Recruitment on the national level 
occurred in a much more formal way. While the first contact with a party 
official might have happened on the interviewee’s initiative, it served the 
interests of the party at the same time, namely their readiness to actively look 
for new members. Bagno5 pointed out that the party was actively looking for 
young activists in various societal fields and on various societal levels in 
order to recruit them as members and by these means used the trust these 
activists gained in their communities for its own political purposes. 
 
Operation Cast Lead (2009) and the Gaza flotilla raid (2010) My 
field trips took place shortly after or coincided with these events, so, 
occasionally the interviewees referred to them in their line of argument; and 
they were also widely discussed in (the) (social) media. That is why I shortly 
outline them here. The military operation Cast Lead against Hamas in Gaza 
started at the end of December 2008 and ended in January 2009, only three 
weeks before the general elections for the 18th Knesset. Its declared goal was 
to stop rockets being fired from the Gaza strip to the south of Israel. In the 
aftermath of these events, the United Nations launched the Goldstone report, 
which in Israel was regarded as one-sided because it accused the country of 
disproportionately condoning civil casualties. 
                                                             
5  Olena Bagno. Informal Meeting at City University New York City (CUNY), New 
York City. (December 30, 2011), author’s own notes 
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The Gaza flotilla was a political campaign which started from Turkey: 
Six ships were heading for the Gaza strip in May 2010. While the participants 
claimed to be taking relief supplies to the civilians in Gaza, Israel suspected 
them of delivering weapons for Hamas. When they entered Israeli territorial 
waters, the ships were demanded to leave by Israeli military. When they did 
not, IDF entered the ships: on one of them at least four people were killed 
through gunshot. The incident caused a long-term deterioration of Turkish-
Israeli diplomatic relations (cf. Schiftan 2010; Pedatzur 2010). 
 
Narrative style As mentioned above, the interviews are conceptualised as 
discursive practice. Against this background, I will be able to show how the 
interviewees use their narratives to turn to an invisible audience. This means, 
at times, not the interviewer is the partner in the current communication, but 
an imagined, absent partner is addressed. This must be understood as an 
argumentative strategy and thus serves a purpose. 
At the same time, I had to consider that for the interviewees it would not 
be the first time that they told their life stories or parts of them. Thus, talking 
about one’s life in a particular way, emphasising parts and leaving out others, 
has to be regarded as actively taking part in the reproduction or modification 
of discourse (Schäfer/ Völter 2005). 
 
Cross-cultural communication and power relations Last but not 
least, I would like to reflect on power relations in the context of the 
interviews (e.g. Ebert/ Okamoto 2015; Lomsky-Feder/ Rapoport 2003). I 
approached the interviewees in Hebrew, but left it open to switch to Russian 
if requested. Occasionally, I felt that this caused irritation due to the foreign 
accent I had, and I was urged quite often to tell my personal story of interest 
in the issue in order to win the (potential) interviewee’s trust. I do not think, 
however, that the fact that I was a foreigner was the reason for some of them 
to decline to tell their story. On the contrary, it may have particularly invoked 
their interest. During the interviews themselves, I often had the impression 
that the interviewees felt urged to explain something they had said in more 
detail to me, assuming I would not know—and often I really did not. The 
form of explanation they delivered ranged from adding details in a neutral 
way, so I would understand the matter, through flirting with me, through 
considering me as a collaborator, i.e. using my European or German descent 
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as a strategy to make an argument, to patronising me about how things work 
in Israeli society. 
Language often did help; however, it did not always do so (e.g. Kruse et 
al. 2012). On the one hand, both the interviewees and I had various languages 
at our disposal to choose from if something was incomprehensible or if a 
term was missing. The interviewees made massive use of it, especially when 
speaking about everyday life: though they usually had a very high level of 
Hebrew, they referred to very familiar things, things of daily routine, in 
Russian. Yet sometimes, the interviewees felt the need to explain things in 
English instead, perhaps because they had not an adequate, more 
understandable way to describe these things. 
 
 
4.3 CODES AND CATEGORIES 
 
As suggested, I started the analysis as soon as I had collected the first data 
and developed more detailed questions based on open coding in order to 
apply and adjust them in the process. As a very first step, I organised the 
material according to topics that either the interviewees would bring up or 
that I had brought up by asking about an issue. I used those topics as in vivo 
codes. The interviewees spoke about their personal experiences, growing up 
in families with an immigrant background, individual and collectively shared 
difficulties in the process and their individual ways of coping with those 
difficulties and about their military service as a central experience. In the 
process of open coding, I had developed first hypotheses about how young 
people become involved. 
Yet I also found that the interviewees did not speak as much about their 
engagement as about their views on Israeli society and their own place in it 
– in other words, that they constantly referred to the macro-level, e.g. to 
cultural codes and to public discourse. Besides, I needed to extend the 
paradigm in such a way that it would be possible to include the role of 
discourse. 
A second step in the process of coding was to approach the material with 
axial coding, as a way to organise the codes into categories and to fill those 
categories with empirical content by ascribing features to them, which in turn 
are based on the data or the codes. Axial coding is rather abstract thinking, 
aiming at systematisation of the preliminary findings and putting them into  
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 Figure 3.: Category: Identification 
Source: Author’s Own Presentation   
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a relation (Breuer 2010: 284). Figure 3 shows an example of categories, as 
developed during the coding process.  
When I approached the material that way, I hypothesised that the 
interviewees use talking about their civic engagement as a strategy to justify 
their particular view of Israeli citizenship. This version of citizenship, in turn, 
exactly as I assumed at that point, seemed to serve to give them a sense of 
belonging. During further analysis, I found more and more hints that my 
assumption might be right; I had found my key category: belonging.  
At this point at the latest, Strauss’s coding paradigm alone was no longer 
helpful. In order to grasp those references to the macro-level, I decided to 
extend Strauss’s coding paradigm because I felt that the concentration on the 
conditions, strategies of action, individual actions, and the outcome of those 








In Pierre Bourdieu’s overall conception of human action I have found a 
useful basis to identify the dimensions of empirical analysis. The present 
chapter aims at providing a theoretical-operational framework for the 
analysis of the interview material in order to find answers to the questions 
raised in the introductory chapter. At the end of the chapter, I will suggest an 
integrated framework of Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts as an extension of 
Strauss’s coding paradigm. Yet at the same time it is more than this: namely 
an alternative different approach to immigrant adaptation from the angle of 
the immigrants’ “subjective positioning”, which recognises the individual as 
actively constructing their sense of belonging. This does not mean that the 
structural factors of immigrant adaptation will be left out; on the contrary, I 
suggest a holistic approach here. 
 
 
5.1 BOURDIEU’S CULTURAL THEORY OF ACTION 
 
Bourdieu’s central themes circle around the issues of an individual’s 
belonging, or, sense of place, legitimisation, and symbolic power. His 
sociological thinking has been described, depending on the purpose the 
various authors claim for using Bourdieu’s ideas, for example as an 
“economy of practices” (Smart 1993: 388), a “dispositional philosophy of 
action” (Savage/ Silva 2013: 112), or as a means for the analysis of social 
inequalities and the “subtle inculcation of power relations” (McNay 1999: 
99). Bourdieu’s social actors, actively (re-)produce the social world they live 
in. In his overall work, Pierre Bourdieu developed five interconnected 
concepts in order to understand and analyse the relation between the 
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individual and society, between subjective and objective structures.1 This 
notion is nicely described with the formula “[habitus x capital] + field = 
practice” (Bourdieu 1987: 175).  
In order to make Bourdieu’s rather theoretical concepts applicable as 
categories for the analysis of interview material, I suggest here to integrate 
Bourdieu’s concepts with methodological approaches from discourse 
analysis. The objective structures are grasped analytically with the help of a 
sociology of knowledge approach to discourse (SKAD) (e.g. Keller 2011a); 
SKAD particularly takes into consideration collectively shared knowledge, 
e.g. in the form of patterns of interpretation. Social practice is understood as 
discursive practice and analysed with reference to Helen Haste’s lay theory 
approach (Haste 1992). Among other things Haste emphasises the impact the 
situational context has on the individual’s argumentative strategies. 
In the following, I will briefly discuss Bourdieu’s concepts with regard 
to my research interest and suggest an operational framework to (re-) 
integrate these concepts with different approaches from discourse studies. 
 
5.1.1 Social Space and Symbolic Order 
 
Social space, i.e. a given society, is the entity of objective structures or 
cultural codes. Lamont and Lareau define culture as “institutionalised, i.e. 
widely shared, high status cultural signals (attitudes, preferences, formal 
knowledge, behaviours, goals and credentials), used for social and cultural 
exclusion” (Lamont/ Lareau 1988: 156). Individual “sets of properties” 
(Bourdieu 1985: 724) constitute the social world (Bourdieu 1985: 723). 
Social actors are positioned within these objective structures along 
dimensions of the accumulation of capital, in particular the overall amount 
of capital, its composition of the various forms of capital, as well as 
individual trajectories or past experiences (Bourdieu 1986; also Atkinson 
2010: 2). Against the background of their objective position in a given social 
space, individuals develop a set of dispositions to act, reflecting the “central 
structural elements (political instability, kinship rules, and so on) of their 
society” (Nash 1999: 185). These dispositions guide the individual’s social 
                                                             
1  According to Silva and Warde, Bourdieu most systematically integrated these 
concepts in his Réponses pour une anthropologie réflexive (Bourdieu/ Wacquant 
1996), (Silva/ Warde 2010: 5). 
A Coding Paradigm of Belonging | 55 
 
interaction. Through their actions they “necessarily reproduce those 
structural elements although in a modified form” (Nash 1999: 185). 
Accordingly, Bourdieu conceives the social space as a “space of 
relationships” (Bourdieu 1985: 725) between social actors. In other words, 
the material order of possession of relevant forms of capital mirrors the 
symbolic order of power relations in that given society (Bourdieu 1985: 723). 
The relationships between social actors in a particular social space are 
determined by the distribution of power among them: the composition of an 
individual’s capital, his or her resources, determine his or her objective 
position in a given society. Their objective position, again, determines their 
“chances of achieving legitimation” (Crossley 2001: 85). The social group 
in power, in turn, determines which forms of capital are considered valuable 
at a certain time, i.e. what kind of composition of an individual’s capital is 
required for achieving a legitimate objective position to exercise power. 
Members of a given society usually do not question this power. It is rather 
generally accepted as a means of guidance about what is regarded legitimate 
and valuable by those social groups—Bourdieu rather speaks of social 
classes in order to emphasise the relative stability of a given social 
hierarchy—who are more distant from power.  
 
5.1.2 Forms of Capital 
 
The concept of capital is central in Bourdieu’s theoretical framework of 
social action; and it has already been mentioned with regard to social space. 
Depending on its particular form, capital needs to be individually acquired, 
or embodied, over time rather than being transmitted directly within the 
family.2 Accordingly, Bourdieu speaks of capital as “accumulated history” 
(Bourdieu 1986: 183). The accumulation of capital occurs against the 
background of an individual’s “respective distance [...] from the realm of 
material necessity” (Crossley 2001: 85). In other words, an individual needs 
to have the time and opportunity to accumulate non-economic forms of 
capital. In this context, Prieur and Savage speak in this regard of capital as 
“accumulated advantage” (Prieur and Savage 2011: 569). In order to 
illustrate this, Bourdieu compares the social world to a game (e.g. Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1996 [1992]): the amount and composition of a social actor’s 
                                                             
2  The exception from this rule is economic capital. 
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capital—one’s stakes in the game—defines one’s chances to pursue one’s 
interest of improving one’s objective position in a given society (Bourdieu 
1985: 724). This means the composition of a social actor’s capital gains 
particular importance in a concrete field; here, capital is both the product of 
and the resource for individual agency (Bourdieu/ Wacquant 1996 [1992]: 
129). It is important to mention here that social actors, according to 
Bourdieu, do not see what they do as a game as such, as something they are 
not necessarily involved in, but as a meaningful and important (Bourdieu/ 
Wacquant 1996 [1992]: 148). 
Bourdieu distinguishes four forms of capital: economic, cultural, social, 
and symbolic; to a certain degree each of them can be converted into the 
other forms (Bourdieu 1986; Siisiainen 2003):3 
 
Cultural capital Cultural capital—or “Informationskapital [informa-tional 
capital]”, as Bourdieu refers to it from a backward perspective (Bourdieu/ 
Wacquant 1996 [1992]: 151)—is closely linked to formal and informal 
education both in Bourdieu’s writing and the concept’s application in 
empirical studies. Cultural capital is divided into its three sub-forms: 
inherited or embodied (e.g. particular cultural skills and knowledge), 
objectified (e.g. school certificates), and institutionalised (e.g. titles) cultural 
capital (Bourdieu 1986). It involves particular cultural competencies, skills, 
and habits, cumulating into “the cultivated naturalness” of particular social 
classes (Bourdieu 1987). Thus, cultural capital is by definition a struggle 
over cultural codes, over “legitimate culture” (Prieur/ Savage 2011: 568).  
Critics mainly refer to ambiguities and gaps in Bourdieu’s notion of 
cultural capital. Lamont and Lareau describe the development of the concept 
in Bourdieu’s writings: being introduced as an “informal [...] competence” 
(Lamont/ Lareau 1988: 155), through being an institutionalised feature, 
mirrored in the possession of formal knowledge e.g. in the form of diploma 
                                                             
3  In the empirical literature, in different research contexts further, sub-forms of 
capital have been introduced: e.g. “socio-political capital” (Fanning et al. 2010) 
in the context of political opportunity structures for immigrant candidates in 
Ireland, or “discursive capital” as suggested by Gavriely-Nuri (2012) studying 
“cultural codes” in Israel. However, I agree with Smart (1993) to reduce the 
operationalisation of existing forms of capital to the basic forms Bourdieu had 
suggested in order to prevent confusion. 
A Coding Paradigm of Belonging | 57 
 
(ibid.), then becoming an “indicator and basis of class position [...] being 
mobilized for social selection” (ibid.), and finally becoming “a power 
resource” (ibid.). In this context Kingston criticises that, due to the vagueness 
and ambiguity of the concept, “too many conceptually distinct variables have 
come to be placed under the big umbrella of cultural capital, creating a 
distorted sense of what accounts for academic success” (Kingston 2001: 89). 
Finally, Bennett and Silva argue that in particular cultural capital became 
practically applicable only after Bourdieu had added a specification of the 
sub-forms of cultural capital (cf. Bennett/ Silva 2011). In order to deal with 
these points of criticism, Lareau and Weininger stress that Bourdieu’s 
concept of (embodied) cultural capital contains particular “techniques and 
‘skills’” (Lareau/ Weininger 2003: 593), or, as Edgerton and Roberts put it, 
“adaptive cultural and social competencies” AND the “possession of relevant 
intellectual and social skills” (Edgerton/ Roberts 2014: 4). In a similar vein, 
Erel applies migrants’ cultural capital as “adaptive [...] competencies”: “first, 
migrants do not only unpack cultural capital from their rucksacks, instead 
they create new forms of cultural capital in the countries of residence. They 
use resources they brought with them and others they develop in situ to create 
quite distinct dispositions. Second, migrants engage in creating mechanisms 
of validation for their cultural capital” (Erel 2010: 649) “as capital alternative 
or oppositional to frameworks of national belonging” (Erel 2010: 643). 
 
Social capital According to Bourdieu, social capital is “the aggregate of 
the actual and potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable 
network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition—or, in other words, to membership in a 
group—which provides each of its members with the backing of the 
collectively owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the 
various senses of the word” (Bourdieu 1986: 51; see also Smart 1993).  
As mentioned above, most empirical studies employing the concept of 
social capital refer to Putnam’s version. While Putnam constructs social 
capital, in particular the aspect of social trust in social relationships, as a 
necessary dimension for social integration, Bourdieu uses the concept, 
together with other forms of capital, to describe social conflict (e.g. also 
Siisiainen 2003; Braun 2001).  
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Symbolic capital Symbolic capital can be translated into social prestige or 
standing—as an individual, but also as a would-be member of a particular 
social group. The purpose of symbolic capital is to produce a “meaningful 
distinction” or legitimate social hierarchy, and the question of what is 
legitimate is subject to constant social struggle (Bourdieu 1986; 1985). This 
form of capital in particular is linked to collectively shared cultural codes; 
these codes define the possession and composition of other forms of capital 
that an individual needs to transform these into symbolic capital (Bourdieu/ 
Wacquant 1996 [1992]: 146). The general recognition of the value of 
symbolic capital is a prerequisite for the transformation of other forms of 
capital into symbolic capital. Over time, as culture may change, the particular 
composition of symbolic capital may change. The direct link to a concrete 
cultural context reveals, or, rather, puts a veil on the arbitrariness of who has 




Bourdieu introduces the concept of habitus in order to bridge the 
conceptional gap between the abstract notion of society and the individual 
that actually lives in that society. The individual’s objective position in social 
space—the social and cultural context—deeply influence his or her ways of 
perceiving the social world. From Bourdieu’s cultural perspective, the 
process of an individual’s socialisation is the “situated internalisation of 
cultural schemes” (Edgerton/ Roberts 2014: 15), of embodied experiences 
connected to this position. By linking objective and subjective structures, 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is able to put individual action into context: 
habitus refers both to an individual and a collective history (Bourdieu 1986; 
see also Reay 2004; Webb et al. 2002; Nash 1999; for empirical examples 
see Rapoport/ Lomsky-Feder 2002; Reay 1997). In the process of 
socialisation, the individual generates power resources (habitual 
dispositions, including the different forms of capital) in the various fields of 
social interaction; these power resources, again, can be mobilised later on in 
current fields of action. Habitus is an “objective opportunity structure” 
(Bourdieu 1985: 726-7), an “interplay between [an individual’s] past and 
present” (Reay 2004: 434), and at the same time it structures what an 
individual expects of his or her future through “embodied structures of 
expectation” (Edgerton/ Roberts 2014: 7). Bourdieu developed his idea of 
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the habitus providing social actors with a “practical sense” (Bourdieu/ 
Wacquant 1996 [1992]: 154) as a critique of the overly intellectual 
conception of human action (Bourdieu/ Wacquant 1996 [1992]: 153; see also 
Edgerton/ Roberts 2014; Crossley 2001). In contrast to assumptions made by 
Rational Choice Theorists, for instance, habitual dispositions guide 
individual actions as an underlying, mainly unconscious basis. As Sweetman 
put it: “as the embodiment of social structure, habitus allows us to act” 
(Sweetman 2003: 532). 
As a reply to critics who see Bourdieu’s conception of individual action 
as a “mere reduction of an individual to his or her positions in social space” 
(Lahire 2003), I agree with Crossley that it is a “matter of emphasis” 
(Crossley 2001). The objective position in social space is only one side of 
the coin—the individual’s subjective positioning and representation is just 
as important. In this context, I argue that by using all of Bourdieu’s concepts 
in an integrated framework, one avoids such a “reduction”. In this sense, an 
individual’s habitus is not only a “structured structure” but functions also as 
a “structuring structure”, actively reproducing the existing social order in 
daily interaction, or social practice. The perception of an individual’s 
position is hence a central “contribution [...] towards constructing the view 
of the social world” (Bourdieu 1985: 727). 
Apart from general critique of Bourdieu’s concept, many authors state 
the ambiguity not only of the habitus but also of all of Bourdieu’s concepts 
throughout his work. However, especially his conception of individual action 
has been under attack. There are three main points of critique of the concept: 
the first point is that there is little innovation in the habitus, but that 
dispositions learned through the socialisation process in early childhood 
remain unaltered. Bourdieu meets this criticism by arguing that the habitus 
enables the social actor with a “practical sense”, and that besides it is 
understood as a “dynamic” and “generative principle” (McNay 1999: 101).4  
                                                             
4  In Jenkins’s reading of Bourdieu (2006), habitus or the subjective perception of 
one’s social environment and subsequent action is completely determined by 
external conditions. As a result, the individual expects of his or her life only what 
seems probable from past experiences, and thus simply reproduces the status quo 
in a given society. Certeau even speaks of Bourdieu’s habitus as a “prison house” 
(Certeau 2008: 84; cited after Webb et al. 2002: 58), lacking “any possibility of a 
self-conscious, dynamic cultural literacy” (Webb et al. 2002: 59) that would 
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A second major point of criticism is that Bourdieu states that there is a 
temporal dimension in the acquisition of a habitus (Noble/ Watkins 2003: 
525; see also McNay 1999). As mentioned above, Bourdieu states that the 
early years of socialisation are formative; in the process of socialisation 
                                                             
include a “self-reflective understanding of the person’s own position and 
resources” (Webb et al. 2002: 57), an “awareness of the rules, regulations, values 
and cultural capital” (ibid.). I share the point of view that—despite that critics—
Bourdieu opened up his concept of habitus to subjective reflexivity by introducing 
what he calls “hysteresis effect” and “socio-analysis”. Nedelcu states that 
“Bourdieu [...] has pointed out, however, that habitus ‘is not destiny’, but rather 
the product of socialisation; thus, it tends to reproduce past behaviour within a 
familiar context but gives way to innovation when faced with novel situations.” 
(Nedelcu 2012: 1345). Once internalised, the individual actually uses repertoire 
of rules most of the time unconsciously to act and react in common situations and 
is at the same time able to creatively, i.e. consciously adapt it to new situations 
(Krais/ Gebauer 2010; e.g. also Noble/ Watkins 2003). In this context, Sweetman 
hints to the “generative capacities of dispositions” not only in times of crisis as 
suggested by Bourdieu, but as the post-modern result of a demand for reflexivity 
in various spaces of everyday life, such as the workplace, the community, or 
consumer culture, in order to understand the “habitus as a continuum of actions”, 
ranging from rational or strategic choices through routinised to unconscious 
forms of action (Sweetman 2003: 538). In other words, dispositions are either 
being reinforced through encountering similar situations, or they are being 
transformed, adapted, if necessary. Several authors stress in this context the 
“negotiated [or discursive character of a] situation at the ground [i.e. 
interpersonal] level [of communication or interaction]” (Crossley 2001: 82; see 
also Bourdieu 1985). In the same token, Nash’s empirical description of an 
“educated habitus” (2002a), which he defines as a “set of mental dispositions to 
process symbolic information” (Nash 2002a: 45) must be understood as a 
reflective aspect of the habitus. However, it would definitely help the concept to 
stress more the “generative role of agency” (Crossley 2001: 96), i.e. to introduce 
the whole continuum of actions, ranging from rational making of plans and 
strategies through routines to completely autonomous because embodied forms 
of action, which would meet the need to take into account the “new demand for 
reflexivity” (Sweetman 2003; Atkinson 2010; Crossley 2001) in changing and 
interwoven societies. 
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individuals unconsciously adapt and internalise the culturally accepted ways 
to act (in terms of structural categories of class, gender or the various social 
fields). In Noble and Watkins’s critique, this internalisation remains a 
“passive process” through “transmission, internalisation, inculcation and 
conditioning” (Noble/ Watkins 2003: 525; e.g. also Lahire 2003). A third 
criticism—related to the question of whether a change in the individual 
habitus is possible—concerns the possibility of social change. Most authors 
accept that “socio-analysis” implies a possibility to make actions conscious 
to the habitus, namely in situations where it is necessary to develop new 
facets (Crossley 2001; Bourdieu 1985). Thus—the argument goes—on the 
biographical level it might be correct that objective structures are 
reproduced, but on the ontological level this circular process can lead to 
social change: Crossley argues here that the current status quo in a given 
society is the “outcome of a historical process” (Crossley 2001: 92). This 
implies that Bourdieu’s ideas on the reproduction rather than the innovation 
of objective structures, or social change, are, again, a “matter of emphasis” 
(ibid.) rather than ignorance of determinism.  
 
5.1.4 Social Field and Practice 
 
A social field is the concrete social sphere where action takes place; it is 
governed by objects of particular value or “power resources”, particular 
“formal and informal norms” (Edgerton/ Roberts 2014: 3), whose entity 
forms a given social space. However, what is valuable, however, in a 
particular field is negotiated through power relations. But these power 
relations are naturalised, and thus accepted as pre-existing and taken for 
granted by the individual (Bourdieu 1986; e.g. also Savage/ Silva 2013; 
Crossley 2001). Thus, a social field can be defined as a “set of objective 
historical relations between positions anchored in certain forms of power (or 
capital)” (Bourdieu/ Wacquant 1996 [1992]: 16). According to Bourdieu, 
fields are semi-autonomous, but there are homologies between them: in order 
to pursue their goals or strategies within a certain field, agents have to be 
capable of mobilising the forms of capital valuable in that specific context 
(Bourdieu/ Wacquant 1996 [1992]: 127). At the same time, all fields are 
subordinate to the field of power, or the “field of symbolic or ideological 
production” (Bourdieu 1985: 731). In this particular field, social actors fight 
over the hierarchical order of subordinate fields as well as the resources 
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needed there (Softic 2016: 136). Bourdieu introduces the term in order to 
empirically grasp his observation that some social actors are able to apply 
their power resources; in particular symbolic capital not only in a particular 
social field but across all social fields and thus occupy particular powerful 
objective positions at a given time (Barlösius 2011: 112).  
In line with one of his central issues, the distribution of power, Bourdieu 
denies altruistic behaviour: social actors pursue these strategies to maximise 
their possession and composition of capital in order to increase their chances 
to define what is valuable or legitimate in a particular field or the given social 
space as such. The interviewees’ civic engagement takes place in the political 
field. Softic defines the political field as the „arena, in which the intrinsic 
value of resources, but also their distribution is at least negotiated” (Softic 
2016: 139). In this context, Bourdieu states that—as in any other social 
field—in the political field, borders between established and lay social actors 
preventing the latter from reaching dominant positions in the respective field 
(Bourdieu 2013: 42). With regard to immigrants entering the political scene, 
it can be assumed that they face obstacles with regard to the forms of capital, 
the required experience and the knowledge they own, i.e. their particular 
habitus. As outlined above, social fields provide the arena for struggles over 
the legitimacy of these distinctions (Bourdieu 1985). The social order can be 
challenged within the schemes and expectations available to a particular 
individual or practical social group (Bourdieu 1985: 734; cf. also Dumais 
2002) by applying subversive strategies in order to call the existing social 
order into question. 
A main point of criticism regarding the concept of field is, again, its 
vagueness and, at times, its interchangeable use as both structure and 
mechanism (cf. Savage/ Silva 2013: 115), depending on the purpose it serves 
in the specific context. In the present study, I conceptualise the field as a 
structure and mainly concentrate on the social field as the actual arena where 
social struggles—i.e. struggles over an individual’s or social group’s 
objective position—are fought. 
The habitus realises itself in a particular field, and in relation to that 
particular field by drawing on embodied dispositions as the basis for agency 
or social practice. Dispositions are understood as a general repertoire of 
options to act which the individual adapts to the concrete situation by filling 
them with content in every particular situational context (cf. Haste 1992: 30). 
By means of their power resources, social actors are provided with a “feel 
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for the game” (Bourdieu 1985: 727), because they accept the basic cultural 
principles or “objective structures” as given (ibid.). This practical sense 
comes with a “sense of place” (ibid.) or a “sense of limits” (Savage/ Silva 
2013): learned dispositions function according to a practical logic, pre-
consciously excluding unfamiliar or “unthinkable” practices from the 
repertoire of possible actions and reactions (Reay 2004). Because social 
actors “play” according to the “rules of the game”, they become accepted 
members of a social group; or, as Savage and Silva (cf. 2013: 113) put it, the 
realisation of an individual’s habitual dispositions is thus central to the 
maintenance of social space—“the game itself”. As a result, a qualitative 
distinction, a social hierarchy, between the different positions in a particular 
field can be established in social interaction because individuals “recognise 
[...] [them] as significant” (Bourdieu 1985: 730): social actors “make 
[emphasis added] the distinctions” (ibid.) through their actions.  
 
 
5.2 THE INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 
 
According to Bourdieu, a social actor occupies an objective position in 
relation to other social actors in a given society, the social space, depending 
on the different forms of capital they have at disposal. These resources are 
acquired in various contexts or fields in the life course and to a large extent 
their composition is determined by the individual’s objective position. 
However, an individual’s subjective positioning, again in relation to others, 
is not necessarily identical with their objective position in social space. 
However, the individual may present their position differently in the various 
contexts. Against this background, Bourdieu states that social actors aim at 
improving their objective position, and the field is the social arena to do so. 
In order to illustrate this, Bourdieu applies the metaphor of social actors 
playing a game, and their resources are their stakes. The social actors 
reproduce or modify their resources while playing that game, the social 
practice.  
The analysis of habitual dispositions aims at understanding which power 
resources the interviewees—being immigrants or children of immigrants—
have and perceive themselves to have at their disposal for taking part in 
everyday social interaction. The field analysis aims at understanding which 
of these power resources they regard as valuable, i.e. which resources they 
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mobilise in a particular (thematic) field. The analysis of social practice, 
finally, aims at revealing the interviewees’ strategic use of their power 
resources in claiming a subjective position within a given field, and 
consecutively, a given social space, here: Israeli society. In the concrete 
social practice of the interview, the interviewees reproduce, yet, also modify 
their power resources.  
In the present study, I assume that the interviewees, against the migration 
background of their families, refer to more than one cultural system when 
adapting to the objective structures of Israeli society referring to the cultural 
system they have been socialised in in their families. Their resources can be 
analysed along different dimensions: as it is the case with objective 
structures, there are also subjective structures, or power resources—habitus 
and forms of capital —that the interviewees have embodied prior to 
migration or in their immigrant families and in the Israeli context. These 
resources may be experienced as contradictory and mismatching or 
compatible. I assume that the interviewees bring the issue of resources up in 
their narratives as they reach the level of consciousness. In this context, I 
further assume that contradictions between the two cultural systems will at 
times rise to consciousness in the narratives. How the interviewees handle 
those contradictions and present them in their narratives is the content of 
analysis of social practice.  
Bourdieu’s concepts form the theoretical-methodological frame of the 
present study; they are not being applied separately but as an integrated 
framework. This integration aims at applying a holistic approach to the 
position of talking, as taken by the participants in the study. A framework of 
Bourdieu’s concepts shall help to show that the interviewees do not act 
independently but in the context of their existence within a particular social 
space, Israeli society. Apart from Bourdieu and Wacquant (1996 [1992]),5 
Nash (2002b) applies a “realist” framework examining habitual dispositions 
against their realisation in particular fields of practice. His framework aims 
at looking at the individuals, and their habitual dispositions in a given social 
                                                             
5  In this context, I am aware of the ambiguities and disruptions in Bourdieu’s 
overall work. However, as Wacquant (1996 [1992]) argues, the development of 
the overall conception covers a period from the 1960s onwards and is dynamic in 
integrating new empirical insights as well as critique from colleagues (see 
Wacquant 1996 [1992]: 22-3). 
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space and from a holistic perspective. In a critique of education research, 
which in their eyes concentrates solely on Bourdieu’s notion of cultural 
capital in order to better understand socio-economic inequality through the 
education system, Edgerton and Roberts refer to Nash’s “structure-
disposition-practice explanatory framework” (Edgerton/ Roberts 2014: 2) as 
an alternative approach.  
In the present study, I have also decided to take a holistic approach. I will 
provide an analysis of the cultural context (objective structures) and of the 
individual dispositions (subjective structures) of the participants. Yet I will 
pay particular attention to how the two levels become linked in the particular 
situative context (social practice), i.e. which resources and strategies the 
interviewees apply and which goals they aim to achieve. The interviewees’ 
subjective positioning can be contrasted with the analysis of their objective 
position in Israeli society. As a final step of the analysis, I aim at making 
statements about how they discursively construct their “sense of belonging” 
against their objective position as well subjective positioning. In other words, 
I will take the perspective of the interviewees and provide an analysis of how 
they actively position themselves in order to make sense of their position in 
Israeli society. 
 
5.2.1 Analysis of Cultural Codes 
 
A central issue in Bourdieu’s concept of social space are cultural codes. As 
I have stated before, I claim that the analysis of (public) discourse in this 
context is of growing importance, or, as Adele Clarke and Keller put it, to 
look “beyond the knowing subject” (Clarke/ Keller 2014: para. 57). To 
determine the cultural codes in the form of public discourse the interviewees 
have embodied analytically in the interview material, I suggest here to apply 
a sociology of knowledge approach. Recent developments in the tradition of 
a sociology of knowledge have shifted the construction of knowledge from 
social to communicative (Keller 2011b). The approach provided by a 
sociology of knowledge allows to make statements about social processes of 
the (re-)production and institutionalisation of knowledge on the societal level 
and also about power relations in these processes. Gavriely-Nuri (2012) 
makes a similar suggestion with what she terms “discursive capital”.  
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The Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse (SKAD) is based, 
among other things, on Foucault’s theory of discourse,6 aiming at the 
analysis of the “discursive constitution of knowledge or [...] [analysing] 
regimes of power and knowledge” (Keller 2007: 1). Keller points here to the 
“emphasis on the active and interpretative efforts of social actors in the (re-) 
production and transformation of symbolic orders in discourses” (Keller 
2011a: 36). Discourse is defined here as “statements and respective practices 
of statements [...] following the same principle of formation” (Keller 2007: 
1); it is a “strategic game [...] [or] a battle] about the interpretative power” 
(ibid.)—a definition very similar to Bourdieu’s definition of social space. In 
this regard, the approach also adapts Bourdieu’s idea of symbolic battles over 
“the legitimacy of symbolic order” (Keller 2011a: 35). SKAD aims at 
capturing “contested social reservoirs of knowledge”, in contrast to 
subjective sense–making; and it aims at capturing the “inter-discursive 
context”, in contrast to looking at closed [...] semantic structures of text-
based approaches (cf. Keller 2011a: 78). In detail, SKAD aims at making 
statements about social actors and their “subjective positions” (Keller 2011a: 
73), their “power resources” (Keller 2011a: 74), their “ways of incorporation 
[of discourses]” (Keller 2011a: 73), “social contexts” (ibid.), “power effects 
in their everyday representation” (ibid.) as well as “[their] updating” (Keller 
2011a: 74) through “processes of collective knowledge production” (ibid.).  
In the present study, I will focus on the cultural codes the interviewees 
use as references to what they present as being common sense in Israeli 
society as well as the cultural codes they refer to as an alternative cultural 
system of reference against the migration background of their families—the 
reasons to do so will be analysed as suggested below. This includes an 
analysis of the interviewees’ objective position, i.e. the position they talk 
from about the symbolic order of Israeli society. I will analyse the 
interviewees’ subjective embodiment of objective structure along categories 
in order to “reconstruct[...] typical or typecasting elements of structure” 
(Keller 2011a: 79):  
 
• the public discourse(s) the interviewees engage in,  
• “patterns of interpretation” and  
• “topoi” (ibid.), as well as  
                                                             
6  For an introduction into SKAD see e.g. Keller 2007. 
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• individual interpretation of these patterns.  
• In a second step, I will analyse whether, and if so, how the interviewees 
reproduce these patterns of interpretation in practice, i.e. the interview 
situation, and for what purpose.  
 
5.2.2 Analysis of Power Resources 
 
Referring to the points mentioned above, I operationalise habitual 
dispositions as power resources. Those resources may then be applied by the 
interviewees in a particular field to claim a certain social position for 
themselves and to distinguish themselves from other individuals or social 
groups.  
Previous empirical studies are generally rather vague in their 
operationalisation or practical application of Bourdieu’s concepts. This is 
particularly true with regard to the exploration of habitual dispositions. 
However, there are a number of reasons for this vagueness. On the one hand, 
Bourdieu himself made very few comments on how to actually apply the 
concept in empirical research. To overcome this conceptual vagueness, some 
authors argue in favour of employing his concepts as a method rather than a 
theory (Reay 2004; 1995; Nash 1999; Bourdieu/ Wacquant 1996 [1992]).7 
Reay, for example, sees the potential to “reveal the taken-for-granted 
inequalities embedded in everyday practices” in the concept of habitus (Reay 
1995: 353). Accordingly, she defines it as a “method for analysing the 
dominance of dominant groups in society and the domination of subordinate 
groups” (Reay 2004: 436). Nash suggested applying the concept in order to 
“name [...] forms of classification, perception and discrimination”, and thus 
try to explain social practice (Nash 1999: 177) to show the “ways in which 
the social world is in the body” (Reay 2004: 432). In a similar vein, Barlösius 
emphasises that Bourdieu’s habitus functions as a system of classification in 
order to establish social distance or “distinction” (Barlösius 2011: 67; see 
also Bourdieu 1987 and Bourdieu 1985). Bourdieu’s very conception of the 
habitus suggests that it is not derived from direct observation but rather 
indirectly: e.g. from the observation of practice and thus the realisation of 
habitual dispositions in a particular situation (Reay 1995; Nash 2002b; 
Rapoport/ Lomsky-Feder 2002). In doing so, the concept of habitus is being 
                                                             
7  This solution would erase at least some of the critique on the concept (see above). 
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made applicable through the analytical distinction between an individual’s 
habitus and his or her lifeworld as the “stream of incoming experience” 
(Atkinson 2010: 8) which can be observed. 
With regard to capital, Bourdieu suggested analysing the forms an 
individual owns in three dimensions: the individual’s overall amount of 
capital, the composition of the various forms of capital and the time needed 
to accumulate this specific composition (Bourdieu 1987: 195-6).  
 
Social capital is operationalised as more or less durable personal relations 
the interviewees are able to rely upon or hope to rely upon in the future. For 
the present study it is interesting to determine who the people behind these 
relations are, in particular what their objective position in Israeli society and 
relative position to the interviewees is, and what exactly the interviewees 
expect from being acquainted with these people, i.e. how the interviewees 
present their relationship with these individuals. 
 
Cultural capital is operationalized as its three sub-forms: inherited or 
embodied (e.g. particular cultural skills and knowledge), objectified (e.g. 
school certificates) and institutionalised (e.g. titles) cultural capital 
(Bourdieu 1986; Bennett/ Silva 2011). Because of the migration background 
of the participants’ families, I will place particular emphasis on embodied 
cultural capital.8 With regard to Bourdieu’s remark about this being 
“Informationskapital” (see above), I will look at adaptive strategies (cf. Erel 
2010) the interviewees may apply in order to make value of their families’ 
cultural capital. I will also look at processes of incorporation of Israeli 
cultural codes made visible in the interviews. Guiding categories for the 
analysis of the interviewees’ power resources are:  
  
                                                             
8  An alternative concept to cultural capital in the respective literature is literacy. 
Literacy is either conceptualised as “cultural literacy” (Schirato/ Yell 2000) or 
“political literacy” (Cassel/ Lo 1997), in the context of civic engagement 
understood in terms of particular “civic skills” (Verba et al. 1995). However, I 
prefer Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital to that of skills, mainly because this 
way I can show that and how this particular resource can be and is used by the 
interviewees in a strategic way.  
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• narratives about relevant past and present experiences,  
• forms of capital,  
• reflections about their objective position,  
• future expectations,  
• moments including socio-analysis: reflexivity, talking about unknown 
situations, qualifications etc.  
 
In a second step, I will focus particularly on the analysis of how the 
participants in the study use these resources in the discursive practice of the 
interview situation. In this context, I will also look at how the participants 
position themselves in Israeli society as the social space under observation.  
 
5.2.3 Analysis of the Field and Discursive Practice 
 
As outlined above, habitual dispositions are realised in a particular field. 
Field analysis according to Bourdieu should be performed in three steps 
(Bourdieu/ Wacquant 1996 [1992]: 136):  
 
• relation of the field at hand to the field of power,  
• objective position of actors and institutions in the field at hand,  
• analysis of the social actors’ dispositions. 
 
I am particularly interested in how the interviewees apply their power 
resources against the background of their objective position in Israeli society 
and also in the strategies they pursue with the application of these resources 
in a particular context. I will analyse the use of resources with the help of 
Haste’s considerations on lay theory (Haste 1992). The methodological 
strength of Haste’s concept is linking a motivational approach with the 
discursive nature of arguments while speaking about this motivation. She 
argues for an approach which takes into account that and how meaning is 
negotiated in dialogue and discourse and against the background of a 
concrete social situation (Haste/ Torney-Purta 1992; see also Billig 1997; 
1989). In this context, Haste criticises a concept which understands a 
person’s belief —e.g. as suggested by approaches of authoritarianism—as a 
pattern that, once formed, is constant and more or less unchangeable and 
informed by an underlying principle (Haste 2004). Haste adapts Bourdieu’s 
thinking as well as ideas from discursive psychology and suggests 
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understanding belief —similar to Bourdieu’s habitual dispositions—as 
providing a “set of schemata and scenarios of how the world works and how 
the individual is located in that world” (Haste 1992: 28), which is actively 
developed and modified through social practice. She states that belief is not 
fixed, but relates to a) the situational context, and b) the public discourse in 
which the speaking individual is situated (Haste/ Torney-Purta 1992). A 
person’s belief is, thus, seen as dialogue and discourse: people hold 
contradictory views and act within a social and cultural context that is 
negotiat(ed)(able) (ibid.; see also Billig 1989; Potter/ Wetherell 1987). Haste 
and Torney-Purta argue that those usually unquestioned or, as Bourdieu 
would say, “doxic” dispositions are brought into the sphere of discourse in 
the context of an interview situation. The particular situational context more 
or less forces the interviewees to justify their arguments.9  
Social practice is operationalised as discursive practice in the context of 
the study. Haste (1992) argues on the basis of Bourdieu’s thinking that the 
individuals can fill their dispositions with varying and even contradictory 
content—depending on their current goal in a given social interaction. The 
social actor’s representation or line of argumentation thus has to be viewed 
against the background of the development of this repertoire of dispositions 
in the process of the development of the habitus (early and recent personal 
experiences and their individual processing) as well as the situational context 
(current events, the actual situation of realisation, argumentative goals or, to 
speak with Bourdieu, strategies, etc.).  
In agreement with Bourdieu, I assume that by way of argumentation and 
justification the interviewees are more or less forced to consciously reflect 
upon those resources taken for granted in everyday life. I further assume that 
the interviewees strategically use these resources discursively as different 
communicative strategies–e.g. making a statement, justifying a past action, 
post-rationalising a past decision–in order to position themselves. I 
operationalise discursive practice as the line of argumentation presented in 
the interview narratives, including the analysis of justifications and possible 
contradictions between different sequences about the same issues or when 
speaking about different issues in the course of the interview. Guiding 
categories of analysis are:   
                                                             
9  As Haste (1992) shows with her study on lay theory, this must not necessarily be 
a discursive interview (Ulrich 1999).  
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• issues relevant to the interviewees when talking about their civic 
engagement, issues linked or rejected,  
• argumentative strategies, justification, contradictions, the purpose these 
strategies are applied for,  
• the situational context of the argument,  
• references made to cultural codes,  
• power resources the interviewees claim to have or not to have at their 
disposal,  
• subjective positioning within a particular field.  
 
 Figure : A Suggested „Structure-Disposition-Practice”  
Explanatory Framework 
Source: Author’s Own Presentation 
 
In a final analytical step, based on the empirical findings, I will explore the 
interviewees’ construction of a sense of place. Here the guiding categories 
are:  
 
• power relations resulting from the interviewees’ positions,  
• “ideologies of superiority” (Reay 2004; 1995), i.e. distinctions made.  
 
Figure 4 shows the suggested explanatory framework.  
4
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In the present study, I aim at developing a material theory of how Israelis 
with an FSU family background who engage with an extreme right political 
party lingering between the discursive images of being a mainstream or a 
sectoral party, construct a sense of belonging to Israeli society.  
 
 
6 Theoretical Sensitivity II:  




As a relevant frame of the present study, I have considered literature on 
Israeli society and the Yisra’el Beitenu party. Thus, in the following sections, 
I will review previous research in these areas.  
 
 
6.1 FEATURES OF ISRAELI SOCIETY 
 
Everyday life in Israel takes place against the background of growing social 
tensions and cleavages. Fishman states that Israeli society has transformed 
from a “consensual society with common values” in the 1950s and 1960s to 
a “tribal society with very few if any common values”. The only 
commonality is seemingly the relationship with Palestinians inside and 
outside Israeli borders in recent years (Fishman 2004: 54). Ben-Porat and 
Turner define Israel as “a developmental state with problematic borders, a 
[divided] civil society [...], and a dominant military stratum” (Ben-Porat/ 
Turner 2011: 5).  
The present section looks at the key features necessary to understand 
present-say Israeli society and the transformation Fishman (2004) describes.  
 
6.1.1 The Political Culture 
 
Bagno identifies two main approaches to the definition of a society’s 
political culture: an attitudinal approach emphasising the evaluative aspect 
of external stimuli on the basis of individually incorporated shared values 
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and an attitudinal-behavioural approach defining “attitude as an active 
response provoked by an external event-stimuli [sic!]” (Bagno 2009: 26). In 
the former case, the definition of a society’s political culture as shared values 
is obviously linked to the society members’ political socialisation. Here, 
political culture is historically formed—and thus possibly transformed—and 
transmitted through formal and informal institutions over generations. In 
their classical study on civic engagement or “civic culture”, Almond and 
Verba define political culture as “the political system as internalised in the 
cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population. People are inducted 
into it just as they are socialised into nonpolitical roles and social systems” 
(Almond/ Verba 2016: 14). In the attitudinal-behavioural approach, political 
culture carries an individual aspect since it integrates individual experiences 
and perceptions of public events and, thus, accounts for “attitudinal 
differences” (Dowse/ Hughes 1986: 227). Dowse and Hughes refer to 
political culture as “specifically political orientations toward the political 
system and its various parts and attitudes toward the role of the self in the 
system” (ibid.).  
These orientations have implications for individual political behaviour as 
well as the society striving for “coherence in the operation of its institutions” 
(ibid.). In this context, Dowse and Hughes also stress the ideological 
dimension of political culture, defined as a “set of ideas having special 
characteristics” in order to establish clarity, internal coherence and 
consistency over internal cleavages (Dowse/ Hughes 1986: 236). Concluding 
from her identification of the various approaches, Bagno identifies “political 
culture as a concept which mediates between the political system and its 
environment, providing a framework within which political beliefs, 
historically considered, can be located, and as a factor which will influence 
and constrain future patterns of development in a political system” (Bagno 
2009: 26).  
Back in the late 1980s, Kahane and Rapoport observed antidemocratic 
tendencies in Israeli society, as for instance a “withdrawal from democratic 
ideas” on the basis of the political system’s perception as corrupt and 
inefficient, “partial rejection of democratic institutions”, and a growing 
number of young Israelis supporting right-wing authoritarian values such as 
strong leadership over democratic elections (Kahane/ Rapoport 1990: 221). 
The authors argue that the political culture in Israel has to be considered 
against the background of socio-political conditions that include a constant 
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security threat, a meta-narrative of the traumatic history of Diaspora Jewry, 
insecure economic development, or a large immigrant population “lacking a 
civic democratic tradition” (ibid.). However, Kahane and Rapoport consider 
these alone an “insufficient explanation” for “antidemocratic trends” in 
Israeli society, but rather to be their result (Kahane/ Rapoport 1990: 223).  
Still for today, several authors have described an atmosphere filled with 
“individual and collective anxieties”, as Kahane and Rapoport already put it 
in 1990 (p. 221). Against this backdrop, one can identify particular “political 
beliefs” in Israeli political culture.  
 
Zionism From a historical perspective, the emergence of Zionism is closely 
linked to the development of modern nationalism and the foundation of 
nation states in Europe. Zionism can be read as the European Jewish version 
of nationalism and has been described as a “Jewish national liberation 
movement”1 or the “generator of Modern Jewish nationalism” (Ram 1999: 
329). Of the various versions, Theodor Herzl’s political vision of a Jewish 
State (1894), an Altneuland (1902)—a new Jewish national state in one of 
the oldest places of Jewish settlement (British Mandate) Palestine— laid the 
basis for the secular and national political Zionism that pulled European Jews 
to the Middle East.  
In this context, secular political Zionism envisioned a particular notion 
of the “new Hebrew” who is young, male, healthy, white, i.e. of European 
origin (e.g. Roberman 2007; Almog 2000). Basically, this “new Hebrew” 
reflected the physical and mental condition of those who emigrated to 
Mandate Palestine—the contribution of women silenced in this male-
dominant notion—and was constructed as a counter-image of the weak and 
poor “Shtetl Jew”, commonly described in Jewish diaspora and Israeli 
literature. Shohat “shows [...] [that] the Eurocentric [Zionist] concept of a 
single ‘Jewish History’ cut non-Ashkenazi Jews off from their origins” 
(Shohat 1999: 5).  
After independence (in 1948), the premises of political Zionism—
settlement in Israel or the return from the diaspora, the adoption of an Israeli 
                                                             
1  Carlo Strenger. Zionism? Post-Zionism? Just Give Arguments. Haaretz Online 
(English Edition), December 20 2007; Retrieved from http://www.haaretz.com 
/print-edition/opinion/zionism-post-zionism-just-give-arguments-1.235552.
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identity and an ideological commitment to the land and the collective, 
“expressed mainly through military service, or the decision to stay over 
leaving” (Lomsky-Feder/ Rapoport 2001)—served as one of the pillars of 
Israeli citizenship.  
In the last decade or two, the dominant ideology of political Zionism has 
been challenged by several developments: among other things the “social 
upward mobility” (Fishman 2004: 58) of lower social classes, in particular 
that of Sephardim2 (ibid.), a growing pluralism characterised by the growing 
demand of segments of Israeli society peripheral to power to gain recognition 
(Livio 2012) and tendencies to avoid military service (ibid.). Finally, the 
arrival of large numbers of immigrants—in particular from FSU countries—
who “lack the Zionist history of life” (Fishman 2004: 61) have additionally 
challenged the Zionist “national ethos of home-coming” (Golden 2002; e.g. 
also Lomsky-Feder/ Rapoport 2001; Golden 1996) by refusing to accept the 
previously dominant politics of immigrant absorption (Lomsky-Feder/ 
Rapoport 2002; 2001), i.e. assimilation to Israeli-Hebrew culture (Eisenstadt 
2008). In this context, Strenger3 (2007) even calls the current reference to 
Zionism in public discourse “anachronistic”, and Kaplan adds “Zionism 
fulfilled its historical mission” (Kaplan 2013: 149).  
As a preliminary result of these developments, Ram observes that more 
recently “classical” Zionism has been accompanied by two new class-
specific forms in the context of global and local or national processes: a 
“post-Zionism”, promoted mainly by secular, political left, higher educated 
segments on the one hand, vs. a “neo-Zionism” of the lower social class, 
Jewish national, religious and political right segments of Israeli society on 
the other hand (Ram 1999: 329). However, this is not a fixed status quo. With 
regard to scientific work (in particular historical science), in Kaplan’s view 
there had been a “post-Zionist” development as well, examining “other 
                                                             
2  From Hebrew “sephardi”, “Spanish”, referring to more recent immigrants from 
Muslim countries in North Africa and the Middle East after Israeli independence, 
whose ancestors had fled Spain after the expulsion of Jews in 1492 and found 
asylum in Muslim countries. 
3  Carlo Strenger. Zionism? Post-Zionism? Just Give Arguments. Haaretz Online 
(English Edition), December 20 2007; Retrieved from: http://www.haaretz.com 
/print-edition/opinion/zionism-post-zionism-just-give-arguments-1.235552. 
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aspects of Israeli society” and in particular applying a “de-mythologizing 
attitude” (Kaplan 2013: 149). At the same time, he already observed the 
emergence of a “post-post-Zionism” which, instead of critically reviewing 
societal developments that were justified with Zionist ideology, is driven by 
a “desire to rediscover” (and recreate) a Zionist society (Kaplan 2013: 150-
1).  
As a result, support for Zionism as the dominant, uniting idea of Israeli 
society has been in decline; one sign of this is a growing willingness to leave 
the country (Dowty 2004). However, in this context Ichilov stresses the 
“absence of a more general [...] Israeli identity” (Ichilov 2004: 101) which 
would leave room for non-Jewish citizens to identify with Israel not just as 
a Jewish state, instead creating an “atmosphere of alienation and distrust” 
(ibid.). On the contrary, right-wing political circles, including the 
government of Prime Minister Netanyahu, aim at strengthening Jewish 
dominance by demands to introduce a loyalty oath to the Jewish character of 
the state and its symbols with regard to internal affairs—clearly aimed at 
Israel’s non-Jewish, in particular Palestinian citizens—and the demand to 
recognise Israel as a Jewish state as a precondition for peace talks with regard 
to foreign affairs.  
 
Israeli citizenship Ben-Porat and Turner describe Israeli citizenship as “a 
peculiar combination of late nineteenth-century developments in nationalism 
and Zionism and twentieth-century wars and settlement” (Ben-Porat/ Turner 
2011: 2), displaying “political struggles [...] defined fundamentally by an 
attempt to reconcile the two conflicting principles of a ‘Jewish and 
democratic state’” (Ben-Porat/ Turner 2011: 1). Israeli citizenship implies 
two aspects with the Law of Return (1952) as the legal basis for the 
attribution of social, civil, and political rights at its centre: inclusionary for 
people of Jewish descent and exclusionary for various “others”, e.g. 
Palestinians outside pre-1967 borders, foreign workers or asylum seekers (cf. 
Ben-Porat/ Turner 2011; e.g. also Peled 2007). Smooha coined this political 
order an “ethnic democracy” and defined it as a “political system that is 
democratic for the dominant group but excludes, on the basis of ethnicity, 
other groups from the democratic process” (Smooha 2001: 24; see also 
Smooha 1989). Accordingly, Peled identifies three dimensions of Israeli 
citizenship: a liberal dimension with regard to the distribution of rights in 
order to “distinguish” between Israeli citizens and non-citizens, a Republican 
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one with regard to the citizens’ contribution to the community in order to 
“legitimise” the existing social hierarchy and an ethno-nationalist dimension 
in order to “discriminate” against the non-Jewish, in particular Palestinian 
citizens (Peled 2011: 278; see also Shafir/ Peled, 2011; 2002).  
However, the legitimisation of the status quo has entered a crisis (Levy 
2011; Peled 2011; Lerer/ Amram-Katz 2011; Lebel 2007; Ben-Porat/ 
Mizrahi 2005) as Israeli society has become more pluralistic on the one hand, 
and various societal cleavages have become more blatant on the other hand: 
ethnic (Ashkenazim vs. Sephardim), religious (religious vs. secular), 
national (Jewish vs. Palestinian), political (left-wing vs. right-wing) and 
social (established vs. newcomers) (Fishman 2004: 54; see also Ben-Porat/ 
Turner 2011; Kimmerling 2005; Ichilov 2004), or have just emerged like 
racial (“white” vs. “non-white” Jews) (Elias/ Kemp 2010; Ben-Eliezer 
2008). The introduction of a loyalty oath for non-Jewish Israelis, in particular 
Palestinian Israelis, as a prerequisite for basic civil, social, and political 
rights, as suggested by the Yisra’el Beitenu party, may be interpreted as an 
attempt to win back this legitimisation. While back in the 1980s right-wing 
extremist parties were banned when they publicly demanded such an oath, it 
has recently become more publicly acceptable, for instance in the form of 
the so-called “Lieberman Plan” (Waxman 2012: 22). In this context, in 
particular the status of Palestinian citizens has increasingly been eroded. The 
massive, partly violent protests of Palestinian citizens that took place in 
October 2000 in Upper Galilee play a central role in both the perception of 
these citizens by the Jewish majority as well as concrete legislative acts 
concerning them (Waxman 2012; Peled 2007). Resulting from those 
developments, there is an ongoing debate whether to speak of Israel as an 
“ethnocracy”, with a Jewish majority ignoring the rights of their national 
minorities, rather than of an “ethnic democracy” (Ghanem 2011; Peled/ 
Navot 2005; Yiftachel 1999; Dowty 1999).  
 
Cultural codes Undoubtedly, the collective memory of the Shoah and the 
“shared belief” of Israel being under siege (Bar-Tal 2000) are two of the 
major “cultural codes” (Gavriely-Nuri 2012) in Israeli society. Gavriely-
Nuri defines “cultural codes” as a “compact package of shared values, 
norms, ethos and social beliefs” (Gavriely-Nuri 2012: 80). Cultural codes are 
inherited directly (through social interaction and personal experience) and 
through indirect exposure (e.g. the media) (ibid.). Familiarity with those 
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codes, i.e. the ability to decode them, provides a symbolic resource to 
exercise symbolic—i.e. interpretative—power (Gavriely-Nuri 2012: 82; see 
also Bourdieu 1985).  
Psychological analyses of Israeli society quite regularly point out the 
impact the perception of being threatened has on how Israelis perceive the 
world. Bar-Tal and Antebi coined the term “siege mentality”4 for the 
phenomenon they observed: “a mental state in which members of a group 
hold a central belief that the rest of the world has highly negative behavioural 
intentions toward them” (Bar-Tal/ Antebi 1992a: 634). “Siege mentality”, 
like other central collective beliefs, is rooted in a long-term (emotional) 
collective memory of contact with one or many out-groups perceived as 
negative or hostile. Connected to this are beliefs of an existential collective 
threat, of facing this threat alone, and “that all means are justified for group 
defence” (ibid.). In concrete terms, the Israeli “siege mentality” currently 
consists of the belief that Israel as a state and the people inhabiting it are 
threatened in their very existence by the Arab states in the region. This 
perception is furthered, for instance through political socialisation, or mass 
media and public discourse in general (e.g. Bar-Tal 2001).5  
This belief has implications for the political culture: Mustafa and 
Ghanem (2010) explain the rise of a “new extreme right in Israel”—
including the Yisra’el Beitenu party—at least partly with the collective belief 
of being under siege. Zertal links the collective perception of “the whole 
world [being] against us” among (Jewish) Israelis directly to another major 
cultural code of today’s Israeli society: the practices of commemoration of 
the Jewish victims of the Shoah. She states:  
 
“[i]n organizing the trial [of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem, 1961] as a historic, 
continuous morality play, [...] [Ben Gurion] created the teleological, indispensable 
link between the agony and death of the Jewish Diaspora and the establishment and 
the right to exist of the State of Israel, including its daily practices, especially the 
                                                             
4  The authors explicitly distinguish a “siege mentality” from other psychological 
constructs like paranoia or ethnocentrism on the basis of an “emphasis [...] on the 
rest of the world” (Bar-Tal/ Antebi 1992a: 634). 
5  However, not all individuals show the same strength in their beliefs; Bar-Tal and 
Antebi (1992a) found the highest correlations with religiosity, hawkish political 
orientation and nationality, i.e. being Jewish.  
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militaristic ones. [...] Defence of one’s country became a sacred mission endowed 
with the weight of the ultimate catastrophe” (Zertal 2000: 112).  
 
By a similar token, Zuckermann identifies several “central axes of fear”—
historical persecution of Diaspora Jews, the Shoah, and the constant security 
threat against the background of ongoing military conflicts with Israel’s 
neighbours—(Zuckermann 1999: 63) and emphasises in this context “the 
dialectical relationship between psychologcial needs, functioning as the 
„glue“ of the socio-political system, and that very same system, which 
ideologically „arouses“, reproduces and affirmatively reinforces those 
needs“ (Zuckermann 1999: 61-2).  
Commemoration practices have, above all, served the political goal of 
enhancing patriotism and loyalty through the potential sacrifice of the 
citizens’ lives to defending their country (e.g. Rapoport/ Lomsky-Feder 
2007; Zertal 2000)—it is no coincidence that the national commemoration 
day (Yom haShoah) is the day before Independence Day. Those practices 
had not been installed at the end of World War II and after the rescue of the 
survivors from Nazi concentration camps, though, because Jewish victims 
clearly contradicted the image of the “new Hebrew” (see above) installed by 
political Zionism (Zuckermann 1999: 69). Zertal adds: “collective mourning 
and grief for the murder of a third of the Jewish people [...] literally could 
have shattered the realisation of the vision of a new state and its struggle for 
existence. [...] Thus, there was an almost concerted effort to “disremember” 
the recent, unbearable past.” (Zertal 2000: 100).  
Accordingly, public remembrance of the Shoah was mainly supposed to 
serve two political purposes: in order to argue that living in Israel, returning 
from the Diaspora, was the only safe option for Jews, on the one hand, yet, 
on the other hand, in order to rhetorically draw parallels between the recent 
past, the existential threat of annihilation of European Jewry by the Nazi 
regime, and the present, the acclaimed existential threat to Israel’s existence 
by its Arab neighbours (Zertal 2000: 106-7). Correspondingly, after the 
capture of Eichmann and his trial in Israel and in the aftermath of the Six-
Day War (1967), “Israeli militarism and security consciousness were 
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boosted” (Zertal 2000: 111);6 and the new narrative of Israel’s “fight against 
the Arab ‘enemy’” (Zertal 2000: 112), based on the commemoration of the 
murdered victims of the Shoah as a warning, was “embraced as the 
cornerstone of Israel’s collective identity” (Gulie Ne’eman Arad 2003: 5).  
However, these practices of commemoration have also been contested. 
In addition to the processes of social change in Israeli society described 
above, a further factor contributing to “growing reservations about the 
centrality of the Shoah in Israel’s national life and political culture” (Gulie 
Ne’eman Arad 2003: 6) has again been the mass immigration from FSU 
countries. Rapoport and Lomsky-Feder (2007) found that the interview 
participants in their case study adapted the Shoah narrative dominant in 
Israel and the connected Israeli-Jewish identity in the process of their 
absorption. At the same time, though, as a social group, they maintained an 
alternative narrative about Jewish life in the Diaspora. Hereby, the 
interviewees challenge the dominant Israeli view of the weak Jew living in 
exile and replace it with their notion of the heroic and victorious (Jewish) 
Soviet soldiers fighting in WWII, which was an integral part of Soviet 
practices of commemoration and which the immigrants had experienced 
themselves (cf. Rapoport/ Lomsky-Feder 2007; see also Roberman 2007). In 
this context, the interviewees also tended to “normalise” personal anti-
Semitic experiences (Rapoport/ Lomsky-Feder 2007).  
Against this background, military service has played a crucial role in the 
lives of Israeli citizens, and it has implications not only in the military but 
also the civil sphere. Livio shows how the “mishtamtim (literally, 
‘shirkers’)” (Livio 2012: 78)—those (Jewish) individuals who dodge 
mandatory military service for various reasons—damage the still highly-
valued contribution to the symbolic collective in the eyes of the (Jewish) 
majority (Livio 2012: 80). Service in the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) is an 
important context for the citizens’ political socialisation. One of the claimed 
goals of mandatory military service has been, as the 1st Israeli chief of staff, 
Yadin, put it, to “raise conscientious Zionist soldiers” (cited after Ichilov 
2004: 123).  
  
                                                             
6  In this context emerged also what Kimmerling (1993) described as “civil 
militarism” for the Israeli context, the interwovenness of the civil and military 
spheres.  
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6.1.2 Disintegration of Israeli Society 
 
As described above, cleavages within Israeli society can be directly linked 
to the (growing challenge of the) legitimisation of the current social order, 
and they often overlap with economic gaps between the segments in 
question. Those cleavages are not abstract but have direct effects on daily 
interactions. Usually they find expression in negative stereotypes used in 
social interactions to humiliate those still engaged, but at times they can also 
be channelled into concrete exclusionary acts against people perceived as 
“the others”. In the early days of modern Jewish settlement in Palestine and 
of the newly-founded State of Israel, the political, social and economic 
dominance of the “Zionist bourgeoisie” (Fishman 2004: 58), i.e. Jewish 
pioneer settlers of European origin and their descendants (Ashkenazim), over 
Sephardim was questioned as little as the dominance of a particular form of 
nationalism in the form of secular political Zionism. This social hierarchy 
was legitimised by the distinctly greater contribution and risk-taking of the 
dominant group, in particular with regard to military sacrifices and political 
responsibilities (Levy 2011: 40). However, in accordance with the decline of 
Zionism as the unifying idea as well as additional developments like the 
decline of trust in Israel’s military power and years of economic crisis (ibid.), 
various rifts and cleavages have surfaced: on the one hand among Jewish 
Israelis (e.g. Shetrit 2010), and on the other hand between Jewish and non-
Jewish, in particular Palestinian, Israelis.  
 
national/ Palestinian citizens The fact that British-Mandate Palestine 
was not waste land but largely inhabited had been largely ignored by the 
Zionist settlers who came to establish their Jewish state. Accordingly, those 
non-Jewish natives were not foreseen to have a place in the “ethno-territorial 
Jewish project” (Rabinowitz 2001: 305) before and after Israel’s 
independence. Instead, there has been (growing) emphasis on the character 
of the state as Jewish over democratic (i.e. the granting of equal rights to all 
its citizens), while the collective identities of national minorities have been 
all but ignored (e.g. Ichilov 2004; Rouhana 1997).7 Rabinowitz shows that 
                                                             
7  A particular case of national minorities in Israel are Druze and Bedouin citizens. 
Druze often become mixed up with the “Arabs”, though they are a non-Arab 
community with their own religion. There exist special Druze departments and 
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in particular Palestinians Israelis have actively been othered in terms of 
culture: they have been referred to as rural (vs. urban Jewish Israelis), 
uneducated/ uncivilised (vs. Jewish millennia-old high culture), or short-
tempered (vs. Jewish deliberateness) for the purpose of constructing a(n) 
(Jewish) Israeli identity against them (Rabinowitz 2001: 317-9). While self-
perceptions of the group have been largely ignored by the Jewish majority 
who have referred to them simply as “Arabs”, in particular after the events 
of October 2000 (see above), the self-definition of Palestinian Israelis has 
changed and they have demanded the recognition as a national minority to 
guarantee particular rights, (e.g. Waxman 2012; Peled 2007). In combination 
with Israeli Jewish perceptions of Palestinian Israelis being a constant 
security threat, Waxman points to the shock that Jewish Israelis have 
experienced in the course of such public demands (Waxman 2012: 17).  
 
ethnic/ “Mizrahim”8 Ben Meir and Bagno-Moldavsky find that the 
perception of an Ashkenazi-Sephardi divide has weakened, yet not vanished 
(Ben Meir/ Bagno-Moldavsky 2010: 52). However, until recently, the ethnic 
divide had been the most visible conflict line in Israeli (Jewish) society. 
Arriving in Israel after independence, Jews from Arab countries were 
supposed to assimilate to the hegemonic Jewish culture of European settlers,9 
i.e. “to be ‘cleansed’” from their “Arabness” (Shohat 1999: 6).  
Moreover, against the background of Rabinowitz’s work about the 
othering of Palestinians (2001), the very terms Oriental/ Mizrahi, or Arab, 
which are used to refer to those Jewish segments of Israeli society, already 
assume a low social and cultural status for this group. Shohat finds evidence 
in Zionist texts “rejecting the non-Ashkenazis as ‘savage’ and ‘primitive’” 
(Shohat 1999: 6). In this regard, Sephardic Israelis were expected to occupy 
the lower stages of the social hierarchy, with the highest stages occupied by 
Ashkenazim. Again, linked to their social position is their economic lower 
social position of this societal segment: in the context of the realisation of 
                                                             
they enjoy cultural and religious autonomy as well as particular social and 
economic benefits (Ichilov 2004: 103). With regard to their citizenship status, it 
is noteworthy that Druze in Israel are allowed to do military service.  
8  Hebrew, “Oriental”  
9  A prominent example is the adaptation of the genocide of European Jewry 
(Shoah) as an all-national collective event.  
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the “ethno-territorial Jewish project”, Palestinian cheap labour workers were 
supposed to be replaced by Jewish ones (Shohat 1999: 9-10). However, since 
the 1980s or early 1990s more confident self-definition of Sephardi Israelis 
as “Mizrahi” has become noticeable based on several processes. For 
instance, the younger generations of immigrants from Muslim countries have 
shown economic and thus social upward mobility (Fishman 2004: 58). 
Besides, they have gained political influence, namely in the framework of 
two political parties: the Likud, and the ultra-orthodox SHAS (cf. Shetrit 
2000).  
A more recent renewal of the emphasis on an Ashkenazi-Sephardi 
divide—based on the emphasis on a claimed cultural superiority of 
Europeanness or, more precisely, “Russianness”—has been reinforced by the 
mass arrival of FSU immigrants.  
 
social/ veteran Israelis vs. newcomers The Zionist discourse of home-
coming clearly undercuts the economic reality in Israel, which has been 
marked by a crisis in the 1980s and a slow recovery. Besides, the current 
social hierarchy of the established at the top and the newcomers at the lower 
stages has been contested in particular by the mass immigration from FSU 
countries. The Israeli public generally acknowledges the positive impact of 
new Israelis from FSU countries in various fields, such as science and 
technology (Dayan 2004: 7-8). However, they also perceive a negative 
impact in other fields, such as politics or crime (ibid.).10 In this regard, on 
the everyday level quite persistent negative stereotypes have emerged like 
that of “Russian prostitutes” and “criminal” (Dayan 2004: 7; see also 
Glöckner 2011: 205-7). From the angle of cultural identification, a further 
aspect contributing to the development of stereotypes is the relatively high 
number of non-Jewish immigrants in the context of this wave of immigration 
due to families of mixed marriage who are not considered Halakhic Jews by 
the Rabbinate.11 Again, those people were not intended to be part of the 
                                                             
10  Khanin states in this regard that FSU immigrants have “managed to change the 
previous right-left balance” (Khanin, 2011: 155).  
11  Since this recognition as a Halakhic Jew regulates various status passages in the 
life course, above all marriage and funeral, the denial of that status limits those 
citizens’ life choices in these regards and in everyday practice constructs a 
minority on religious grounds—not to mention that the regulation of cultural 
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Zionist project and although the integrative power of Zionism as an ideology 
has weakened in other areas, it is still powerful with regard to regulating 
immigration.  
 
political In classic terms, there are two main political camps in Israel: the 
political left-wing, and the political right-wing; besides there being a 
growing political centre. Left-wing politics has usually taken a territory-for-
peace position in peace negations with Palestinians and with regard to 
internal affairs rather a welfare-state and social-equality oriented position—
to name only a few examples. Right-wing politics, in contrast, has rather 
advocated a peace-for-peace position in the negotiations with the 
Palestinians and a free market economy, but has also put more emphasis on 
national security than on other political issues, as Gutwein12 points out.  
However, former clear-cut differences between the political camps, in 
particular with regard to the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, are 
becoming blurred. Lieberman’s Yisra’el Beitenu party, a clearly extreme 
right-wing political party, for instance, crosscuts the traditional right-wing 
                                                             
rights according to an individual’s religious status is in sharp contrast to the 
dominance of individual secularism among Israelis with an FSU family 
background. Non-Halakhic citizens are even collectively separated in official data 
as “others” from the Jewish segments of Israeli society (Central Bureau of 
Statistics 2016; 2010). Only those who have a Jewish mother are Jewish 
according to the Halakha, the complex of Jewish religious law. However, the Law 
of Return, which organises immigration to Israel, allows entrance of non-
Halakhic Jews (having a Jewish father, or a Jewish grandparent) and of non-
Jewish spouses and children and moreover grants basic civil rights, including 
Israeli citizenship, to both groups. The group of individuals who are granted 
immediate citizenship by the Law of Return differs from the Halakhic definition 
and has historical-political reasons. The Law of Return has aimed at granting 
shelter to Diaspora Jewry in the aftermath of the Shoah and is thus guided by the 
definition of who was considered Jewish in the Nazi-German Reichsbürgergesetz 
of 1935.  
12  Daniel Gutwein. How the left elevated Lieberman. Haaretz (English Edition), 
2009. Retrieved from: http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/how- 
the-left-elevated-lieberman-1.269990  
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positions13—and has been quite successful with this strategy in national 
elections.  
 
racial/ “Ethiopian Jews” Falashmura, Beta Israel or Falasha14, are 
usually not a subject of research, but if they are, the empirical results reveal 
that those usually socially weak segments within Israeli Jewish society are 
confronted with hostile, even racist, attitudes toward them (cf. Amit 2011). 
Pedahzur and Yishai (1999) find in their study on xenophobia15 in Israel that 
the social groups they examined are targeted on the basis of different factors: 
Palestinian Israelis due to the unsolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
Falashmura on the basis of race, and foreign workers particularly because of 
the economic competition. However, those factors also influence the 
hierarchy of the social groups targeted, for instance, hostile attitudes are far 
more often expressed toward Palestinian Israelis than toward foreign 
workers or Falashmura. Like other studies have shown (see above), the 
degree of religiosity of the respondents and their perception of fear also have 
a negative influence. For the case of Falashmura, Pedahzur and Yishai 
explain hostile attitudes toward them by simply stating “that they are so 
different from the Jews from other countries in skin colour, culture, social 
tradition, and religious practices” (Pedahzur/ Yishai 1999: 102). Other 
authors term the phenomenon more precisely as cultural racism (cf. Elias/ 
Kemp 2010; Ben-Eliezer 2008); and Elias and Kemp put the statement into 
context: “entry and absorption difficulties encountered by the sizeable 
population of Ethiopian Jews have led to the emergence of racial divides and 
intra-Jewish colour-based forms of racism” (Elias/ Kemp 2010: 74).  
As a result of their low economic status and social exclusion, Falashmura 
are at the very margins of Israeli society (e.g. Amit 2011). Elias and Kemp 
find that in return, second generation youth chooses a rather transnational 
way of coping: they tend to adopt a “‘black[...]’ (instead of Israeli [...]) 
[identity and, with it,] [...] black Diaspora cultural symbols (e.g. music, 
hairstyle, fashion, and forms of social protest) completely foreign to them in 
Ethiopia” (Elias/ Kemp 2010: 82).  
                                                             
13  Ibid. 
14  Amharic,“stranger” (Ben-Eliezer 2008: 936)  
15  Xenophobia is defined here as “not only rejection of what is strange; the socially 
weak can be victims as well” (Pedahzur/ Yishai 1999: 102).  
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However, the younger generation has also begun to claim their rights as 
citizens.16  
 
religious/ Jewish ultra-orthodox Although the Jewish religion is of 
high significance here, and many public institutions are based on it, the 
significance of religion has also been contested in recent years. According to 
Ben Meir and Bagno-Moldavsky, the secular-religious divide has replaced 
the former divide along ethnic lines as the most severe within the Jewish 
segments of Israeli society (Ben Meir/ Bagno-Moldavsky 2010: 52).  
 
6.1.3 Political Attitudes of Young (Jewish) Israelis 
 
According to classical theories of political socialisation, young people 
become socialised on political issues both directly and indirectly in different 
contexts—above all in face-to-face interactions at school, in peer groups and 
various other environments, both national and global and, I would argue, also 
local and regional ones. When it comes to growing up in Israel, Ichilov states 
that children are exposed to conflict as the “dominant message at the global 
sphere” (Ichilov 2004: 11) which has become “part of the people’s daily 
routines” (ibid.) while at the same time the “traditional bounds of 
citizenship”, namely unity and solidarity, erode, as has been described 
(Ichilov 2004: 30). In this context, Ichilov agrees with Bar-Tal (2001) in 
stating that constant exposure to conflict (e.g. the Palestinian-Israeli conflict) 
transforms into collective narratives or societal beliefs, in particular about 
threat (Ichilov 2004: 51).  
These narratives, or “stories”, evoke strong negative collective emotions 
and are the basis for learning “predispositions for prolonged conflict” (ibid.; 
cf. also Halperin/ Bar-Tal 2011; Bar-Tal/ Antebi 1992a). Against this 
background, Ichilov (2004) examines young Israelis’ notions of a “good 
citizen” and finds that a majority supports loyalty to the state as well as 
                                                             
16  Isabel Kershner. Second-Generation Ethiopian-Israelis March toward Acceptance. 
June 9 2012; Retrieved from: 
 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/10/world/middleeast/second-generation-
ethiopian-israelis-march-toward-acceptance.html  
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obedience to political authorities (Ichilov 2004: 127).17 She also finds that 
the young peoples’ answers “reflect the major rifts within Israeli society”, in 
particular with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and connected 
cleavages between political left and right and Jewish and Palestinian Israelis 
(Ichilov 2004: 128).  
Concluding from results of the longitudinal IEA study on young peoples’ 
perceptions of citizenship, Ichilov states a decline in “tolerance toward 
‘others’” (e.g. national minorities), efficacy and trust in political authorities, 
and “civil identities” for the Israeli case (Ichilov 2004: 153). At the same 
time, young (Jewish) Israelis perceive a growing threat, above all of the 
erosion of “bonding forces” to be caused by rifts within Israeli society 
(Ichilov 2004: 155). Also, an increasing number of young people find the use 
of military power legitimate in order to reach political goals; they support 
anti-democratic tendencies–e.g. depriving non-Jewish citizens of particular 
civil rights or emphasising the character of the State of Israel as a Jewish 
state (Ichilov 2004: 153). However, her results also show that young Israelis 
have become increasingly politically engaged and actively take part in both 
conventional forms of engagement, such as political discussions, 
demonstrations or in various organisations as well as unconventional or even 
illegal forms of protest (ibid.).  
Other empirical studies confirm a “consistently high level of generalised 
interest in social and political issues” (Enosh/ Katz 2004: 12) among Israeli 
adolescents with about 15 per cent of them stating interest in foreign policy 
and about 55 per cent in social issues in 2004 (ibid). Whether this increase 
in political action also results in an increase in political literacy, i.e. 
knowledge of facts, remains questionable against the background of the 
reported intolerance and support of national(ist) or antidemocratic 
tendencies, however.  
 
6.1.4 The Political Adaptation of FSU Immigrants 
 
There have been three large waves of Jewish immigration from Russia or the 
Soviet Union: in the period of the Yishuv, the Jewish resettlement of 
                                                             
17  Those from Kibbutz settlements usually display a more balanced view and also 
stress a citizen’s obligation for active engagement in one’s community (Ichilov 
2004: 127). 
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Palestine in the context of secular Zionism before Independence, the 
Prisoners of Zion or Otkazniki movement of the 1970s and 1980s and the 
“Great Russian Aliyah” (Khanin 2011) after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
Arian et al. dedicated that 2010 Israeli Democracy Index to the 20th 
anniversary of FSU immigration and an examination of the political attitudes 
of those segments of Israeli society. Besides, the study is set against the 
background of two large military operations, the 2006 Lebanon War and the 
2009 “Operation Cast Lead” in Gaza. Their study shows that positive 
attitudes toward democracy among the respondents are in decline: though 
they generally support state institutions, in particular IDF (Israeli Defence 
Forces), they are dissatisfied with their own political influence or 
representation as a social group (Arian et al. 2010: 55), the perceived high 
level of corruption of political elites (Arian et al. 2010: 61), and political 
leadership in general which is perceived as weak (Arian et al. 2010: 58). In 
this context, 74 per cent (veteran Israelis: 61 per cent) support the idea of a 
strong leadership (ibid.). With regard to the rights’ aspect, almost half of the 
respondents (48 per cent) reject “harsh criticism” of official policies, such as 
military operations, (Arian et al. 2010: 63) and 77 per cent (veteran Israelis: 
47 per cent) support the encouragement of “Arab emigration”, and the 
limitation of civil rights of national minorities, in particular Palestinian 
citizens (Arian et al. 2010: 64). Halperin et al. find that Israelis with an FSU 
background tend to answer more often in exclusionist terms than veteran 
Israelis and explain this at least partly with “political ‘hawkish’ attitudes” 
and in particular “well-rooted negative Russian sentiments toward Islam” 
(Halperin et al. 2009: 1001).  
These figures must be interpreted against the context of two 
developments: the generally increasing public acceptance of open prejudices 
and discrimination, and IB’s “loyalty” slogan (2009) as a consequence and 
further catalyst of that acceptance. Generally, the authors state a decline in 
social trust against the perception of growing cleavages within Israeli 
society, yet at the same time an increase in the expression of belonging of 
the particular FSU community (Arian et al. 2010: 81).18  
                                                             
18  In this context, Khanin identifies three main models of the group’s political 
integration: the cooperation of Russian political elites with mainstream political 
parties, either as “satellite lists” or “intra-party lobbies” (Khanin 2011: 58-9) or 
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Most studies link those attitudes directly or indirectly to the immigrants’ 
“Soviet legacy” (Khanin 2011: 56). The supposedly “imported” political 
culture consists of particular features, e.g. the preference of strong leadership 
over democratically elected representatives, patriotism, low levels of 
political participation/ mistrust in political elites and “suspicious of political 
authorities”, economic liberalism vs. social contestation (Philippov/ Bystrov 
2011: 261) and the maintenance of the “post-Soviet concept of the ‘enemy-
image’” (Arian et al. 2010: 65). Correspondingly, Philippov and Bystrov 
sum up the recent increase in voters’ turnout rate and of the FSU immigrants’ 
general influence on (political) life in Israel with the words that “they [FSU 
immigrants] are on their way to creating the appropriate patterns of active 
citizenship” (Philippov/ Bystrov 2011: 260); however, they also claim this 
“imported” political culture to be an “excuse for voting for the most radical 
parties”, in particular the Yisra’el Beitenu party (ibid.). In this context, 
empirical studies on the political “attitudes” of FSU immigrants—and, as 
implied there, their children—suggest a certain stable set of attitudes, 
described as more right-wing and conservative in comparison to other Jewish 
layers in Israeli society—especially when it comes to the peace process and 
territorial concessions (e.g. Philippov/ Knafelman 2011; Philippov/ Bystrov 
2011; Arian et al. 2010; Goldstein/ Gitelman 2004). Remennick (2007) 
described the phenomenon as “integration without assimilation”. Yet, 
Bagno’s study (2011b) suggests that the political attitudes of immigrants 
approach those of the Israeli majority over time.  
In the literature, there are two major positions about how to perceive the 
(first generation of) new Israelis’ persistence. One of them is arguing that 
this standing matches the latest developments of growing pluralism and 
visibility of minorities in Israeli society (cf. Dayan 2004). However, 
researchers who take a more pessimistic position on the phenomenon argue 
that, on the contrary, this is a sign of the group’s perception of themselves as 
part of the dominant Jewish majority and, moreover, “the elite within [this] 
majority” (Shumsky 2001). Connected to that “elite”-perception is that of 
one’s (cultural) superiority over ethnic and national, in particular Muslim 
minorities (cf. Lerner 2010; Shumsky 2001). What Khanin describes as a 
“preservation of [the] mentality and values of ‘Russian’ Jewishness and less 
                                                             
the establishment of “independent community-centred” (Khanin 2011: 59), 
“sectoral” (e.g. Bagno 2011a) parties.  
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of ‘Russian’ language and culture” (Khanin 2007: 115), the perception of 
“Russia as a [supranational] civilisation” (Lerner 2010: 29), serves as the 
necessary link to understand the increasingly extreme positions with regard 
to granting civil rights to ethnic and national minorities in Israel, in particular 
Palestinians (cf. Lerner 2010; Lomsky-Feder et al. 2005; Shumsky 2004; 
2001). Concluding from this, at least for the first generation of FSU 
immigrants, it is safe to say that those restrictive attitudes have a cultural 
dimension, personally experienced in their (post-)Soviet everyday life, 
which is added to the perception of threat against the background of the 
security situation.  
 
 
6.2 THE YISRA’EL BEITENU PARTY 
 
The current section reviews literature on the Yisra’el Beitenu party. The 
respective literature on the Yisra’el Beitenu party focuses on three main 
aspects, namely its status within the Israeli party system—or, to speak with 
Khanin, whether IB is a “Russian party with an Israeli accent” or an “Israeli 
party with a Russian accent” (Khanin 2010: 105-6)—, its location within the 
Israeli political continuum between left-wing and right-wing ideologies as 
well as the context of the party’s constantly growing electoral success 
between 1999 and 2009.  
 
6.2.1 Is Yisra’el Beitenu an Extreme Right-Wing Party? 
 
In his historical overview of Israeli political extreme right-wing parties, 
Pedahzur challenges Ehud Sprinzak’s “classic definition” of what is 
understood as right-wing extremism in Israel (Pedahzur, 2000; 2001). This 
“classic” concept had evolved after the Six-Day War (1967) and used a 
traditional definition based on the analysis of the historical phenomena of 
“revolutionary fascism” in Europe and the “American postwar radical right” 
(Pedahzur 2001: 26), and was built exclusively on issues of “land and 
security” (Pedahzur 2001: 25). On the basis of his observation that about 20 
per cent of the then Knesset members favoured antidemocratic or 
xenophobic ideas, Pedahzur argues in favour of replacing Sprinzak’s concept 
with a more contemporary approach based on the analysis of today’s 
European extreme right-wing movements and parties. He defines right-wing 
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extremism as a syndrome of several features, namely nationalism, racism 
(“old” and “new”), xenophobia, anti-democracy or favouring a strong state 
(cf. Pedahzur 2001; e.g. also Mudde 2002; 1995). Pedahzur concludes that 
the observed transformation of the right-wing political camp also has 
immense influence on the political party scene in Israel: the emergence of a 
multi-party camp, united by a “shared ideological vision” about how to deal 
with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict but divided by others, reinforced the 
“polarisation within Israeli society”, causing “more conventional parties” to 
“[adopt] the political manners and style” of the political parties on the right-
wing edge (Pedahzur 2001: 39).  
Pedahzur shows that the Israeli right-wing extremism has “transformed” 
from an “old” form (1970s-1990s), mainly represented by the KACH party, 
founded by Rabbi Meir Kahane, and predominantly playing on nationalist 
and racist tones. The “new” form which has emerged on the Israeli political 
scene is nowadays represented by SHAS and Yisra’el Beitenu.19 Along with 
features represented already by the “old” form, Pedahzur identifies new 
features, such as xenophobia, anti-establishment, or anti-democratic 
tendencies. In particular, IB demands a fundamental modification of Israel’s 
“judiciary or criminal justice systems” (Pedahzur 2001: 31), incriminating it 
as “administrative dictatorship” over the elected government (Pedahzur 
2001: 35), as well as the provision of the president with much more power, 
comparable to the political power the Russian president wields (ibid.). 
Accordingly, IB’s 1999 election campaign—the first general election the 
party participated in—focused on “mobiliz[ing]” feelings of “deprivation” 
and “frustration”, based on the perceived “persecution of the Russian 
community in Israel” by the police and other institutional organs (ibid.).  
The typical voter of the Yisra’el Beitenu party is, according to Bagno’s 
findings, secular, younger, an immigrant male whose ethnic origin is his first 
identity, afraid of Arabs as a group, lives in an area affected by (recent) 
military operations, holds right-wing or hawkish political views and is 
attracted by the party’s programme rather than by a concrete candidate 
(Bagno 2011a: 31). Besides, IB’s immigrant voters are “least satisfied with 
the quality of democracy”, as mainly mirrored in their perceived low political 
                                                             
19  Although Pedahzur mainly focuses on SHAS—IB had been founded only two 
years before the publication of his article—, his analysis reveals some interesting 
aspects about Lieberman’s party as well.  
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efficacy, low political interest and low political literacy; accordingly, they 
are expected to use their vote more as a “protest” (Bagno 2011a: 27).20 This 
finding can be seen as a proof of Pedahzur’s finding (2001) of IB presenting 
itself as an anti-establishment party (see above). Accordingly, Bagno states 
that when those voters with an immigrant background actually become 
politically active, they, more than their veteran Israel counterparts, “make 
instrumental use of [this] participation” (Bagno 2011a: 28). Khanin attests to 
the party a “substantial political protest potential” (Khanin 2010: 107). IB 
has made extensive use of this protest potential and based its electoral 
campaigning on an “unprecedented attack on members of the Israeli law 
enforcement and the bureaucratic establishment”, and in this way won the 
“solidarity of both immigrants from the FSU and other origins as well as 
veteran Israelis” (Khanin 2010: 107; see also Pedahzur 2000). This strategy 
obviously pays off despite the fact that the party has been part of that 
“establishment” since 2006 and left the governments several times for 
strategic reasons only.  
There are two major positions to explain the recent electoral success of 
extreme right-wing parties in Israel: while some authors see the reasons 
basically in social and economic processes, in particular the state of the 
welfare state and failures of the political elites to respond adequately, 21 
others explain the phenomenon with processes and transformations within 
the political field itself (e.g. Mustafa/ Ghanem 2010). Pedahzur embeds IB’s 
appearance and electoral success into the broader process of the 
“transformation of Israel’s extreme right” (Pedahzur 2001; 2000). In his 
analysis of the “supporting conditions for the survival [and emergence of 
new] extreme right-wing parties in Israel”, Pedahzur develops an 
explanatory model, including conditions on several levels: the bottom of his 
pyramid is the Israeli political culture, followed by the analysis of social 
cleavages, structural factors (i.e. the threshold vote or legal controls), with 
the top formed by the very party scene (Pedahzur 2000). The most important 
                                                             
20  This gives reason to worry since Torney-Purta and Klandl Richardson (2004) 
emphasized the importance of those three factors as much of a precondition for 
political engagement.  
21  Daniel Gutwein. How the left elevated Lieberman. Haaretz (English Edition), 
2009. Retrieved from: http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/how-the-
left-elevated-lieberman-1.269990  
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feature of the country’s political culture is what Smooha had called “ethnic 
democracy” (Smooha 2009; 2001),22 which Pedahzur sees as the 
“precondition for ethnic conflict” because it “[encourages] radical political 
expressions towards the minority” (Pedahzur 2000: 8-9). In this regard, the 
Yisra’el Beitenu party—according to Peled an “extreme right-wing party 
headed by a West Bank settler, Avigdor Lieberman” (Peled 2011: 278)—
particularly plays on an ethno-nationalist component of Israeli citizenship, 
and “gained notoriety” (ibid.) with Lieberman promoting his plan of a 
territorial exchange of Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria with Israeli 
territories inhabiting large populations of Palestinian Israelis, namely near 
the 1967 Green Line and in Southern Galilee.  
A further level of Pedahzur’s model (Pedahzur 2000) is represented by 
various cleavages in Israeli society, in particular social rifts. These cleavages 
are important for the analysis because one fundamental feature of the “new” 
right-wing extremism in Israel is the parties’ development of a “two-
dimensional platform”, on which social cleavages serve as one issue—
particular notions of how the Palestinian-Israeli conflict should be solved 
form the other—instead of previous parties relying on only a single issue. 
Consequently, when it comes to the level of the party scene itself, those 
political parties are most successful in managing to persuade the electorate 
of their ideological vision and are able to “[represent] their constituencies” 
simultaneously (Pedahzur 2000: 21). Lately, SHAS and Yisra’el Beitenu 
have been most successful in this respect.  
 
6.2.2 Is Yisra’el Beitenu an “Ethnic Party”? 
 
In order to categorize the Yisra’el Beitenu party, Bagno refers to Chandra 
and Wilkinson’s differentiation between “ethnic structure” and “ethnic 
practice” (Chandra/ Wilkinson 2008): while ethnic parties relying on the 
former approach put emphasis on “descent-based attributes” in order to 
mobilize specific groups, ethnic parties utilizing “ethnic practice” for the 
same purpose emphasize rather “time-sensitive” categories (cf. Bagno 
2011a: 20). “These categories [imply] the exclusion of others, but at the same 
time go for an explicitly national agenda in order to catch-all possible eligible 
                                                             
22  On the discussion of the concept itself, see for example Berent 2010; Danel 2009; 
Peled/ Navot 2005; Ghanem et al. 1998; Peled 1992; and Yiftachel 1992.  
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votes” (Bagno 2011a: 21).23 Another feature Bagno mentions in this context 
is a “catch-all ethnic party’s” “loyal[ty] to the establishment” (Bagno 2011a: 
22)—a feature Pedahzur (2001) would strongly disagree with with regard to 
IB. The remains of the “ethnic party” can be found in IB’s use of the Russian 
language in its media campaign for the 2009 general elections as well as in 
the Russian-speaking candidates on the party’s electoral list. Though both 
components may as well serve the opposite argument of the immigrants’ and 
the party’s political assimilation to the Israeli scene since, first, Russian-
speaking candidates can be found on the lists of other major parties as well 
(though not as many at the top of the respective list as with IB), and second, 
other major parties also made use of Russian language-campaigning since 
Israelis with an FSU background have become a major political force. This 
development meets the interests of the party’s potential constituents, as 
Glöckner states: “RSJ [Russian-Speaking Jewish] voting patterns in the 
elections of 2003 and 2006 rather indicated that the model of pure ‘Russian’ 
parties has passed its peak, possibly underlying the fact that for many of the 
RSJ immigrants the socio-economic situation had improved very much in 
the course of the last decade” (Glöckner 2011: 83).  
Accordingly, Khanin tells the history of the Yisra’el Beitenu party as a 
history of “[ideological] transformation”: based on his findings that 2/3 of 
IB’s electorate in the 2009 general elections consisted of Russian-speakers 
and 1/3 of veteran Israelis without such a background. Khanin states that the 
party’s “major dilemma [was] to find a modus vivendi between [its] 
nationwide aspirations and [its] predominantly Russian community 
character” (Khanin 2010: 105).24 Khanin sees a major cause for IB’s electoral 
success in the “charismatic Lieberman” himself, appearing as the 
representative of various peripheral social groups, as well as the successful 
launching of the “concept of a ‘population and territories exchange’” which 
can be understood as a “neo-centralist alternative” to both left-wing and 
right-wing political approaches of how to reach a peace agreement with the 
Palestinians (ibid.). In order to pacify the obvious contradiction of keeping 
                                                             
23  On the concept of a “catch-all ethnic party” see Enyedi 2008; Mudde 1999; and 
Roper 1994.  
24  On the question of how far this “Russian community character” was still 
predominant in 2009; Bagno (2011a) found that in the latest of these elections IB 
was no longer perceived as an immigrant party.  
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its Russian-speaking electorate while gaining electoral support of veteran 
Israelis, the Yisra’el Beitenu party has “regular[ly] updat[ed] its political 
image [as well as its] political tactics” (Khanin 2010: 107) and has 
transformed from an “‘all-Israeli’ right-wing party [with an] electorate [...] 
coincidently Russian-speaking [via a] Russian non-sectarian party [via a] 
Russian party with an Israeli accent [toward a (currently)] originally Russian 
nationwide party” (ibid.). Correspondingly, Khanin finds that the party’s 
ideology has gone through an evolution as well: while in its first election 
campaign in 1999 the party shared a moderate right-wing ideology with the 
Likud and a social welfare orientation with the then still-successful FSU 
immigrant-based Yisra’el Ba’aliyah (YBA), it performed a strong “right-
wing shift” when entering the National Union bloc in 2003, but returned to 
a more moderate “centre-right” ideology after leaving the bloc in 2004 
(ibid.).  
Through all these switches and transformations, the Yisra’el Beitenu 
party has not only been able to “preserve most of its camp’s strong right-
wing Russian and veteran core”, but also to compensate losses from this 
camp by gaining a more moderate electorate in 2006, mainly through 
wandering voters from the Likud, YBA and the Kadima party (ibid.). By 
2006, the party had managed to “balance internal ideological controversies” 
between an “Israeli Russian-Jewish community which voted either for the 
ideological right or which was social welfare-oriented centre and would have 
otherwise voted for an immigrant party”, a “right-wing Liebermanist core”, 
and a “more moderate mainstream” party (Khanin 2010: 109). According to 
Khanin, it had done so mainly by combining a “kind of centre party” 
ideology25—filling an “ideological vacuum” left by the political failure to 
achieve peace of Sharon’s plan to disengage from Gaza—with a “strong 
rightist rhetoric” (Khanin 2010: 109-10). In addition to this, the party made 
“effective use of the historical momentum” (Khanin 2010: 119), mainly 
through “capturing the feelings of public anger about Palestinian Israeli 
demonstrations” (Khanin 2010: 114) in support of Hamas in the context of 
the military operation “Cast Lead” (2009) in Gaza. Olena Bagno would 
                                                             
25  With the announcement of the so-called “Kissinger-Lieberman-Plan or 
Lieberman-Plan”, the party had practically accepted “a territorial compromise 
between Jews and Arabs in the lands West of the Jordan river [and, implicitly, 
also] the establishment of a Palestinian state.”  
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disagree here: she emphasises that in its 2009 electoral campaign the Yisra’el 
Beitenu party made only implicit use of exclusionist elements, but did not 
openly attack Palestinian Israelis or other ethnic or social groups (Bagno 
2011a) with slogans like “No loyalty, no citizenship”.26  
As a consequence, in 2009 Lieberman’s party had not only made major 
transformations of its public image and its ideology, but it had also 
experienced “substantial [yet, wanted] changes of its electorate” (Khanin 
2010: 114) since through these transformations it had also become attractive 
for veteran Israelis for whom Lieberman had stopped being a “persona non 
grata” (Khanin 2010: 113). The Israeli political centre had started to see his 
sharp rhetoric as mere framing of ideas which in the 2006 elections had still 
been unacceptable, simultaneously, Lieberman had become a symbol for the 
representation of peripheral groups of Israeli society (cf. Peled 2011).  
 
6.2.3 Yisra’el Beitenu’s Electoral Success 
 
Electoral campaigns must not be underestimated, and IB’s electoral 
campaigns have accordingly undergone important transformations. In her 
paper, Meller analyses the Yisra’el Beitenu party’s electoral campaigns on 
TV for the general elections of 1999 to 2009. From her analysis, she 
concludes that the party has employed the “metaphor of nation as home and 
family”—as already the party’s name suggests—as a conscious reference to 
Israeli or Zionist history (Meller 2010: 3) and important values in Israeli 
political culture in order to “remove [...] ambiguity” about Israel as the 
“home of ‘Russian’ Jews” (Meller 2010: 7). Meller understands the party’s 
1999 campaign as “a statement [both] against competing Russian parties [as 
well as] against the Israeli establishment” (Meller 2010: 7-8);27 this meets 
Pedahzur’s definition of the new Israeli right (see above; e.g. also Pedahzur 
2001). In the 1999 elections, IB functioned as a “bridge [toward] a home” 
for those Russian-speaking Israelis who wanted to “relinquish their identity” 
(Meller 2010: 8; cf. also Shumsky 2001). Interestingly, the campaign 
                                                             
26  Partija “Yisra’el Beitenu” (“Our House Israel”). Online Platform. http:// 
www.ndi.org.il (Russian). 
27  Lieberman, according to Khanin (2002), refers to the Israeli establishment as 
“oligarchs”, after the economic elite which evolved in Russia and other former 
Soviet Republics in the aftermath of their independence.  
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presented Lieberman “as a fierce leader”—an image which will remain in 
the later campaigns—and placed the issues of social welfare and national 
security on the party’s central agenda (Meller 2010: 9). Meller interprets IB’s 
decision to run within the extreme right bloc “National Union” in 2003 as 
“an integral part of [its and its voters’] socialisation in Israeli society” 
(Meller 2010: 11): the parties of the bloc shared the vision of an “anti-Arab 
and anti-concessions and [...] hawkish defence plan” (ibid.). Again, the issue 
of national security was stressed, and Lieberman was presented as a 
“protective paternal figure” (ibid.). In 2006, the party again ran as a “stand-
alone party”; in its campaign, the party promised to “resolve the 
demographic problem”—again, a national security issue—in order to 
“reaffirm [IB’s] position on the Jewish identity of the state” and to overcome 
the perceived disintegration of the Jewish Israeli society in order to “unite 
against a common [external] enemy” (Meller 2010: 12). Finally, Meller sees 
the success of the party’s 2009 campaign in mainly two factors: the party-
related “carefully constructed discourse” around the party leader, Lieberman, 
as well as the context-related “consistent shift to the right” of Israeli society 
(Meller 2010: 15), and a respective adaptation of the party’s agenda.  
In her analysis of IB’s 2009 electoral campaign, Bagno finds that the 
party “exclusively [builds on] issues related to Israel rather than on ethnic 
policy issues” (Bagno 2011a: 24) despite the fact that their candidate list for 
the elections includes “many immigrants” and suggests the opposite. Above 
all, security or the perceived lack of it is an issue; the party’s programme/ 
platform as well as its campaign centre around security concerns. The party’s 
messages in the campaign—namely, “Lieberman—I trust him”, “No loyalty, 
no citizenship”, “Only Lieberman understands Arabic”—call upon implicit 
“feeling[s] of personal insecurity induced by external forces” or “disloyal 
forces” (Bagno 2011a: 26-7), whereas concrete exclusionist demands on 
ethnic grounds are rather implicit or introduced in the public discussion of 
those messages (Bagno 2011a: 26).  
Alongside the developments described above, most authors mention the 
influence of current events on IB’s electoral success in 2009, above all the 
military operations against Hamas in Gaza28 which had ended only three 
weeks before the 2009 elections, and in the cause of which IB was able to 
put its major issue of personal and national security on the agenda. Arian et 
                                                             
28  Referred to as “Operation Cast Lead” in public discourse. 
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al. reflect that the territorial conflict between Israel and the Palestinians has 
been “[superimposing] itself upon all other political divisions” ever since the 
1967 Six-Day War (Arian et al. 2011: 280). In its cause, security issues have 
dominated the “mindset of Israeli voters” and divided Israeli society along 
the “foreign policy cleavages”; besides, security became “interlocked with 
the religious—secular split and nationalist attitudes” (ibid.). Not 
surprisingly, security issues (along with social issues) dominated the 
electoral agenda of the political parties and by putting them on the agenda 
they best met the public opinion (Tsfat et al. 2011: 233). IB was most 
successful in doing so and accordingly received the best media coverage of 
its electoral campaign—though 83 per cent of those news reports contained 
“criticism on ideological grounds” (Tsfat et al. 2011: 238-9). Yet, Khanin 
(2009) 29 states that IB’s success in the 2009 elections cannot be explained 
by the “Gaza effect” only since even left-wing politicians criticize that the 
military operation was stopped prematurely. However, he emphasizes that 
Lieberman made the strongest statements about it; and in addition, it seems 
that his long-term critique of Israeli Arabs pays out in this context because it 
meets the disappointment of many Jewish Israelis by the open support or 
solidarity with Hamas (cf. also Waxman 2012). Last but not least, Pedahzur 
and Brichta point to the role the utilisation of local government structures 
can play in a party’s electoral success, especially with regard to new political 
parties which aim at entering parliament through (existing) local structures. 
Local government structures represent an “important resource” for those 
parties since they establish a “linkage” to the national level (Pedahzur and 
Brichta 2000: 55).  
To sum up, according to Meller, IB’s campaigns mirror the party’s as 
well as its Russian-speaking voters’ political integration or “Israelization” 
(Meller 2010: 16): having started with a founding body of Russian-speaking 
Israelis and electoral campaigns in Russian with Hebrew subtitles, by the 
next general elections in 2003, they (as part of the bloc) could count on the 
support of non-Russian-speaking candidates and the party’s growing ability 
to attract non-Russian-speaking voters. This trend continued in 2006 and led 
to TV ads completely in Hebrew (with Russian subtitles, as had become 
                                                             
29  Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin. Феномен НДИ: станет ли Либерман новым 
Бегиным? IzRus, 08.02. 2009. Retrieved from:  
 http://izrus.co.il/obshina/article/2009-02-08/3683.html  
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standard for Israeli political parties) in 2009 (Meller 2010: 16). Meller sees 
the party’s ongoing integration of the electoral campaigns going hand in 
hand with the political adaptation of its Russian-speaking electorate, 
referring to the electorate’s “development of a collective identity” from a 
more “introvert political and social inclination in the Russian community 
[…] [toward the predomination of a] general-national Jewish identity” (ibid.; 
cf. also Shumsky 2001).30 Accordingly, asking about the party’s public 
image shows that a majority of both FSU immigrants and veteran Israelis 
think of IB “not [as] an immigrant party”, and among IB voters the number 
of people sharing this view is even higher (Bagno 2011a: 25).31  
 
                                                             
30  Yet, Meller is not consistent in her general evaluation of the party and its voters’ 
integration, since in her final conclusion she still sees major elements of a “Soviet 
political culture” defining the voters’ approach to the Israeli reality (Meller 2010: 
16).  
31  73% of the respondents in the 2009 INES survey with an FSU origin and 64% of 
veteran Israelis expressed this view, and correspondingly 78% of IB voters with 
an FSU origin and 88%of veteran Israelis (Bagno 2011a: 25).  
 




7 The Interviewees’ Objective Position  
in Israeli Society:  




The participants in the present study do not talk about their civic engagement 
in a vacuum. Social action, here: civic engagement, takes place in a particular 
social environment, here: the political, field, against the background of 
objective opportunities or restraints and individual power resources. In the 
present chapter, I will briefly discuss the participants’ objective position in 
Israeli society as the social space within which the present study has been 
undertaken. I consider the participants in the study members of the social 
group of immigrants from the former Soviet Union, arriving in Israel after 
its collapse. The consideration of Israelis with an FSU family background as 
a social group is for methodological reasons rather than based on 
assumptions about the group’s identity. As outlined above, according to 
Bourdieu, members of a social group share a similar objective position in a 
given social space based on their possession of capital. Having said this, it is 
likely for members of that social group to share particular experiences of 
opportunity and restraint in the process of incorporation. 
The short description shall mark the starting point for an analysis of the 
interviewees’ objective position within this social space. As outlined above, 
time is essential for the accumulation and validation of capital as well as the 
development and reorganisation of habitual dispositions. In this context, I 
will provide an analysis of the power resources the interviewees present to 
have at their disposal during time. 
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7.1 THE OBJECTIVE POSITION OF  
FSU IMMIGRANTS: MAJORITY OR MINORITY? 
 
Israel is an immigration country, encouraging in particular “return 
migration” from the Jewish diaspora. Immigrants from the former Soviet 
Union have arrived in Israel under the Law of Return (1952) which regulates 
(Jewish) immigration to Israel. The objective position of those immigrants 
can be analysed along two dimensions: their legal status, i.e. citizenship 
status (Delanty 1997: 9), and their social status. According to the Law of 
Return, immigrants are granted immediate Israeli citizenship and the 
allocation of full political rights (e.g. Israeli passport, active and passive 
voting rights); and they receive full economic rights (e.g. access to welfare).  
The recognition of diploma or formal education in general—and thus the 
immigrants’ economic incorporation—has been easier in Israel than in other 
countries of Jewish immigration from the former Soviet Union (Glöckner 
2011; 2005). Glöckner (2011) states that in Israel—unlike in other receiving 
countries—FSU immigrants have joined the dominant group (Israeli Jewish 
citizens). Like every other (Jewish) citizen of Israel, military service is 
mandatory for FSU immigrants—its length however, depending on age and 
family status upon arrival—and they are obliged to pay taxes.  
Thus, legally, immigrants and their families who arrived in the country 
from countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) have become Israeli 
citizens. However, there is collective discrimination against a particular 
group of immigrants—in theory not targeted against those from FSU 
countries, but in practice it concerns mainly them as a social group—under 
the Law of Return and their family members with regard to their cultural.  
In the hegemonic discourse Jewish immigrants are considered home-
comers. Those new citizens are expected to integrate quickly and smoothly 
into Israeli society, “be committed to the Israeli national ethos” (Lomsky-
Feder/ Rapoport 2001: 1) and become “real Israelis” (Golden 2001). 
However, Jewish immigrants—though sharing more or less of a common 
cultural heritage based on “Jewish Law” (Fromm 1989 [1922])—bring 
experiences different from those who stayed “at home”1 and are newcomers 
in the specific cultural context of Israeli society. Their social status in the 
                                                             
1  On home-comers cf. also Schütz 1945 
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7.2 ANALYSIS OF POWER RESOURCES I:  
“MOVE UPHILL” 
 
Most of the interviewees have lived in the reality of migration and 
incorporation. They mention economic problems at home, and usually they 
connect these difficulties with their family’s migration background. Zeev, 
for instance, tells me his parents “don’t have time for us [Zeev and his little 
sister], they are working all the time” (Zeev, p. 7); in a similar token, Katya 
states: “[my mother], she is working a lot, so, my grandmother looked after 
me” (Katya, p. 9). 
But the interviewees refer to those experiences differently, depending on 
the extent to which they have made those experiences and their individual 
strategies of coping and the issues they emphasise in their narratives. 
Crosscutting these individual factors, there are differences between those 
who have already started their professional careers and those who are still in 
school, i.e. with respect to the length of their stay in Israel. The former would 
hardly speak of any difficulties in their families. Katya, for instance, 
immigrated as a 10-year-old girl with her mother and grandmother from 
Moscow in 1993, has lived in Bat-Yam near Tel-Aviv, (“the centre” [Katya, 
p. 1]), ever since. She finished school, did her military service, received 
higher education and started working; she had spent more than two thirds of 
her life in the country, has a mixed circle of friends and speaks of herself as 
“Russian-Jewish Israeli, this is the end of the immigrant era” (Katya, p. 1). 
Her emphasis is rather on her present personal achievements and experiences 
of success and living “a normal life” (Katya, p. 21) than difficulties in the 
context of migration experienced in the past. 
For those interviewees still in school and living at home, those 
difficulties are still a central part of their everyday experience. Their families 
often live at the periphery of the country—not Katya’s “centre”—with regard 
to geographical as well as economic concerns. Boris’s story shall serve as an 
example here. Boris was finishing school at the moment of the interview; he 
grew up in Hadar, a geographically lower neighbourhood in the northern 
Israeli city of Haifa with a higher percentage of more recent immigrants as 
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well as low-income families than elsewhere in the city. He is aware of living 
at the periphery, saying of his place of residence: “immigrants who made it 
[economically] move uphill” (Boris, p. 2).2 He is well aware of the economic 
difficulties in his family, his parents’ hard work in order to advance 
economically, and the does not complain about their absence, but simply 
states it is that way. Yet, Boris personally experiences the consequences of 
the difficult economic situation in the family, not only in terms of money but 
also with regard to his sense of belonging: 
 
Boris: “My grandmother and grandfather were not very interested in looking after me. 
Why? Because I am not Jewish (.), like, in Ukraine I was Jewish, here I am not, 
actually, in Israel (.) [I am] Ukrainian, there [in Ukraine] I am (Jewish)“ 
Interviewer: “(Mmh)“. 
Boris: “Here it goes according to the mother, and my mother is Ukrainian, so my 
grandparents were not very interested in looking after me ((because)) I am, well, 
again, I am not Jewish.“ (Boris, p. 2)  
 
In Boris’s story, the family’s financial situation links what is happening on 
the collective level (e.g. hegemonic discourse on home-coming, stereotypes 
about recent immigrants) with the individual level of dealing with the 
consequences of migration. The child is directly confronted with the 
consequences, and finally accepts that he does not belong (“I am not Jewish”) 
and thus is not as worthy to be “look[ed] after”. In Boris’s view, this even 
divides his family. Summing up, Boris states: “I was more a street kid, 
hanging out with friends” (Boris, p. 2). 
In single cases, like Avi’s, the issue of physical violence at home is 
brought up. Avi, now living in Natserat Illit, grew up in Hadar as well. Even 
before their immigration to Israel, the family was in financial difficulties. 
Originally from Moscow, after his parents’ divorce and his mother’s 
remarriage, the family “was forced to move to Kharkiv [Ukraine]” (Avi, p. 
                                                             
2  However, the interviewees perceive their everyday life at the periphery 
differently. Lukas, who like Boris has almost finished school and lives with his 
family in Hadar, tells me of a quiet everyday life. The family already has 
improved economically and moved a little “uphill”, both parents work, but his 
mother has already found the spare time to become actively engaged in their 
neighbourhood (Lukas, p. 10).  
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1). In 1993, when Avi was eight, Avi’s family, including his grandparents, 
immigrated to Israel for economic reasons (“[The decision to immigrate] 
didn’t derive from any value, any value, any Zionist value” (Avi, p. 1) and 
settled in Natserat Illit. Yet, the financial situation of the family did not 
improve until his stepfather finally found work. The family moved to Haifa, 
and Avi’s little sister was born. Avi does not speak much about the situation 
at home. Regarding his step-father, he simply summarises: “we did not have 
a good relationship, we had [physical] fights, I was hospitalised” (Avi, p. 2). 
Also, later, already as an adult, Avi refers to second-hand experiences of 
physical violence: when he speaks about his own civic engagement later on, 
he tells similar stories about young people from families with an FSU 
background growing up in Natserat Illit. In their relatively weak objective 
position as newcomers in Israeli society, the interviewees experience subtle 
discrimination of immigrants in everyday life. Acts of discrimination are 
exercised by individuals against individuals but also perceive them as 
members of a particular social group, new citizens.  
This is neither a particular Israeli problem nor a problem concerning 
especially Israelis with an FSU family background. As previous empirical 
research shows, especially in economically weak or peripheral areas, social 
problems interfere with ethnic cleavages (e.g. Gonzalez-Sobrino 2016; Barth 
1969). Correspondingly, especially those interviewees living in peripheral 
towns or neighbourhoods directly experience social cleavages in their 
everyday lives and they fight those cleavages on the street. Emmanuel, who 
immigrated with his family in 1998 from Novosibirsk as a five-year-old and 
also lives in Hadar with his parents and his little sister—tells me about an 
incident on the street: 
 
“They called me a ‘stinking Russian’ on the street, they also humiliated my little sister, 
[...] they think of themselves that—if arrives here some immigrant and he doesn’t 
know the language nor has he work nor connections, meaning he is no one, so you 
can do with him whatever they want (..), and till today they simply think of themselves 
that they are much better and this, this is simply humiliating.” (Emmanuel, p. 1) 
 
Elsewhere in his story, Emmanuel clarifies who “they” are: “those from 
Morocco” (Emmanuel, p. 5), Israelis of Mizrahi origin. Again, there is a 
difference between those—usually the younger ones—for whom social 
cleavages are an everyday reality because they live in a particular 
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neighbourhood and those who have “move[d] uphill”. The latter rather 
consider those experiences as past and hardly mention incidents in this 
context. However, there is a commonality between the younger and the older 
in their strategies of coping with those incidents from a backward 
perspective. Basically, the interviewees fight a cultural “war with words” 
(Brekle 1989) in their narratives. Mizrahim are presented as culturally 
different and even inferior because of particular values of “honour, [...] and 
the status of women” (Emmanuel, p. 28; Avi, p. 22) ascribed to them. 
Emmanuel has adapted the hegemonic discourse about the weaker social 
status of Mizrahi Israelis and the justification of that status on grounds of a 
claimed cultural inferiority. Yet, the style of Emmanuel’s narrative—he tells 
it in the 3rd person—suggests the encounter he tells me about is not a very 
recent experience but one he looks at already from a distance. And indeed, 
he tells me about another incident later in the interview: The positive 
experience confuses him and makes him reflect about the truthfulness of the 
stereotypes he holds toward Mizrahim: 
 
“I hated those people my whole life, and now, like, I suddenly have some friendly 
relationships with them—and this I understand, you begin to understand that not 
everything, not all of them, well, again, you understand that the majority, that anyway 
they run around [...] ‘you are bad Russians’.” (Emmanuel, p. 9)  
 
As Boris’s story already suggested, the interviewees also experience a more 
abstract form of subtle discrimination. In the hegemonic discourse, and 
particularly the media, recent FSU immigrants have been suspected to have 
fled their home countries for economic reasons rather than “coming home” 
to Israel for ideological reasons, i.e. based on Zionism (e.g. Remennick 2007; 
Dayan 2004). The lack of ideological reasons for immigration to Israel—to 
make Aliyah, i.e. to ascend, as would be the corresponding ideological 
term—clearly violates the “Israeli national ethos” (Lomsky-Feder/ Rapoport 
2001) of home-coming. Due to the successful overall incorporation of 
Israelis with an FSU family background in the long run, it is probable that 
this has become less of an issue in public. But especially the older 
participants in the study are aware of that discourse. Accordingly, Vicky 
directly refers to the discourse of home-coming when she stresses the 
particular “Zionist” atmosphere at home. As an eight-year-old child Vicky 
moved with her family from Belarus to Israel in 1992. Vicky’s statement 
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suggests that the emphasis on being Jewish has entered her home only after 
arrival in Israel; yet it can be read as a means to prove her right of 
immigration:  
 
“We didn’t talk about politics, but we did talk, we talked about that is important that 
we are in Israel, ehm, (...) and (...) that we are happy and that we are well here and 
that we are here to stay, [...] so maybe that those are my roots, that from there I already 




“[Back in Russia the atmosphere at home was] maybe less [Zionist], maybe it was 
less ideological, ehm, to go to Israel because we are Jewish, but (..) it was not the 
ideology of the 1970s when people fled the SU because they were strong Zionists, but 
I can ensure you that here [in Israel] I, here, me and mother—ok, grandma, grandma, 
she was always very anti-, anti-nationalistic, she, she never was connected to Russian, 
Christian, Jewish, whatever—so [about] the Aliyah I can’t tell, but here I altered into 
being very, very Jewish.” (Katya, p. 18)  
 
The narratives reflect a constant reference to the hegemonic discourse of 
home-coming and Zionism; and Vicky’s and Katya’s statements have to be 
understood as a discursive reproduction of this discourse. Both present their 
lives in Israel after immigration as an adaptation to the “national ethos”. By 
doing so, both prove—in contrast to Boris—to those who have raised those 
accusations, the invisible audience they talk to here, that they belong. 
From that position of belonging, Katya reflects upon the individual 
reasons of such discriminative behaviour and manages to reconcile her 
negative past experiences with a present feeling of having moved beyond: 
 
Katya: “Here [in Israel], I was offended when I was called “Russian” because there 
[in Russia] I always knew I was Jewish (..), that is why here, here it bothered me very 
much (..) but I have overcome this, too.” 
Interviewer: “What does that mean, to be ‘Russian’? How did you deal with that?“ 
Katya: “How I dealt with that? I was always (.) directly becoming emotional and to 
explain: ‘why do you call me like that, I am Jewish, and my mother is Jewish, and all 
my family is Jewish, and me, (.) who are you to say that to me’, so, I took that very, 
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like, very, very (.) emotional, but, ehm (..)—again, that came from kids, usually, that 
did not come from, from—, well, adults, I was a kid back then”. 
Interviewer: “Yes, but you also said, your mother either was called ‘Russian’?” Katya: 
“Y—yes, (..) but also, (..)—people who, ehm (.) (laughing)—are less successful in 
life, suddenly see someone who comes to the country as a stranger (.), who comes to 
the country and slowly gets along better than those people—which is also very natural 
[that they] say (.) “he takes my place”, that is very natural, that is natural self-defence 
of people, now I understand that, so, now I don’t care about them (..), ehm, (..)—
indeed, generally, the Aliyah of the 1990s was, was, also helped the country—well, 
Aliyah always helps, immigrants always help, because they raise the level of the 
population that already lives—that is not true only (.) from my point of view, I believe 
it is true also (.) for other countries, not only Israel.” (Katya, p. 23)  
 
Katya’s qualification at the end of her quote (“I believe it is true also (.) for 
other countries, not only Israel”) suggests that the experience she tells is in 
the past (“that came from kids, usually, that did not come from, from—, well, 
adults, I was a kid back then”) and that Katya has developed a way of coping 
with those experiences. Yet, the story also reveals that the she had not 
expected confrontation with or questioning of her sense of belonging (“I was 
offended”, “I was always (.) directly becoming emotional [crying?]”).3  
Both Katya and Vicky connect the experienced confrontation in Israel 
with personal experiences of anti-Semitism back in the former Soviet Union. 
They present those experiences as a similar confrontation of not belonging 
in their narratives. Vicky remembers how she learnt that she was Jewish and 
what it meant; it is easy to get her sarcasm: 
 
“At home I heard talking that we are Jewish and that we are different. In our class 
were only two Jewish kids, we had the knowledge that we both were Jewish and that 
we need to take care of each other, but also the kids in class helped us to know because 
they told us.” (Vicky, p. 11)  
 
Katya describes strategies of hiding her Jewishness:  
  
                                                             
3  Katya’s example confirms that an individual’s sense of belonging contains an 
emotional component; this emotional component will be revisited throughout the 
interviews. 
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“To Judaism we [Katya and her mother] became connected already here [in Israel] 
(6), ehm, wow, I really—actually not (.) though—wow, that’s funny, that’s really 
funny—, when, ehm, my mother had taken the decision that we come here and I 
already knew that we would leave—I was in school, I was in 1st grade, nine years old, 
ten—(..) the moment my mother would say something to me (.) on the street (.), ehm, 
well, ‘listen, we leave, you need to, in school you need to do so and so’, I would 
always say to her: ‘Mama, schschschsch! Don’t talk about that! Schschschsch! Keep 
that a secret, so no one knows!’. I don’t have a clue where that came from, but 
obviously it came from some built-in fear (..) that it is forbidden to talk about that we 
are Jewish, forbidden to talk about that because of all that repression—my great-
grandfather, the father of my grandfather, he was in prison from 1937, they released 
him when Stalin died [in 1953], that is just—what did he sit for? Because they had 
found a picture in his home, ehm, (..) a picture of [Mikhail Nikolayevich] 
Tukhachevsky,4 that is one of, one of (..) the leaders of (..)—if I remember correctly—
of the Whites. A picture, because of a picture you take a human being to prison and 
you leave a woman with three children at home, why? (.) In private talks, it always 
came up that one must not talk about that we are Jewish—also our family name does 
not sound exactly Jewish (.), it does not sound Jewish at all, my father’s family name 
sounds more Jewish, but I added it only here in Israel, ehm (..), so, so, there was such 
a thing (.)—a nine-year old girl who did not suffer from anything carries an inner fear, 
which is very sad. I don’t want my children to carry the same fear, I don’t want them 
to fear to say they were Jewish, or, Israelis, or, whatever (.)—it’s very, very sad (..)—
at school I didn’t tell anyone that we would leave before, before the last week, simply 
because I was afraid—of what?“ (Katya, p. 22-3)  
 
The children in both families grew up with a feeling of being “different” and 
not “belonging” that they finally embodied in the form of a particular 
habitus. Yet, in contrast to findings of previous empirical studies (e.g. 
Rapoport et al. 2002), those interviewees do not “normalise” their personal 
experiences with anti-Semitism. Instead, they use the reference to those 
experiences, not only their own but their families’, as an argumentative 
strategy to claim their right to be in Israel. 
  
                                                             
4  Tukhachevsky was a marshal of the Red Army and part of Stalin’s inner circle 
until 1937. He was executed in 1937 during Stalin’s Great Terror (cf. Harris 2016; 
Snyder 2010). 
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7.3 ANALYSIS OF DISCURSIVE PRACTICE I:  
“SABRAS” VS. “RUSSIAN WHORES” 
 
A minority of interviewees positions themselves as established citizens and 
looks at the newcomers. Igal’s story shall serve as an example here. When I 
explain to Igal—living in Natserat Illit and waiting to enrol at the local 
college —I will anonymise his name, he answers directly: “make it an Israeli 
name, I am Sabra” (Igal, p. 1).5 His biographical background differs from the 
others with regard to personal experiences in the context of migration. Igal 
neither shares the personal experience of leaving nor that of starting over; his 
parents had immigrated to Israel already in the mid-1980s, before the Great 
Aliyah. In his family, the issue of adapting to a new cultural environment 
was hardly discussed. Igal became interested in his mother’s experiences 
only when she became a member of the Knesset: 
 
“Regarding your question [about Igal’s parents], regarding what happened to my 
mother during Aliyah, at the beginning it didn’t interest me, with the time it began to 
interest me, so I started to ask my mother questions about her Aliyah, how it was, how 
here, how there, how it can be that a new immigrant—it’s possible to say she is an old 
immigrant of course, but—how it can be that an immigrant is—like, in my head, it 
dawned on me—when my mother was elected to be a member of the Knesset, I didn’t 
believe it, even when she had been a member of the Knesset for some time I simply 
was totally shocked, I didn’t believe that my mother, the mother that I see at home, 
that suddenly she has become a member of the Knesset, [although] her Ivrit—there is 
nothing to do about it, her Ivrit is not smooth, it’s a tiny bit bumpy, here and there she 
makes mistakes—, so how can it be that such a mother suddenly is elected to be a 
member of the Knesset? Since then I started to ask questions.“ (Igal, p. 34-5)  
 
Two things are striking in Igal’s story. First, he becomes interested in his 
mother’s biography only after she has been successful, after she “suddenly 
[has been] elected to be a member of Knesset” though, in Igal’s eyes, she 
still is “an immigrant”. Those two pieces of experiences—an “immigrant”, 
                                                             
5  In Israeli discourse, speakers address someone as a Sabra who—in contrast to 
recent immigrants—was born in the country in order to make a qualitative 
distinction between those who have grown up, even partly, in the Diaspora and 
those who have been raised in the culture of the newHebrew (e.g. Almog 2000). 
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an outsider, entering the Parliament, one of Israel’s centres of political 
power—obviously do not match in his view (“I simply was totally shocked”). 
Second, Igal is not as interested in his father’s story because he “has stayed 
in his position [as a factory worker] ever since his arrival” (Igal, p. 38). Thus, 
while his mother is a constant reference in his story, Igal mentions his father 
only towards the end, and only when I ask specifically about him. 
Against this background, Igal talks about Israelis with an FSU family 
background: 
 
“The Russians, the Ukrainians, or all the Soviet Union, they come to Israel for social 
reasons, for economic reasons, they do not come because of Zionism, that means that 
Judaism is already not essential, not (...)—'give me money, give me economic, don’t 
talk to me about a Jewish state, that does not interest me, I don’t care about it, don’t 
want to (...)—give me my money, I don’t care if we’ll have a Prime Minister who is 
an Arab, my pleasure, the main thing is I’ll get my money, that is what I care about.’ 
This hurts us a lot, it hurts the previous Aliyot a lot. [Igal goes on talking about 
separate TV programmes in Russian], now, I don’t say this concerns only Russians, 
it’s also Arabs and everyone, there are TV channels in every language, if there is one, 
two, three, I don’t have a problem with that, but now it’s eight, nine—I [i.e. the 
immigrants] go to a coffee shop, and I don’t need to know Ivrit, I simply, there is 
always someone who speaks Russian, so I can talk in Russian, I don’t need to know 
Ivrit.“ (Igal, p. 25-6) 
 
Igal’s demand to speak Ivrit as a means of assimilation stems from his 
everyday experience. He links his personal experience of an (assumed) lack 
of proficiency in Ivrit with the argument that using Ivrit in everyday life, i.e. 
adapting the host society’s language/ culture, is the ultimate sign of being a 
member of the Jewish collective. By adapting a “hegemonic position 
[(]national, collectivist, Zionist, Israeli, [...] Ashkenazi (European descent), 
secular, male[)]” in Israeli collective identity (Ram 1999: 335), Igal aims at 
distancing himself from FSU immigrants of the 1990s and presenting himself 
as “normal” and, thus, belonging. Correspondingly, Igal refers to the 
newcomers as “the Russians”. Though the term is common in public 
discourse, it also cuts off those citizens from the Jewish/Israeli collective. In 
order to show he belongs to that collective, Igal adopts his mother’s 
biography and even speaks from her position (“This hurts us a lot, it hurts 
the previous Aliyot a lot”). Yet, he is not able to adopt her position 
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completely because he lacks knowledge and personal experience of the 
background of Jewish life in the Soviet Union and the aftermath of its 
breakdown as well as their process of incorporation. Accordingly, he must 
admit: “this [the assimilation of FSU immigrants] is the only thing we [Igal 
and his mother] argue about” (Igal, p. 26). However, later on it becomes 
clearer why Igal aims at distancing himself from those “Russians” so 
eagerly: 
 
“When they arrived, there started all kinds of rumours: Russian [girls] are whores, 
they go to Arabs, and so on. Now, why does this happen? Because in the last waves 
immigrated gentiles, Russian gentiles, they are not Jewish, now, when they arrive in 
Israel, and they get connected to an Arab who is Christian, for them this is not 
problematic, because a Christian Arab and a Christian Russian [girl], this is not a 
problem, no problem, it’s ok. But that Israeli Sabre like me who looks at this from the 
side, I understand this, but some people don’t understand this, they only see a Russian, 
they immediately generalise him as Russian, it doesn’t bother them, Jewish, gentile, 
they don’t care, they see a Russian, now when they see a Russian, they generalise all 
the Russians, all together.” (Igal, p. 28) 
 
Igal tells the incident in the third person as if talking about somebody else. 
But it is as likely that he speaks about a personal experience where he was 
“see[n as] a Russian”, and, thus, his own sense of belonging, his Jewishness, 
questioned. The argumentative strategy Igal applies here is twofold: on the 
one hand, he adopts his mother’s biography and places his story in the 
context of former waves of immigration. In line with public discourse, Igal 
claims immigrants of these waves had come to Israel for ideological reasons 
and adopted the “Israeli national ethos”.6 On the other hand, Igal adopts the 
public discourse about “Russians” and the stereotypes raised in this 
discourse, but not without qualification: in order to bridge the gap between 
discourse and his personal experience of being linked to that social group in 
everyday life, Igal claims some of the newcomers were “Russian gentiles, 
they are not Jewish”— adopting here another line of the same discourse 
questioning the newcomers’ Jewishness—and those stereotypes were to be 
ascribed to them alone. At the same time, however, Igal reproduces the 
                                                             
6  Igal does not use the term otkazniki (e.g. Beizer 2005), however probably because 
he does not know. It is also not clear whether his parents arrived in this context. 
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generalisation of stereotypes he has criticised before (“all the Soviet Union, 
they come to Israel for social reasons, for economic reasons, they do not 
come because of Zionism, that means that Judaism is already not essential”).  
In summary thus far, it is possible to make some general statements about 
the interviewees’ objective position as members of the same social group in 
Israeli society. Yet, there are a number of individual factors–e.g. age at the 
time of the interview, place of residence, socialisation, social network, etc.–
, and not to forget the temporal aspect which make it impossible to draw 
general conclusions about each individual member’s objective position in 
Israeli society and the political field in particular.  
Thus, the objective position of the study participants within the Israeli 
society is a composition of resources true for the social group of FSU-
immigrants and resources rooted in individual social action. On the one hand, 
they, as a collective, have shared the same political and economic citizen’s 
rights and duties as Israeli-born citizens since their arrival but have lacked 
resources and social status as relatively new citizens. On the other hand, 
individual social actors have made individual experiences and integrated 
them into their habitual dispositions and acquired different forms of capital 
on an individual basis. At the same time, first individual members have 
acquired the necessary resources, earned that social status due to individual 
achievements and become part of the Israeli elite in various fields (cf. 
Glöckner 2011), and as a consequence, the social group as a whole has 




8 Talking about Civic Engagement:  




In this chapter, I will show how the interviewees talk about becoming 
engaged with the Yisra’el Beitenu party.  
Enjoying full political rights, I assumed it was unlikely that the 
interviewees had faced legal barriers—in various empirical studies this is 
referred to as political opportunity structures (e.g. Fanning/ O’Boyle 2010; 
Fanning et al. 2010; Bloemraad 2006)—to become engaged; and the 
interviewees do not mention any legal restrictions either.  
However, previous empirical studies on the civic engagement of 
immigrants show that they need a certain degree of adaptation to the host 
society in order to have access to culture-specific resources. In this context, 
de Rooij concludes immigrants become engaged in less -time and cost 
intensive areas (de Rooij 2012: 459). With regard to the participants in the 
current study, this does not apply: as listed above, the interviewees engage 
in a variety of forms of civic engagement, most of them in their spare time. 
However, with regard to Fanning and O’Boyle’s description of a particular 
“socio-political habitus” (Fanning/ O’Boyle 2010), which is not necessarily 
related to migration, the interviewees can add their own experience. 
The second question is, however, how the interviewees strategically 
apply their power resources in these stories, i.e. how they present them and 
for which purpose. Civic engagement takes place within the political field 
(e.g. Bourdieu 2013), which is close to the field of power and directly 
subordinate to the latter.  
Thus, one may assume that people who are actively engaged with a 
political party, which, additionally, is legitimised by being part of the 
118 | Inclusion through Exclusion 
 
government, speak about their relation to the execution of power. And the 
interviewees do, yet, not predominantly speak in terms of personal influence, 
but with regard to serving a community. 
 
 
8.1 ANALYSIS OF POWER RESOURCES II:  
ROLE MODELS 
 
The empirical findings presented above already suggest that the participants 
in the present study have compensated the lack of some forms of power 
resources—relative to the host society’s—at their disposal throughout the 
length of their stay. However, it also shows that the interviewees as 
individual members of the social group differ a) in the composition of their 
resources based on the individual mixture of collectively shared and 
individual predispositions, experiences and their individual processing, and 
b) in the emphasis on different aspects. 
One of the aspects receiving particular emphasis in this context are 
individuals, usually in their families, who serve the interviewees as role 
models. Generally, the family plays a minor role in the narratives. The 
interviewees speak about their civic engagement in terms of individual 
achievement. One reason may be that most of them are adults, and have left 
home for studies or work, and thus there are other people outside the family, 
peers, who are close to them. 
When the interviewees do speak of their family, they usually refer to their 
home as supportive and involving good relationships with their parents 
providing a particular atmosphere of trust, respect and support in the family. 
This atmosphere does not necessarily have to be political, but it usually 
provides the interviewees with a sense of belonging. Rapoport and Lomsky-
Feder describe a similar relationship between the participants in their study 
and their parents; the family is also the place where a sense of belonging, in 
particular the knowledge of being Jewish, is cultivated (Rapoport/ Lomsky-
Feder 2002: 239). 
With regard to their civic engagement, most of the interviewees 
emphasise the support they have received at home. At the same time, some 
interviewees speak about family members who serve them as role models. 
The fact that the interviewees bring up family members who serve them as 
role models for civic engagement is in line with Torney-Purta and Klandl 
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Richardson’s finding (2004) who show that the way in which political issues 
are brought up in the core family has a positive impact on the children’s or 
adolescents approach to civic engagement. This is particularly true for the 
interviewees’ grandparents. Both, Avi and Katya, speak of their grandparents 
as citizens who actively defended the values they believed in, yet in different 
ways. Avi’s grandfather was a writer back in the Soviet Union, and at times 
censured; he continued writing occasional articles for one of the local 
Natserat Illit newspapers after his immigration to Israel. Avi describes a 
close relationship with his grandparents, in particular his grandfather, whom 
he visited as often as possible after his mother’s remarriage (see above). One 
possible reading of Avi’s story is that his grandfather serves as a father-
substitute for his grandchild. Yet, the important thing for Avi is that his 
grandfather “raised me in a Zionist mood” (Avi, p. 21), and continues serving 
as a moral authority in Avi’s head:  
 
“Something sits in my head, and this is disturbing me, I tell you the truth, that there 
is a situation that I will leave this country, like [...] the moment that I already see, 
ehm, that really is, like, if I had kids, or if I had already, ehm, some economic basis, 
and I see that this is not, it doesn’t move anywhere [...] if my grandfather would hear 
me now, auwa, ‘what, are you crazy?!’, he would say, ‘what happened? You will stay 
here, this is the country, this is the country, what happened? If everybody talked like 
that, what will be? Nobody would stay here!’ He is right, so this maybe comes from 
home, too” (Avi, p. 19). 
 
Katya’s grandmother—Katya states the two have many discussions as she 
also lives close to her granddaughter—is a similar moral guidance. Katya 
observes similarities of her own life with that of her grandmother’s: both 
share the experience of serving in the military—her grandparents were both 
partisans (Katya, p. 9)—and being politically interested: “she knew 
everything about politics, so it was simply impossible, impossible, ehm, even 
to argue with her” (Katya, p. 12). More than with her mother, Katya talks 
with her grandmother about these experiences. Interestingly, in this context 
the reference to the Knesset as one of the centres of political power (see 
above: Sabras) returns in Katya’s story. Katya tells me how “proud” (Katya, 
p. 12) her grandmother was when she started working there as a 
parliamentary assistant. The Knesset in her narrative, just like in Igal’s, is 
more than merely a workplace, it is a symbol of power.  
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Against this background of success, Katya claims to prefer “Russian-
speaking” (Katya, p. 38) over referring to herself as “Russian”, adopting the 
hegemonic discourse just like other interviewees refer to themselves. Her 
family’s history as well as her own achievements so far are for Katya a 
resource for gaining self-esteem and symbolically preserve her “culture” 
over completely adapting to the Israeli mainstream. Accordingly, Katya 
reflects on her sense of belonging:  
 
“[Being Russian is] nothing to be proud of, I, it’s, it’s, it’s a part of me, it’s a part of 
my culture, a part of [what defines] me, I, I can’t live—I am not proud of it, because 
to forget my past is, is, is bad, it means what, what does it say about me, yes my 
grandmother was, my grandparents were, they were soldiers in the Soviet army, (..), 
and my mother grew up there, and my father is still there, so what, I’ll forget all of 
this and say ‘no, I am not, not Russian, and I want to forget all this?’ It’s wouldn’t be 
right, and also, also you see that I come from this background, and people also tell me 
this explicitly: ‘one can see that you, that you, that you are Russian’, yes, my way to 
dress, [...] it is a matter of growing up.“ (Katya, p. 5) 
 
This adds another layer together with her argument of being Jewish (see 
above). Katya’s identity of being a “Russian-speaking” Israeli is carefully 
constructed and reflects a long process of fighting and coping. 
In contrast to grandparents who give some of the interviewees a general 
compass or sense of belonging, politically engaged mothers have a direct 
impact on their children’s political orientation. Two other participants, Igal 
and Lukas, talk about the influence their mothers’ active engagement has on 
their own activities: both had been recruited by their mothers and helped 
them organise local activities in the framework of IB. But the interviewees’ 
recruitment was not the starting point, rather do those interviewees reflect on 
the fact that they have learnt to see the world through their mother’s eyes in 
a long-term socialisation process. As Igal puts it: 
 
“[T]he whole family shares the same political attitude, an attitude which originates of 
course [...], my mother gave this attitude, my mother planted this attitude into us, now, 
my mother comes with a certain talk, so we simply continue to talk like this, there is 
no argument, because we all believe the same way, we can’t argue, argue about what, 
you understand? [But] I love arguments, I get crazy to sit with an Arab and talk with 
him about the state of Israel: ‘to whom does this country belong, to me or to you?’, I 
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always do that, always—, the thing is that because—, of course, I respect the person 
that I stand up against him, but because my education is a little bit higher than his, in 
this specific subject of course, yes, no doubt about that, he has higher education than 
I do in many subjects, but in this specific subject—, so we start to argue, in the end 
when I get into some ecstasy, when I get excited, he simply stops talking. Because he 
doesn’t know, he doesn’t know, and this is exactly what happens here, educated 
people know what happened in the world, and they know what happened in this 
specific country in the course of the year, and these Palestinians that are born now, 
those children don’t know, they simply don’t know where they live, they live at war 
with Israel, so they simply fight Israel, why do they fight Israel, they don’t know, they 
don’t have a clue, they are told that the Israelis took the territories from them, this is 
not true, they don’t know that, and they don’t care, this is what their mother told them, 
me on the contrary—if my mother had a different attitude, I —, everybody tells me, 
‘Igal, you are influenced by your mother’, the truth is, yes, I am not ashamed of that.” 
(Igal, p. 25-6) 
 
Igal implies that his mother’s strong opinions have not left any room for 
alternative political views. But his statement also illustrates that he is not 
interested in hearing alternative political views when he has the opportunity 
to engage in discussions with people who think differently but is absolutely 
convinced his mother’s opinions are a historical truth he must spread. Igal’s 
conviction can be explained with his positioning in Israeli society: in order 
to present himself as a Sabra, Igal can adopt the extreme right political 




8.2 ANALYSIS OF DISCURSIVE PRACTICE II:  
“IT [...] COME[S] NATURALLY” 
 
In this section, I will show how the interviewees talk about their motivation 
to become engaged. In their empirical study on party activists, Bruter and 
Harrison (2009) identified three different types of activists: moral, social and 
professional-minded ones. All three of those can be found among the 
participants in the current study. Yet, some interviewees consider it more 
important than others to talk about the source of their motivation: a particular 
community. 
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Looking back to the beginning of his engagement, Max, a member of the 
Knesset for the Yisra’el Beitenu party at the time of the interview, claims it 
was “natural” for him to become engaged: 
 
Interviewer: “Did you talk about politics at home, with your mother and 
grandmother?” 
Max: “No, there are things that come naturally, there are things that you do not discuss 
and do not, not (...)—well, my mother, she is a teacher of Russian language and 
literature, she, she helps me with other issues which on a certain stage I need advice 
upon in order to decide whether to proceed or not. Why? Because—if a person takes 
a decision that yes, he is going to run for office, maybe. When decisions are taken—
to help the weak—when decisions are taken—to become engaged with an NGO—I 
think it is worth it to have some discussion in the family, [whether] ’yes’ or ’no’. It 
[informal engagement] should come naturally—there is spare time, there is time that 
one can give to support others—it should come from inside a person, not like he is 
[discusses whether] ’yes’ or ’no’. Why? Because you cannot make plans about these 
things, impossible to say ’I start here and finish there’, that is why—it is such a huge 
change of your life once you start—in the end, yes, it crosses your mind that you 
spend more and more time—in the beginning it should come naturally, if somebody 
starts to do that, he should like it, not like he forces himself or feels obliged before 
someone else. That is how I see it, I do not see anything special in this, something that 
needs to be discussed at home, to do or not to do—in the beginning at least.“ (Max, 
p. 21-2) 
 
The motivational source, as he describes it (“it should come from inside a 
person”), is not something acquired during one’s socialisation process, it is 
a character trait. Max is striving to present his engagement coming entirely 
from inside against the background that he has particular qualities, “leader 
qualities”.  
But at the same time, he states his motivation to become engaged 
involves the feeling of moral obligation as a citizen, an internal 
predisposition which is learnt (“it should [my emphasis] come naturally”). 
Accordingly, he makes a qualitative distinction between different forms of 
civic engagement: every citizen should become engaged in their 
communities, and those who have particular character traits, should start 
political activities. Expressing the feeling of such a moral obligation involves 
a more or less abstract social unit towards whom this obligation is felt, and 
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indeed, the community is a common reference in the narratives. The 
community involves different contexts or levels of abstraction. It can be the 
interviewees’ concrete social environment; community in these cases is 
related to “issues in everyday life” and concrete personal experiences. Some 
interviewees state their active engagement has been motivated by a pressing 
issue in their community (cf. Haste/ Hogan 2006). Max and Ben for instance 
have become engaged in their college student’s councils, a rather temporary 
and random community.  
Yet another group of interviewees state they have become politically 
engaged as a consequence of recent events, i.e. because they were upset 
because of something in the news (cf. ibid.). In this context, the so-called 
Gaza flotilla of the summer of 2010 is of particular interest. There were 
literally dozens of demonstrations to show support to the Israeli Defence 
Forces (IDF) every weekend in the course of the event. Zeev decided to help 
organising spontaneous demonstrations on behalf of the IDF in his school.1 
Zeev states he felt obliged to publicly express solidarity with the IDF and 
organised pupils’ demonstrations on Fridays in his hometown Haifa: “It’s 
important to show support to the IDF, we did well [what we did in Gaza], we 
are at war with them [i.e. the people in Gaza]” (Zeev, p. 14). Igal adds: “every 
Israeli wants to support [IDF], every Jewish Israeli” (Igal, p. 15).  
Another local event was the discovery that Natserat Illit’s mayor was 
corrupt in 2009. Igal, like Avi a student of media and communication at the 
nearby Jezreel Valley College, talks about how his mother—the 
representative of the Yisra’el Beitenu party in the Knesset—took the lead in 
local demonstrations with him helping her with the organisation. While in 
the case of demonstrations in Natserat Illit, community occupies a concrete 
space and people, the city or the city’s inhabitants who feel upset about their 
mayor, pro-IDF demonstrations take place against a rather abstract 
conception of community. Against the background of these statements, 
community is directed toward a more abstract sense of belonging, an 
“imagined community” (Anderson 2006 [1983]). In Zeev’s and Igal’s cases, 
this community–“we”–is that of Jews.  
                                                             
1  The IDF is seen as apart from the government, and support for the former is still 
high (Arian et al. 2010; Ben Meir/ Bagno-Moldavsky 2010)—in contrast to 
support for the latter (Arian et al. 2010; Ben Meir/ Bagno-Moldavsky 2010). 
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Sometimes is the idea of community refers to a specific local context or 
particular personal encounters; this particularly concerns participants from 
Natserat Illit. Avi tells me he was upset about what he perceives as social 
problems the local, in particular immigrant youth in Natserat Illit suffers 
from. He explains his motivation to become actively engaged with his 
personal experiences: 
 
“I went through a lot, now I am here, and I said [to myself], I have already grown up 
from the same processes being 16, 17, and I see that the young people here need, and 
I speak to you basically about Russians.” (Avi, p. 4)  
 
Community in Avi’s case then implies an emotional attachment to a certain 
group based on concrete shared experiences—here: a common migration 
background. In his case, emotions of grief, frustration and anger cause him 
to feel responsible. In this context, Avi’s story suggests a feeling of social 
responsibility, a moral obligation to become engaged when facing problems 
in his community. Yet Avi also emphasises that he wants his engagement 
clearly understood as community work, not political activities: “I didn’t want 
[to mix my activities with politics] until now, if you like, it’s fine” (Avi, p. 
11). Katya, on the other hand, states that her community work only started 
when she began to work for a political representative. She tells me how 
excited she was when she returned from her job interview, having found out 
that her potential future position was more than “being a secretary”: 
 
“Maybe this sounds like hypocrisy, but, ehm, when I came to the job interview [...], 
and [the MK] began to tell me about the work, I began to understand that this is not 
just about being a secretary and not just, ehm, to answer telephone calls, that doing 
that work I can find other tasks for myself, I drove home and all the way back I 
couldn’t listen to radio nor anything else, I arrived at home, and just said to my 
mother: ‘Mom, I, you don’t know how much it is possible to really help people at this 
work, and you simply don’t believe’, [...] ehm, it, it, it, it brings such a huge feeling 
of satisfaction (4), this is not hypocrisy, I really told her this, she was shocked and 
told me: ‘this is what you are thinking about when you want to enter politics?’.“ 
(Katya, p. 8) 
 
Accordingly, she describes her job as that of a “legal advisor” rather than 
that of an “assistant” and, consequently, as if she was actually working in a 
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legal office, like her father wanted her. Avi’s and Katya’s community is not 
the temporary one which Ben refers to. Both show concern about the 
immigrant community of “Russians”; thus, it symbolises emotional 
attachment. By referring to her social group and stating that in her job she is 
able to help, Katya manages to reconcile her own decisions with her father’s 
expectations, and thus to re-establish the good relationship she claims that 
they have. Furthermore, in order to justify her staying in her current position 
before him but also before herself, Katya returns to her father’s warning but 
turns it into an argument in favour of her involvement in politics—gaining 
actual power:  
 
“[Y]ou can actually change something—the moment I say that I am calling from an 
MK’s office [...], [a]nd that is why I chose, right for now, to accept that [being engaged 
with the Yisra’el Beitenu party], because I also want to learn the rules of the game.” 
(Katya, p. 8) 
 
Katya even risks her good relationship with her father about her political 
engagement and tells me about the “exhausting argument” with her father: 
“[A]lways remember that this is politics and that this, simply can, can simply 
be as not, not, not, not so much white and pure as you may imagine it“ 
(Katya, p. 9). Katya’s father, who stayed in Russia after her parents’ divorce, 
warned her about the “dirty game of politics” and at the same time made her 
understand that he expected her to become a lawyer like himself and Katya’s 
grandparents (Katya, p. 3). Accordingly, the argument is not so much about 
the specific party but about political activity in general. Scepticism about 
politics in general and involvement in particular is quite common among 
post-Soviet citizens, and consequently among the respective immigrants in 
Israel (Ben Meir/ Bagno-Moldavsky 2010; Arian et al. 2010; Bagno 2009). 
Katya understands and partly shares her father’s concerns about her 
professional future and a stable income and also that she might “get hurt in 
the dirty game of politics”.  
However, in the narrative she emphasises the advantages, i.e. the 
contribution to her community she will be able to make (“it is possible to 
really help people at this work”), over possible disadvantages or negative 
personal outcomes. However, the narrative also reveals an instrumental form 
of motivation, namely that of making a political career. The line of Katya’s 
argument at that point is also of a strategic nature. In her story about the job 
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interview she tells me it was important for her to finally have found a job 
after a considerable time of unemployment. Katya does not share her 
parents’, here her father’s, scepticism about politics but rather looks at the 
job opportunity pragmatically. Talking about her current position from a 
backward perspective, she states she would like to “learn the rules of the 
game” (Katya, p. 4) and therefore meanwhile accepts to work in politics in 
general and for the Yisra’el Beitenu party in particular.  
The game metaphor also occurs in other interviews, in particular when it 
comes to the resources one needs to play this “game”. This can be social 
connections necessary to enter that “game”, i.e. people who function as 
gatekeepers, but also particular skills like the ability for representation or 
impression-making on others.  
 
 
9 Serving the Country:  




The following chapters deal with the analytical question of how talking about 
civic engagement with the Yisra’el Beitenu party is discursively framed by 
patterns of interpretation of Israeli citizenship. In the narratives, the 
interviewees’ construct of Israeli citizenship is based upon certain 
conditions: the fulfilment of a citizen’s duties, namely serving the country 
and being loyal to the Jewish state grants a citizen rights; and the notion of 
who a good citizen would be is central. I will show how the interviewees, 
based on the argument of being a good citizen, position themselves in a 
dominant position within the Israeli society along the dimensions of duties, 
participation and identity or, in Bourdieu’s words, a sense of belonging. 
Against the background of the assumption that the social group in power 
defines who gains legitimate access to the Israeli society in the form of 
providing or denying Israeli citizenship at a given time, I argue that the 
interviewees’ reading of Israeli citizenship is their strategy to successfully 
construct such a dominant position. Having said this, the empirical analysis 
aims at showing how the participants in the study embed their narratives 
about civic engagement into the broader context of how they present Israeli 
citizenship and their roles as Israeli citizens, respectively. 
The current chapter looks into how the interviewees present Israeli 
citizenship in general and the dimension of service of the country in 
particular, and how they embed narratives of their own service of the country 
into this reading.  
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9.1 ANALYSIS OF HABITUAL DISPOSITIONS I:  
“YOU GET [WHAT] YOU GIVE” 
 
In the context of the study, citizenship is understood as the “membership of 
a political community” (Lister/ Pia 2003: 8), featured by four core 
dimensions in a particular relationship: (political, cultural, economic) rights, 
duties, participation, and identity (Delanty 1997: 9). In the narratives, all four 
of these dimensions can be found and they are presented in a particular 
relationship. The insight of how the interviewees theorise Israeli citizenship 
on the one hand and how they construct it as everyday practice on the other 
hand is essential for understanding how they construct their subjective 
position within the field of Israeli citizenship and, consequently, within 
Israeli society. Pinson shows that the Jewish and the Palestinian students in 
her empirical study construct their understanding of citizenship along 
various discourses. They employ individualistic approaches which stress the 
granting of rights to the individual citizen as well as those approaches which 
rather stress the relationship of a citizen within a particular citizenship space 
which comes with certain obligations, in particular military service (Pinson 
2004: chapter 7). In contrast to Pinson’s findings, the participants in the 
current study construct citizenship first and foremost in terms of perceived 
obligations: they construct Israeli citizenship around the fulfilment of duties, 
upon which the individual citizen earns certain rights. Ilan claims: 
 
“So, to say, as much as you give to the state as much you get, like, (...) to me this 
sounds very logical, right? If you (..) are a citizen who fulfils his duties, you deserve 
full rights; if not, you deserve part of it, if you don’t give anything to the state [...] 
why will I pay taxes, me, who, why do my military service, do everything, and (..) 
somebody else will receive social benefits, pension, insurance, and all these things on 
my money.” (Ilan, p. 14)  
 
In other words, a “just distribution of goods”, including citizen’s rights, in 
Israeli society should be organised according to an individual’s contribution, 
not according to an individual’s needs. 
The first dimension of citizen’s duties, as presented by the participants in 
the current study, is that of service of the country. Ilan, the lawyer, puts his 
argument on a legal basis:  
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Interviewer: “[...] Is military service mandatory as well?”  
Ilan: “It’s the law in the state of Israel!” 
Interviewer: “But those who—" 
Ilan: “You don’t want to serve in the military, like, you have a problem with that 
[military service], and I understand that some people have a problem with that, like, 
do national service, serve the country in some other way.” (Ilan, p. 15) 
 
The “law” regulating military service in Israel is the National Defence 
Service Law (1986), but this “law” is not the common argument to join the 
army in the interviews. Instead, the obligation due to the law is presented as 
a moral motivation and at the same time as “natural” (Helman 1999: 395). 
Zemlinskaya describes the link between service, loyalty and citizen’s rights 
in her empirical study on draft resistance: “[i]t [military service] is perceived 
as an expression of loyalty to the state and as such it defines the hierarchy of 
belonging to the state” (Zemlinskaya 2008: 12). The interviewees have 
internalised that public moral discourse about a citizen’s obligation to serve 
and do not question the obligation to join the army. It is usually against their 
personal experience of military service that service of “all Israeli citizens” is 
demanded, disregarding the differences in opportunities and approaches of 
different societal and/ or ethnic groups in the country. Indirectly, Katya 
claims “every citizen in the state” (here: student) undergoes the same 
procedure, so everyone “want[s] so badly to serve in the army” (Katya, p. 
27). The interviewees just accept it as given to get enlisted after school and 
not doing military service is usually not considered an option. Some 
interviewees, however, explain their motivation to serve with their migration 
background. In this context, Lukas explains why he got enlisted despite his 
rejection as unfit due to physical health issues: 
 
“It is very important to me to protect this country because we live here, although I 
was not born here, in my eyes it is very important because this country helped me a 
lot, like, helped my family, like, helped, helped me to make a place for myself here 
(.), helped my mother to find work, like, my brother grows up here, I grow up here, 
grew up here, so, it is very important to me, like.” (Lukas, p. 6) 
 
A further issue in the context of their reading of citizenship is how the 
interviewees relate their civic engagement and active participation to the 
other dimensions of duties, rights, and sense of belonging. The interviewees 
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distinguish between an abstract understanding of citizenship in terms of 
citizen’s duties, in particular contribution by doing military service and 
concrete political participation in the form of civic engagement (cf. Pinson 
2004). However, participation is presented as not mandatory and thus as 
subordinate to a citizen’s duties: accordingly, in the narratives civic 
engagement in contrast to the interviewees’ military service is not presented 
as a major issue but serves them rather as a point of departure to present 
themselves as a good citizen (Ichilov 2004). As will be shown below, the 
interviewees talk about their civic engagement as something that “happened” 
rather by chance than something they did consciously and regard as service.  
But, not for all of them it is as clearly a citizen’s duty to contribute. 
Emmanuel reflects about the confusing contradiction between the abstract 
hegemonic discourse of home-coming and directly experienced “hatred” of 
“Russians”, as in the story about his little sister’s humiliation. His emotional 
reaction then displays a feeling of humiliation, and consequently the 
rejection of the idea of contribution: “look, it’s not that I want it too badly 
because personally I, a country that looks at me strangely, why should I risk 
my life?” (Emmanuel, p. 29). 
 
 
9.2 ANALYSIS OF HABITUAL DISPOSITIONS II:  
“I WENT THROUGH SOME KIND OF 
BRAINWASH” 
 
The interviewees connect the notion of mandatory military service, which 
they perceive as the most important way of serving their country first and 
foremost with formal socialisation agents, above all civic education lessons 
in school. However, in practice those lessons are described as the frontal 
teaching of slogans rather than discussions about sense and nonsense of 
having citizen’s rights and duties. Katya puts it that way: 
 
“[W]hy did I want so badly to serve in the army? Because—again, this is not because 
of deep faith in that party or another, it’s simply because I felt: ‘wow, I have to!’ (..) 
Now why? Because I went through some kind of brainwash (laughing), yes, maybe 
not in the understanding—not in the negative sense of the word, but yes, when 
everybody—every citizen in the state has to serve, [...] I simply remember myself in 
school, [...] the country needs to raise a new generation, the country needs to raise a 
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new generation, it needs to prepare them already from a young age, so if this is, if this 
is to speak about youth organisations, ehm, they talk in slogans, so yes [...], again, I 
can’t tell you to what extent this [talk in slogans] is wanted because we live in that 
reality (...) and every country does this at the end of the day (laughing), it’s not that 
only we do that [...], obviously, obviously it is wanted by the state, because it has to 
continue its—it has to continue its erection [...], because if it doesn’t raise a new 
generation, it obviously will not go on to exist, so obviously it is right.” (Katya, p. 27-
8) 
 
And Vicky, talking about when she started to consciously think about what 
it means to be a citizen, adds: 
 
“I became more interested in what is really going on with regard to politics during 
adolescence because I was in a youth movement called the Zionist youth movement, 
ehm, there I more considered Zionism and actions that need to be undertaken and 
afterwards also in the army, ehm, I became more interested in why actually we fight 
so many (...) wars and what leads to what.” (Vicky, p. 16) 
 
Yet Katya presents the moral motivation to “want so badly to serve in the 
army” as something learnt, externally enforced (“I went through some kind 
of brainwash”). “Brainwash” carries an alternative interpretation: students 
are not able, not allowed, not wanted to question the idea of obligatory 
military service, they are not necessarily convinced of the idea but lack 
thinking about an alternative. However, Katya hurries to add that it was 
something she was not forced to learn but did willingly (“brainwash 
(laughing), yes, maybe not in the understanding—not in the negative sense 
of the word”), as something a good Israeli citizen internalises—or, as Vicky 
said, “consider[s] [...] to be undertaken”. Generally, the messages sent in 
formal education contexts are received as rather abstract or far from personal 
experience—yet at the same time powerful. In this context, other authors 
refer to the perception of military service as a moral obligation towards their 
country also described like this by native-born Israelis (e.g. Goldberg 2006; 
Helman 1999); Kimmerling has coined the phenomenon “civil militarism” 
which means that “socio-political boundaries of the collectivity are 
determined and maintained by participation in military service, its 
manipulation, and sacrifice to support spheres that are classified as ‘national 
security’” (Kimmerling 1993: 207). Accordingly, Ilan justifies the 
132 | Inclusion through Exclusion 
 
outstanding role military service plays is due to the fact that it links the 
perceived obligation directly to the “situation that we are in” (Ilan, p. 15), a 
situation lacking security. Yet, as will be shown, the interviewees’ 
perception of a lack of security has an impact on how they read citizenship 
and citizen’s rights especially: 
 
“We are not Switzerland, we are not Denmark, [for] people from Germany it might 
be difficult to get [i.e. to understand], like—Germany, of all countries, for 
foreigners—like, the situation that we are in, the security guys who stand outside [a 
building] and check your bag every time you enter and all these things, like, there is 
nothing [to do about it], it’s hard, it’s very different from abroad, it’s very different 
from Europe [...] it [serving in the military] is the law in the state of—it’s the law in 
the state of Israel.” (Ilan, p. 16) 
 
Zeev simply states: “we have to contribute, we are Jews, we have to fight, 
why, I have no clue, [...] we did well [what we did in Gaza], [...] we are at 
war with them” (Zeev, p. 14). For the establishment of the link between the 
security situation and military service, civic education lessons play a crucial 
role in the eyes of the interviewees—as Katya put it, the state needs young 
people or students to be in line with the official state ideology. In Katya’s 
understanding, “official state ideology” means a nationalist approach to 
security issues which is justified in her view “because we live in that reality”.  
Finally, the interviewees can draw on the personal experiences they made 
during military service. On the one hand, the interviewees refer to personal 
experiences in the past when talking about their own motivation to serve in 
the IDF or to become actively engaged in a community or political context. 
On the other hand, they post-rationalise these personal experiences and refer 
to them in light of public discourse in order to show what they understand 
by a good citizen. Similar to civic education lessons, military service is 
described as a major factor for how young Israelis perceive their everyday 
life in Israel. Ilan says:  
 
“In Israel [...] young people are generally more conservative, more Zionist, and the 
older ones vote rather for Avoda [the Labour party], Meretz [a rather liberal party], 
like, more liberal [...] Again, like, the young generation, which is the generation that 
serves in the military or has to go to the military or is just after the military or is in 
reserve duty, ok, they know exactly what is going on in the country, like, they live 
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this every day, they are at the university, they see what’s going on in the media, they, 
they are more active, like, older people who work, no idea, at the work place or 
pensioners, or people from the older generation that usually vote Avoda and so on—
no idea, maybe they see the things a little different, like, it’s their right, I get it.” (Ilan, 
p. 24) 
 
Ilan here connects military service with being “more Zionist”, and thus 
indirectly establishes a direct link between being Zionist, doing military 
service, and fulfilling one’s citizen’s duty. Besides, he links being 
“conservative” with the personal experience of military service—which is 
not surprising against the background of previous findings about the 
influence of war on political opinion (e.g. Canan-Sokullu 2012)—, but more 
importantly with being Zionist as a political opinion (“young people are 
generally more conservative, more Zionist, and the older ones vote rather for 
Avoda [the Labour party], Meretz, like, more liberal”). In this context, recent 
military service is not only presented as a particular filter but as a point of 
view which is more appropriate than that of older Israelis who do not share 
that insight knowledge. In Ilan’s view, the cleavage between political right-
wing and political left-wing is simultaneously a generational cleavage. In 
Ilan’s opinion this is due to the fact  that “young people face the political 
reality during their military service” (Livio 2012),1 and (also as a causal 
effect of their recent service) are more interested in politics while their 
parents’ generation either tend to forget their experiences, make their peace 
with them or may have other, everyday worries. In sum, political right-
wingers, i.e. in Ilan’s words those who are “conservative“, or, “Zionist”, “go 
to the military or [are] just after the military or [are] in reserve duty“, are able 
to see the political reality because they have insider knowledge. 
In contrast to the major role other socialisation agents play for the 
willingness to join the IDF, family is hardly mentioned in this context. Yet 
in contrast to findings of previous empirical studies on the issue of military 
service among FSU immigrants and their children (e.g. Eisikovits 2006), the 
interviewees do not mention any negative attitudes or talk hesitantly 
concerning their military service in the family (cf. Eisikovits 2006: 295).  
  
                                                             
1  More specifically: in border control units, as some of the interviewees point out, 
e.g. Lukas. 
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9.3 ANALYSIS OF DISCURSIVE PRACTICE III:  
A MATTER OF SOLIDARITY 
 
Peled identified three layers of Israeli citizenship: a liberal dimension with 
regard to the distribution of rights in order to “separate” between Israeli 
citizens and non-citizens, a Republican one with regard to contribution to the 
community in order to “legitimise” the existing social hierarchy and an 
ethno-nationalist dimension in order to “discriminate against” non-Jewish, 
in particular Palestinian citizens (Peled 2011: 278). Having asked secular and 
religious as well as Palestinian pupils in the Israeli school system about their 
understanding of Israeli citizenship, Pinson (2004) can empirically confirm 
the actual existence of a threefold perception of Israeli citizenship across the 
three groups (secular Jewish, religious Jewish, and Palestinian citizens). Yet 
the participants in the current study do not make such a distinction with 
regard to the citizen’s duties of different segments of Israeli society. Instead, 
they apply the same standard for every segment of Israeli society regardless 
of their actual legal status. In more detail, they apply a Republican reading 
of citizenship to all Israeli citizens: citizens are obliged to participate (e.g. 
Dalton 2008; Lister/ Pia 2003), or—in the words of the interviewees—to 
serve the country in an equal way. 
Accordingly, the interviewees’ emphasis on military service of all 
possibilities to contribute can be read against the background of recent 
developments in Israeli society with regard to diminishing the absolute value 
of military service in Israeli society and what Levy calls “the violation of the 
Republican equation” (Levy 2011: 40). In this context, in the Israeli public 
discourse, the notion of “mishtamtim” (Livio 2012) has appeared, i.e. 
individual (Jewish) citizens who dodge their military service for various 
reasons. However, I argue here that the interviewees do not intend to criticise 
those Jewish individuals in the first place. This is for two reasons: first, 
“mishtamtim” are not referred to directly in the narratives. Second, and more 
importantly, the interviewees constantly construct their line of argument 
about Israeli citizenship against another segment of Israeli society: 
Palestinian citizens. However, they do that indirectly. Again, one can take 
Ilan’s narrative as an example. Ilan is preoccupied with his hope for a 
political career. Above all, he aims at presenting himself as ambitious and 
successful and making an impression: on me in the direct context of the 
interview situation on the one hand. On the other hand, Ilan also aims at 
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impressing his invisible listeners in the Yisra’el Beitenu party. For this 
purpose, he talks in much detail about his past and present activities within 
the framework of the party and outside of it. Besides, Ilan emphasises he has 
done all those things although, first, “this is not an obligation”, and second, 
in particular not for him since he is physically disadvantaged (“I had a stroke, 
the physicians didn’t believe I’ll survive” Ilan, p. 2). Accordingly, he is the 
one delivering the most elaborate statements about how he understands 
citizenship. Again, quoting from Ilan’s interview: 
 
“[Y]ou have the right to get as much as as you give, that is to say as much as you give 
to the state, as much you get, like, (.) to me that sounds very logical, right? If you are 
a citizen who fulfils his obligations, you are entitled to full rights, and if you don’t 
[fulfil your obligations], like, you are not [entitled to full rights] but part of them.” 
(Ilan, p. 13) 
 
And he provides a detailed definition of what serving the country means to 
him:  
 
Interviewer: “In what way is it possible to serve the country?” 
Ilan: “Serve the country? Like a million ways! What does it mean ‘to serve’? First of 
all, start with what you are obliged to do, that’s first of all, if you do that, it’s already 
enough.” 
Interviewer: “What is that in detail?”  
Ilan: “Ah, ok, what it means?” 
Interviewer: “Aha.” 
Ilan: “First of all, don’t evade taxes, pay taxes like everyone else, go to the army—
you don’t want [to go to the] army? Do national service! Ehm, (pause) no idea, if you 
want [to serve] like just a tiny bit more, donate to some place, to the community that 
you live in, volunteer somewhere, contribute to your community, where you are, like, 
this is not an obligation, but it is something that satisfies you—I, when I [studied] in 
second grade at Tel Aviv University, I volunteered at the [...], at the court, to people 
who need money, and they come [to the court], and they don’t know what they want 
in life, and they have debts, like, 1,000 NIS, and they are poor, and you (.) help them 
to fill in the forms and explain to them what to do, hand in the forms, like, (..)—[it’s] 
great satisfaction, like, I, all the time during my studies, all the time—I don’t know, 
all my adult life, I think, I have been volunteering somewhere, ok?” (Ilan, p. 13).  
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Ilan puts it straight, service of the country is obligatory—in which form, 
however, is in his eyes to a certain degree an individual decision. At the same 
time, his quote implies that there are individuals or segments of Israeli 
society who do not serve in the military. Yet, unlike Ilan suggests, the 
National Defence Service Law instructs mandatory military service for 
Jewish Israelis—making exemptions on individual grounds and giving the 
possibility of doing National Service instead—but explicitly excludes 
Palestinian citizens on grounds of security concerns. It is safe to suggest that 
Ilan, as a lawyer and referring to “the law”, is aware that he interprets the 
regulations on mandatory military service for the sake of his argument. From 
the quote it has become clear that Ilan knows that those who do not serve in 
the military cannot be forced to do National Service instead. But, against the 
background of his own history of civic engagement, Ilan demands some kind 
of contribution to the “community” from every Israeli citizen and makes the 
option of alternative service quasi-mandatory. And he utters this demand 
forcefully; he even directly addresses his imaginary non-serving listener: 
“you [my emphasis] don’t want [to go to the] army? Do national service!”. 
In this context, Ilan does not explicitly distinguish between Jewish and 
non-Jewish or Palestinian citizens; yet his wording makes it clear that he has 
just the latter in mind: Ilan refers to “the law”, and to “national service”.  
Besides, by hiding the fact that Palestinian citizens are legally excluded from 
military service, Ilan implies that those citizens evade their citizen’s duty. In 
other words, he discursively terminates the legal distinction between the 
Jewish majority and non-Jewish minorities with regard to their duties. 
Instead, Ilan applies a Republican reading of citizenship to all Israeli citizens, 
wittingly ignoring that some segments of Israeli society, here in particular 
Palestinian citizens, have not got any chance of fulfilling this demand. As 
will be shown below, Ilan is not the only one claiming that the Palestinian-
Israeli minority does not fulfil their duties, and service is not the only duty 
mentioned in this context. It is rather the case that the non-Jewish minority 
serves the interviewees as the other against whom they can show they fulfil 
their own duties as Israeli citizens. 
It can thus be read as a discursive marker for an “imagined community” 
(Anderson 2006 [1983]; see also Barth 1969). As outlined above, the concept 
of community, however random, concrete or abstract, in the narratives 
implies a moral value demanding the active engagement of those who belong 
to it. Ilan here connects this sense of belonging to a particular community 
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with a particular view of Israeli citizenship as contribution: as it was with 
civic engagement, contribution is discursively defined as a moral value. Zeev 
goes even further and adds a scenario of threat to the moral demand: “people 
who don’t serve harm the state, [...] we are Jews, and we have to contribute 
to the state” (Zeev, p. 11). 
The interviewees do not make a direct reference, yet I argue that the 
presentation of service as regarding all Israeli citizens equally must be read 
as a reference to one of IB’s electoral slogans as well. Picture 1 shows the 
respective screenshot of the party’s online platform. The picture shows 
someone, obviously a soldier because of the olive-coloured trouser legs and 
military boots, standing in front of military backpacks.  
 
 Picture 1.: “AJust Society Begins With an Equal Society.”  
 
Source: Yisra’el Beitenu Website2  
 
Whether that person is male, or female is not clear because one can see only 
their feet and part of their legs; and this is intentional: in Israel, military 
service is mandatory for both sexes alike. A slogan reads: “A just society 
begins with an equal society.”. The slogan reflects both the legal discourse 
of mandatory military service for Jewish Israeli citizens, and the ethno-
nationalist discourse of military service as a moral obligation of (Jewish) 
Israeli citizens against the background of a constant threat to security. Yet at 
the same time the slogan implies that the obligation as well as the legal ruling 
                                                             
2  Partija “Yisra’el Beitenu” (“Our House Israel”). “A Just Society Begins with an 
Equal Society.” Retrieved from: http://www.beytenu.org/a-just-society-begins 
-with-an-equal-society/ 
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of military service is not limited to the Jewish segments of Israeli society but 
concerns every Jewish and non-Jewish citizen. It further implies that there 
are individuals or groups who do not serve and thus do not fulfil their 
obligation as Israeli citizens; otherwise it would not be necessary to mention 
the issue in an electoral campaign. 
This is exactly how the interviewees argue. Yet it is left open to the 
potential voter to interpret who is the target group of this campaign. Against 
the background of the ethno- nationalist roots of that discourse it becomes 
clear that the target group are non-Jewish segments who do not serve, i.e. 
Palestinian citizens. Neither the Yisra’el Beitenu party nor the interviewees 
feel the need to make that explicit any further.  
 
 
10 Loyalty to the Jewish State:  




As outlined in chapter 9, the interviewees present serving the state as a 
fulfilment of one’s duties as an Israeli citizen and showing loyalty to the 
Jewish state as a central issue with regard to citizenship. The repeated 
emphasis on their perception of the disintegration of Israeli society and its 
discursive linking to (a lack of) loyalty to the state of Israel is central in the 
narratives. 
The narratives are structured around perceived cleavages and a perceived 
threat. Gal argues in favour of integrating “the ways in which ‘ordinary 
people associate with citizenship’” (Gal 2011: 215; see. also Joppke 2007: 
44) and shows that in the data he used, the respondents clearly link different 
spheres of rights to different threat perceptions: the perception of economic 
threat can be linked to the allocation of welfare rights, symbolic threat is 
connected to the cultural rights dimension and a perceived security threat 
results in a lower willingness to allocate political rights. In this context, an 
evaluative hierarchy of threat (Rippl et al. 2007: 111-2) can be derived 
analytically: on the one hand, perceived cleavages causing an “internal” 
threat, i.e. within the Jewish segments of Israeli society, connected to 
symbolic collective values—e.g. as derived from the interviewees’ 
understanding of Zionism—and, caused by the challenge of those values, the 
existing social hierarchy and the interviewees’ objective position within that 
hierarchy. On the other hand, in the narratives perceived “external” 
cleavages are presented as posing an existential threat to both individual and 
collective as well as realistic and symbolic well-being. While nation-wide 
polls show similar results with regard to the perception of the disintegration 
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of whole social groups, the interviews differ from the general picture when 
it comes to the centrality of the issue of disintegration—in particular the 
emphasis on a gap between Jewish and Palestinian segments of Israeli 
society, which has implications on their willingness to allocate rights. This 
centrality in the narratives can be explained with reference to the political 
ideology of Lieberman’s Yisra’el Beitenu party. In the narratives, this 
ideological superstructure reinforces a particular processing of personal 
experiences—in particular on the local level—, which in return serve as an 
argumentative basis for the reproduction of that ideological superstructure.  
Partly, those cleavages are perceived on the basis of concrete personal 
experiences; in these cases, narratives about cleavages are based on the 
(factual, emotional, evaluative) description of very concrete encounters the 
interviewees experienced. As will be shown, in this context, the interviewees 
find examples and situations from their everyday experience to reconfirm, 
and, thus, reproduce learned habitual dispositions. Accordingly, there are 
different contexts against which the interviewees’ narratives of threat take 
place. They cluster around three “argumentative contexts”: the context of a 
perceived disintegration of Israeli (Jewish) society, the larger historical-
political context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the situative context 
of the Gaza flotilla in the summer of 2010. 
 
 
10.1 ANALYSIS OF DISCURSIVE PRACTICE IV:  
“EVERY ISRAELI...” 
 
The intermingling of current discursive events, (long-term) personal 
experiences and political dispositions affects the interviewees’ view of 
Palestinian citizens of Israel in particular with regard to their notion of 
loyalty to the State of Israel. The discursive events (cf. Jäger 2004) the 
interviewees relate to Iran’s former president Ahmadinejad’s threat of 
“wiping Israel off the map”,1 the war against Hisbollah in Lebanon (2006), 
                                                             
1  Glenn Kessler. Did Ahmadinejad really say Israel should be ‘wiped off the map’? 
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Operation Cast Lead against Hamas in Gaza (2009) or the Gaza flotilla 
(2010). All four discursive events have been controversially discussed in 
Israeli public discourse. However, while the first three are against the 
background of an outer enemy vs. Israel constellation, the last one focuses 
on an inner enemy, namely Palestinian citizens. 
Especially the Gaza flotilla and the subsequent discourse was still so 
fresh at the time of the interviews I conducted in 2010 that these interviewees 
made frequent references to it in their narratives. Yet the emphasis the 
interviewees placed on the reference differs. Igal presents it as a unifying 
event for the Jewish collective. He claims: “every Israeli wants to support 
IDF now, the whole world is against us, on the side of the Palestinians, that 
Turkish Arabs send a flotilla is proof” (Igal, p. 3-4), and uses it as an 
argument to find proof for his black-and-white dichotomic perception of the 
world against Israel (e.g. also Lerner, 2010), or what Bar-Tal and Antebi 
(1992b) refer to as “siege mentality”. Zeev and Vicky may share Igal’s view 
on the world around them, but for both of them the discursive event serves 
as motivation to become active. Vicky says: “sometimes I feel that I want to 
contribute more” (Vicky, p. 8), and justifies that so far by being a state 
employee and as such was limited in her political activities, but “actions to 
strengthen the state allowed” (Vicky, p. 8). Zeev even felt the need to 
organise such an “action[...] to strengthen the state” and gathers like-minded 
people at his local school in Haifa to have regular Friday demonstrations to 
show support to the IDF. He explains his need to show support, stating: “we 
did well [what we did in Gaza]” (Zeev, p. 14). Zeev does not explicitly speak 
about who he has in mind with the collective “we” he uses; yet from the 
context—Zeev speaks about being “at war with them [i.e. the people in 
Gaza]” (Zeev, p. 14)—the collective “we” can stand for Israelis, Jews or the 
IDF. 
Katya refers to discursive events on another level. She speaks about an 
argument between herself and her father who stayed in Russia after her 
parents’ divorce, and whom she happened to visit at the time of Operation 
Cast Lead in Gaza in winter 2008/ 2009. Their argument started against the 
background of a news report in Russian television about the military 
operation and Palestinian civilians in Gaza suffering from it. Katya tells me 
how angry she was with her father for not standing on Israel’s side of the 
story but speaking up against Israeli military actions instead:  
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“With my father I did have a serious argument [about politics], actually, actually at 
the time of Operation Cast Lead, when I visited him for Sylvester [New Year’s Eve] 
(.), he obviously, too, was influenced by some, in some way by all those media reports, 
and (.) we really had a fight, a real fight, we argued so much that I almost started to 
cry because (.) he, he simply started to talk in a way that I could not, not, not accept, 
(..) um: he really started to blame Israel. I took this very hard, I started, I started to get 
very emotional, and (..)—this was one of the arguments that really, um, I got very 
angry with my father, and this just does not happen, so I took this very hard, but, um, 
well, it has been forgotten over time because (..)—again, it’s my father, um, 
arguments about anything connected to internal politics—my father is not involved in 
what is going on here in Israel, he is only interested in what happens outside, ok, that 
means, foreign politics.” (Katya, p. 8) 
 
On the personal level, Katya expects her father to agree with her with regard 
to political events and is upset that this is obviously not the case. She is upset, 
however, not only because her father “obviously, too, was influenced by 
some, in some way by all those media reports”, but also because it was her 
father she was having an argument with over an issue that is very important 
to her and that she is emotionally connected to, and her father does not and 
cannot share her position. It reveals a feeling of estrangement with a person 
who is very important to Katya and from whom she seeks advice in important 
personal matters, and the very fact that she stresses “well, it has been 
forgotten over time” shows that it is not. However, on the collective level, 
Katya’s quote also implies her concern with Israel’s standing in the world 
and her trust that Israel’s government, and in particular the IDF, act morally 
right (cf. Arian et al. 2010: 91). 
 
 
10.2 ANALYSIS OF DISCURSIVE PRACTICE V:  
“IT HURTS” 
 
The issue of criticism of official institutions is a very sensitive one for the 
participants, especially the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) have a somewhat 
sacrosanct status among them. In view of discursive events, the interviewees 
refer to critique of Israel, and in particular its politics towards Palestinians in 
Gaza and the West Bank as well as military operations. Accordingly, those 
who criticise one or more of these institutions, are regarded as disloyal. 
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However, this perception not only concerns the participants of the present 
study, IB voters, or Israelis with an FSU family background, but represents 
a widespread notion in the Israeli (Jewish) public: as Ichilov showed, young 
(Jewish) Israelis in general perceive a growing threat and increasingly find 
the use of military power legitimate to reach political goals and they also 
support anti-democratic tendencies, for example by emphasizing the 
character of the State of Israel as a Jewish state (Ichilov 2004: 153). Avi 
states in this regard: 
 
“Israel needs to be bad, I think we need to be bad, [I mean] not to kill, God forbid, 
blood, God forbid, be bad and say ‘you want to blow us up here, you send us a flotilla 
[the Gaza flotilla raid ]?’, just as an example, the latest event, the most current, so, 
great, no problem, we won’t enter with toy pistols, I had shot down the whole ship, 
like the Russians did over there [i.e. in Chechnya?], let’s say, it was these days, that 
the whole world will hate us, no problem, we will enter, like Ahmadinejad [the then 
Iranian president, who, according to controversial translation, threatened to wipe 
Israel off the map, just an example, congratulations, how bad a person is, and this [...], 
and I hate him because he hates me, and hates us, but I defend [the idea] that we will 
be bad, because only then they will fear us and leave us alone, there is nothing to do 
about it.” (Avi, p. 14).  
 
This tendency goes on; Zimmermann (2016) states that the notion of what 
is politically correct to say in Israel nowadays has changed in the way that even 
the political left agrees that the government or official Israeli politics is no 
longer to be criticised. In this context, the interviewees are particularly 
bothered by their incomprehension of what they present as “pro-Hamas 
demonstrations” in several Palestinian settlements in Upper Galilee taking 
place in the aftermath of the 2010 Gaza flotilla: 
 
“I saw on TV many demonstrations against [IDF], Israeli Arabs with Palestinian flags, 
and this hurt me very, very much. Why on earth do Palestinian citizens show solidarity 
with terrorists who claim to destroy their homeland while in Israel every citizen is 
supposed to have equal rights and access to various governmental support, only 
demanding a very basic proclamation of loyalty to it.” (Vicky, p. 19)  
 
Emmanuel adds:  
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“Our country is surrounded only by enemies and all say, like, ’we hate Israel and you 
are goats’ and so on (..), Israel cannot do anything about it because they [political left-
wing] said ‘Stupid, they will annihilate, bomb your busses, but you sit quietly!’, and 
above all, that it works no matter that Iran shouts, Lebanon shouts, they can shout till 
tomorrow, but there is resistance in this country from within, the Arabs who? I don’t 
talk about those who live in the cities but those who live in the Arab villages, small 
towns, there are serious and violent protests going on against Israel, there Israeli flags 
are burnt, and they shout, ‘Freedom for Palestine’.” (Emmanuel, p. 22) 
 
When it comes to the perception of threat, Palestinian citizens are explicitly 
othered in the interviews; all of the interviewees refer to them as “Arabs”, 
“Israeli Arabs”, or “Arabs in Israel”; Igal claims in this context: “there is a 
problem with the Arabs in Israel, they perceive themselves as Palestinians, 
not as Israelis” (Igal, p. 50). All of these terms disregard the self-
understanding of the national minority (Waxman 2012; Peled 2007; 
Rabinowitz 2003), and thus show open misrecognition of particular minority 
rights. But while the first versions (“Arabs”, “Israeli Arabs”) leave the 
interviewees with a lack of understanding; the second term openly excludes 
Palestinians from belonging to the Israeli reality, and, as a result, Palestinian 
citizens are presented as a merely tolerated but temporary minority. Igal is 
aware of the Palestinians’ self-understanding, yet on the one hand he ignores 
it completely and on the other hand, he perceives any identity different from 
Jewish in dichotomic contradiction to being Israeli. As a consequence, in 
Igal’s view, national minorities are not part of the Israeli = Jewish collective 
but excluded from it without exception. While not all of the participants 
argue this strictly, they all draw a symbolic boundary between Jewish and 
Palestinian citizens. 
Having drawn that symbolic boundary between themselves as part of the 
Jewish collective in Israel and Palestinian citizens, “Arabs”, and as such part 
of the “Arab world”, the latter are presented as the ultimate threat to the very 
existence of Israel and its (Jewish) citizens. In the interviews, the Palestinian 
demonstrations in Upper Galilee are presented as proof that Palestinian-
Israeli citizens do not identify with their Israeli co-citizens but with the 
Palestinians across the border; as Vicky puts it: “Israeli Arabs with 
Palestinian flags”. 
In this context, the interviewees often link passages about a perceived 
threat with particular: similar to the demonstrations and riots in October 
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2000, which left the Israeli-Jewish segments shocked and with a feeling of 
betrayal (see also Waxman 2012), the interviewees are shocked and feel 
betrayed by “pro-Hamas demonstrations”. Her shock is displayed in Vicky’s 
statement: “[w]hy on earth do Palestinian citizens show solidarity with 
terrorists who claim to destroy their homeland while in Israel every citizen 
is supposed to have equal rights”; it reveals both the inability to understand 
minority demands for particular rights and recognition and the actual 
misrecognition of these minority rights in her own statement. Instead, she 
feels betrayed by those who demand those rights. Those demands which had 
been easy to ignore as long as they were uttered quietly or within the 
institutional framework, are now perceived as an unexpected and 
uncontrollable threat to national security; Vicky summarises: “this hurt me 
very, very much”. The inability to understand is also displayed in the 
interviewees’ reactions: they argue for the demand of a loyalty oath for 
Israeli citizens. Unisono, there are statements throughout the interviews, 
mirroring Vicky’s “[Israel] demand[s] a very basic proclamation of loyalty 
to it”, Igal’s “the State asks for a minimum” (p. 1), or, Ilan’s “the state 
demands a minimum [of] loyalty” (Ilan, p. 14).  
 
 Picture 2: “No Citizenship Without Allegiance”.  
 
Source: Yisra’el Beitenu Website2  
  
                                                             
2  Partija “Yisra’el Beitenu” (“Our House Israel”). “No Citizenship without 
Allegiance”. Retrieved from: http://www.beytenu.org/no-citizenship-without- 
allegiance/ 
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As it is the case with the demand for an “equal contribution”, the 
demonstration/ display of loyalty to the Jewish state must be read as a 
reference to one of the Yisra’el Beitenu party’s electoral slogans: “Without 
allegiance, not citizenship”. Even more than the slogan about making an 
equal contribution, the demand for loyalty echoed in the Israeli public and 
dominated much of the 2009 electoral campaign for the national elections. 
Picture 2 shows the respective screenshot of the party’s online platform. The 
picture shows three schoolgirls with long brown hair and dressed in white 
shirts, waving Israeli flags. The girls smile, in the background nothing but a 
blue sky. The slogan says: “No citizenship without allegiance”; the subtitle 
says: “For Israel to remain a Jewish, democratic and Zionist State”. The 
girls–innocent children and not boys who might be bullies–look happy: being 
loyal is so easy, as if it was some game children play—except that these 
children do not understand what is at stake in that game: collective 
deprivation of citizenship for those who do not want to play in the eyes of 
those who make the rules. It is just as easy for the interviewees to demand 
“allegiance”—the Hebrew term says “loyalty” (ne’emut); but in contrast to 
the electoral slogan, they directly address the national minority targeted 
against the background of personal experiences.  
The slogan shows quite frankly how, or, where the Yisra’el Beitenu party 
positions Palestinian in relation to the very society: outside. IB’s loyalty 
slogan has been harshly criticised as targeting Palestinian citizens and 
Palestinian citizens only (e.g. Bagno 2011a; Koren 2010); yet at the same 
time it seems to have found consent in the Jewish segments of Israeli society. 
This is mainly because of the, at first glaze, rational character of the demand: 
be loyal, do not harm the state, your homeland that you live in! For most 
Jewish citizens, this may be a peculiar civic duty since it is such a self-evident 
one. However, in this context the demand for Israel to remain a “Zionist 
State” is rather to stress that the Yisra’el Beitenu party is in line with the 
Zionist values of the State and aims at attracting voters who have had doubt 
in that. Avi directly links both issues, threat perception as the cause and the 
loyalty oath as the presented solution He directly addresses Palestinians 
(“you”) as the imagined listeners, throwing his incomprehension and anger 
at them. However, he is also confused:  
 
“[W]hy do you go towards terror, like why do you go ‘Let’s do damage’ to your state, 
‘No loyalty’, like Lieberman says, ‘No loyalty, no citizenship’, this is his slogan, but 
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the [...] he is right, actually in this he is right, as much as he is corrupt and everything, 
as much as I don’t believe in in this person, but this is true, because from my point of 
view the same people who throw stones and everything, afterwards I go to eat 
Shawarma at their place. It’s a pity because a people needs a culture, because a people 
[...] I don’t even know how to distinguish, right, it’s difficult to distinguish between 
Jewish and Israeli, there is some [...], you know, sometimes it is asked, asked on, I 
see it on TV, let’s say, someone is interviewed, like we are doing right now, only 
that’s on TV, how do you feel? Do you feel more like Jewish or Israeli? What is this 
question? Is this something different? In my opinion, it is not something different, and 
it’s not, not important whether you are Jewish or not, you live in Israel, you accept 
Israeli values? What does this mean? Are you for peace, first of all, with the help of 
God, if not peace, so at least for the Israelis, you already live in Israel, you serve the 
country, in the army, you served in the army? From my point of view, you are Israeli, 
you didn’t serve in the army, but you as a person accept the values of [...], what was 
it? Like, patriotism, some love to the state of Israel, this is what I think.” (Avi, p. 21) 
 
Avi’s quote displays his hesitation to decide clearly that IB’s slogan is the 
legitimate way, and he appeals to “Israeli values” which he presents not 
necessarily as “Jewish” but negotiable. After all, Avi’s hesitation is rather 




11 Palestinians as Quasi Non-Citizens:  




In the previous chapter, I outlined that the interviewees emphasise an 
existential threat. Based on these findings, I will look at the presentation of 
threat, in particular the interviewees’ presentation of Palestinians as a threat 
in more detail. In the narratives, this presentation is not limited to 
Palestinian-Israeli citizens but broadened in two directions: Jews vs. 
Palestinians (citizens and non-citizens) on the one hand, and “Western” 
societies vs. “Islamisation” on the other hand. In other words, Palestinians 
are presented as an existential threat on three levels: on the national level as 
“disloyal citizens”, on the regional level as “members” of the Hamas—
internationally recognised as a terror organisation—, and on the global level 
as “Islamist Muslim immigrants” in Western democracies, including Israel. 
Throughout the interviews, Palestinians are considered part of “the Muslim 
world” (Ilan); and on each of the three levels, different stereotypes about 
Muslims are employed.  
 
 
11.1 ANALYSIS OF DISCURSIVE PRACTICE VI:  
“PEOPLE FROM THE VILLAGE” 
 
Throughout the interviews, Palestinian citizens are hardly directly presented 
as a theme. Instead, they are the invisible other against whom the 
interviewees construct their reading of citizenship, or, rather citizen’s duties, 
as was shown in the previous chapters. Accordingly, talking about 
Palestinians takes place in dichotomic terms of “them” vs. “us” (Weinblum/ 
150 | Inclusion through Exclusion 
 
Iglesias 2013): non-Jewish, non-contributing, disloyal segments of Israeli 
society vs. Jewish, contributing, loyal citizens. As shown above, in this 
context Palestinians appear most probably when it comes to the current state 
of the Israeli (Jewish) society, its perceived disintegration, the discursive 
events in the aftermath of (probable) military operations and matters of 
national security. A very simple explanation for the non-existence of 
Palestinian citizens in the narratives is that this is a direct reflection of the 
interviewees’ everyday life and their lack of contact with Palestinian Israelis. 
However, depending on their personal experiences, and above all, 
locality, the interviewees stress different levels. The particular locality of 
Natserat Illit (Hebr.: “Upper Nazareth”) serves as a counter-example to the 
non-existence of Palestinian citizens in the narratives. Natserat Illit was 
founded in the 1950s as a development town in Upper Galilee at the 
geographical and socio-economic periphery of the country. Rabinowitz 
(2003) states, as a Jewish settlement uphill the Christian-Palestinian town, it 
was consciously put [geographically] above Natserat Tachtit (Hebr.: “Lower 
Nazareth”) alongside other Jewish settlements in order to preserve the Jewish 
character of the region. Inhabitants of the city do not talk about too little 
everyday contact with their Palestinian neighbours but negative everyday 
encounters instead. Vicky, a public servant who has lived in Natserat Illit 
since her family’s immigration, introduces “the problem with Arabs” (Vicky, 
p. 12) with a declaration of love toward her home town: “I love this city, [...] 
I belong here, [...] it makes me sad” (Vicky, p. 12). In the narratives, the very 
presence of Palestinian citizens or “Arabs” is discursively connected to 
different social developments which the interviewees perceive and present 
as problematic and who, more precisely, are presented as their main cause. 
The interviewees speak about it in the context of the city’s location at the 
geographical, economic and political periphery of the country and a resulting 
lack of economic resources of the city’s inhabitants. Avi, who is engaged 
with a local NGO to fight social problems of “Russian youth” in the city, 
describes an intermingling of social problems connected to the migration 
background of many of the city’s inhabitants (cf. also Remennick 2010; 
2003). Against the background of personal experiences—his stepfather beat 
him up when he was still living at home, and a close friend committed suicide 
because, according to Avi (p. 6), he was desperate about his economic 
situation living in Natserat Illit—Avi claims:  
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“It’s not just me who grew up like this, there are many young people who grew up 
like this, simply they, they are used to misery, so nobody cares because they all grew 
up like this.” (Avi, p. 11) 
 
Vicky adds another aspect: “young people don’t always have the money to 
buy a flat, (...) Arabs do, [...] it makes me sad, [...] I came from Russia in 
order to live with Jews” (Vicky, p. 13-4). 
However, the socio-economic dimension of the “problem” is only the 
surface of the arguments here. Vicky complains Palestinians from the 
neighbouring settlements and Nazareth would strategically buy houses in the 
city young Jewish couples cannot afford. By doing so, in Vicky’s eyes, 
Palestinians “break an unwritten law”; and this “unwritten law”, according 
to Vicky, states that Natserat Illit is Jewish and does not allow Palestinian 
inhabitants. Jewish inhabitants, according to Vicky, would not even consider 
moving to Nazareth to live in an “Arab” town, or, as Vicky puts it: “I came 
here to live among Jews” (Vicky, p. 14). Interestingly, Vicky does not nearly 
as vigorously claim territory beyond the Green Line of 1967 as “Palestinian”, 
or—at least—“not Jewish” territory, e.g. in parts of East Jerusalem where 
Jewish families are reported to strategically buy or build houses in order to 
“free those areas from Arabs”1 (Lis/ Levinson, 2011). So, the actual 
“problem” Vicky describes here is the very presence of Palestinians in a 
territory she considers Jewish (“I came from Russia in order to live with 
Jews”).  
Avi argues along similar lines but does so in a much subtler way. He 
expresses his special concerns about female minors, in particular from FSU 
immigrant families, being seduced—whether he means sexually abused is 
not clear—by “people from the village”: 
 
“I [...], so to speak in my neighbourhood I see girls, basically Russians, like, 
immigrants, from the FSU, who, ehm, hang out with Arabs who come from the 
villages, with a BMW, like, a silvery one, and open windows, without a roof, they 
[the girls] get on the car, jump into the car, and this is not ok, girls aged 16, aged 14, 
                                                             
1  Jonathan Lis and Chaim Levinson. Top Israeli Officials Set to Inaugurate Jewish 
Neighborhood in East Jerusalem. Haaretz (English Edition), 25.05.2011. 
Retrieved from: http:/ /www.haaretz.com/top-israeli-officials-set-to-inaugurate 
-jewish-neighborhood-in-east-jerusalem-1.363898  
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little ones, I am not used to this, and terrific, they haven’t got a good education at 
home, obviously, or something here is inadequate in their heads or [...] it’s not ok, we 
have a law that minors mustn’t do that.“ (Avi, p. 10-1). 
 
Avi’s concern must be seen against the background of growing media 
coverage of the issue of intermarriage between non-Jewish female 
immigrants from the FSU with Christian- Palestinian citizens. These 
intermarriages were referred to as a rather problematic way of immigrant 
adaptation (Raijman/ Pinsky, 2011). Avi positions his argument against the 
background of “law”, but at the same time he acknowledges that his problem 
with the phenomenon is on another level (“I am not used to this”); Igal 
mentions the phenomenon as well, yet he explains it more straightforwardly: 
“[there is] a problem with Russian whores and Christian Arabs” (Igal, p. 28). 
Notions of Palestinian Israelis, as derived from the narratives, carry 
elements of cultural racism. Avi euphemistically calls those who in his 
opinion cause social problems “[people] from the villages” in Upper Galilee, 
in contrast to himself who lives in the Jewish city of Natserat Illit. “village 
people” carry the connotation of people with a low intellect,2 however, the 
connotation is neither new nor specific for FSU immigrants. In this regard, 
the interviewees are certain they are in line with the Israeli nationalist 
discourse about the Palestinian minority. These stereotypes can be traced in 
Israel’s political culture (Rabinowitz 2002), however, here they become 
reinforced by personal experiences. Rabinowitz shows in an investigation of 
early anthropological studies in Israel that even back then Palestinians were 
referred to as uncivilized. Yet, the stereotyping of Muslim minorities or 
rather non-white minorities also fits the (post-) Soviet notion, as Shumsky 
(2004) shows in his analysis about the construction of the superiority of 
Russian culture. Avi even links the others to dirt, a common feature of 
cultural racism which aims at constructing cultural superiority based on the 
dichotomy between civilized and uncivilized. Empirically, this phenomenon 
has been described, e.g. with regard to Pakistani and Indian immigrants in 
the UK (Nowicka/ Krzyzowski, 2016). Those same “[people] from the 
villages”, the others Avi refers to, would come to the city and destroy the 
                                                             
2  On the stereotyping of villagers as people of lower intellect or “incompetent” 
(Fiske et al. 2002). 
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public park—not local (Jewish) inhabitants who care for their community, 
one may add:  
 
“Once there was a water fountain, today there are only drug addicts and garbage 
everywhere, everyday come all kind of people from the villages, drug addicts, 
alcoholics, it’s a mess over there, it’s dirty everywhere.” (Avi, p. 7). 
 
As shown above, similar stereotypes are applied in the narratives when the 
interviewees speak of personal encounters with Mizrahim. The difference 
between the stereotyping of Mizrahim and the stereotyping of Palestinians is 
that with regard to the former one can observe a process, and, as a 
consequence, a change: the longer the interviewees live in the country, i.e. 
the more frequent and direct personal encounters are, the less do the 
interviewees apply collective negative stereotypes, but reflect upon the 
respective encounters. With regard to Palestinians, there is no such process. 
Wagner and his colleagues (e.g. Pettigrew et al. 2011; Zick et al. 2008; 
Wagner et al. 2003) claim that intergroup contact would diminish negative 
stereotypes toward the out-group and have overall positive outcomes. They 
do not go into detail, however, about the specific nature of intergroup contact 
(cf. Pettigrew et al. 2011). In Natserat Illit, everyday—still indirect, 
though—encounters between Palestinians and Jews are deeply impacted by 
mistrust, as the examples show, and those encounters, together with events 
on the national and international level, reproduce mistrust; as Avi states: 
“people from the village, they will stab me like a sheep” (Avi, p. 13). 
Consequently, Palestinian citizens are othered as a group which threatens the 
Jewish inhabitants’, and, as a consequence, also the Jewish collective’s 
economic and cultural existence. They are presented as a symbolic threat 




11.2 ANALYSIS OF DISCURSIVE PRACTICE VII:  
“PALESTINIANS = HAMAS” 
 
Katya carefully avoids speaking about internal or foreign affairs; she prefers 
to talk about her work as a parliamentary assistant. When she feels she comes 
too close to political opinions, she interrupts her speech and states: “I don’t 
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want to talk about it” (Katya, p. 31, p. 32). Yet at times she feels the need to 
make a statement. Katya comes to talk about “the people who are on the other 
side”, and means Palestinian non-citizens, while speaking about how much 
she agrees with the Yisra’el Beitenu party’s ideology with regard to foreign 
politics:  
 
“[We need] to demonstrate to outside that we are not wimps, and not, not, not, not 
only peace talks—in the end—which means, yes, yes, one does need to show muscles 
sometimes, peace talks are very important, right, but, ehm, (4), but not only. There is, 
there is something that I don’t really, ehm, love, but, ehm, (..), friends, ehm, friends 
simply, ehm, many tell me: ‘what is possible to achieve with a good word and a pistol 
is much more than [what is possible to achieve] only with a good word.’ It’s—there 
is—it’s simply a translation from English, yes, something like that, so yes, a good 
word, and also (...), and also—not only a good word—and also, and also you can’t 
ignore that, because the moment you see your friends go, ehm, go, ehm, to fight, if—
, there in the North [the Lebanon war in 2006] or the South [the Gaza war in 2009], 
and you don’t know whether they’ll return, and you don’t know what’s going on there, 
and you receive SMS messages, ehm, ‘I am going to be not available [on the phone], 
ehm, I don’t know, I don’t know for how long, so don’t miss me, and don’t think that 
I—like, I am simply not available’, what am I supposed to feel, what—am I supposed 
to feel love for the people who are on the other side of, of, of the border? Really not, 
really not, so, because of this it’s very easy for me to connect to that [part of the party’s 
ideology], with regard to internal affairs I don’t know, I don’t know, internal affairs, 
that’s already, ehm, there are already many aspects.” (Katya, p. 7) 
 
Katya tells her story against the background of several wars and military 
operations in the years prior to her interview; she directly refers to the 
Lebanon War against Hisbollah in 2006, and the Gaza War (Operation Cast 
Lead) in 2009. She tells a story of emotional involvement–it is about a close 
friend in reserve duty who was sent to the Lebanese border at the very 
beginning of the war in 2006–and will refer to it as an argumentative basis 
throughout her interview. Lukas tells a similar story; he tells me how he was 
interested in that his friends who already serve share those experiences with 
him. Yet, as his statement shows, he does not only receive information and 
satisfy his curiosity but also becomes emotionally involved, stumbling, 
fearing for the lives of those friends when they get wounded in a military 
operation:   
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“I have several friends [who are already doing their military service], like, one of them 
serves as, like (..), ehm, nu, (..), he watches over the airplanes, repairs them and, like, 
checks if everything works, and there is one, let’s say, in a fighting unit, he goes to 
the [occupied] territories and to the border control, [...], they talk about what they are 
going through, like, what they experienced, [...] and also my aunt was in the army, 
and she told me about the border controls that—when she was there—about the things 
that happened, like, once they had—there was an attack when she was standing there 
and she was wounded at the shoulder, she, like, talked about this when we came to 
visit her.” (Lukas, p. 16) 
 
In both Katya’s and Lukas’s narratives, Palestinians exist only indirectly: 
citizens as an abstract group with whom they have not got any real contact 
(“them”, “there are Arabs in Israel”, p. 31) and non-citizens as the “people 
who are on the other side of the border”. The fact that Palestinian non-
citizens are the others who cause Katya to part with her friends—an 
emotional act—because they represent a threat to national security obviously 
make it easier for her to “demonstrate to outside that we are not wimps”. 
Halperin et al. show in their study that this “fear” is a negative emotion, 
moderated through the perception of threat, plays a major role in the 
maintenance of negative attitudes toward individuals and social groups, 
constructed as others, They find that “exclusionist political attitudes [...], 
[i.e.] the opposition to the granting of civil and political rights to residents 
and immigrant minority groups [in the Israeli context, above all, Palestinian 
citizens]” (Halperin et al. 2009: 998) increases after traumatic events like 
terror attacks. Those attitudes function as a “psychological resource gain” 
and they help the respondents to “cope with [...] [their] life” (Halperin et al. 
2009: 1008). The two examples outlined above confirm the findings of 
Halperin et al.. Besides, they show that negative emotions can also be 
triggered not only by the actual event but also by the memory of that event: 
both Katya and Lukas talk about incidents that occurred in the past; those 
they worried about have already returned and are out of danger. However, 
both of them have embodied the past experience of a threat in the form of an 
emotional, bodily, reaction into their dispositional repertoires and now, while 
talking about the experience, they look at the events through the lens of their 
embodied dispositions. 
Several authors emphasize the emotional or affective aspect that 
ideology can create, in particular emotions of love (toward one’s own group) 
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and hate (toward a perceived other) (e.g. Ahmed 2004; Bar-Tal 2001; 
Zuckermann 1999; Dowse/ Hughes 1986). Besides, emotions as collective 
memory or “cultural codes”, are conceptualised as an integral aspect of a 
society’s political culture (Gavriely-Nuri 2012): For the Israeli political 
culture this is particularly true with regard to perceived conflict or existential 
threat (Bar-Tal/ Antebi 1992a: 634). In their suggestion of how to 
conceptualise national identity, David and Bar-Tal emphasize the 
importance of the emotional dimension of belonging to a collective (David/ 
Bar-Tal, 2009: 360), of feeling attached (Ahmed 2004: 28). Ahmed stresses 
the link between “constant [collective] history” (and collective 
memorisation) and “personal [in this aspect also bodily] perception” of social 
interaction with perceived “others” (Ahmed 2004: 32). She starts her 
analysis of emotions, love of the in-group and hatred toward outsiders from 
the definition that “emotions are what move us” (Ahmed 2004: 27). Gold 
conceptualises emotions as culturally constructed and thus socially shared, 
yet internal states mediating an individual’s “sense of belonging” (Gold 
2015: 114-5). In her case study on the emotional dimension of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, she shows that both sides employ means of triggering 
negative emotions like humiliation (Gold 2015: 117-8). 
The interviewees speak about many emotions. Above all, they make the 
relationship between Jews and Palestinians emotional and they themselves 
are emotionally involved in that relationship. With regard to Palestinians, the 
interviewees speak in terms of negative emotions of betrayal and fear; this is 
in line with the previous findings outlined above. The interviewees also 
speak of love, however, interestingly, not (only) with regard to a particular 
“in-group”—to speak in socio-psychological terms—but “love of the land of 
Israel”. This is a phrase which mainly appears in the context of talking about 
Zionist values, yet the interviewees stress “love of the land of Israel” 
differently. Most interviewees use it to stress that IB is a “Zionist party” (e.g. 
Ilan, p. 24) and in direct reference to Zionism, namely as one of its principles, 
as Max outlines: “repatriation, love of the land of Israel, security” (Max, p. 
10). Avi prefers to translate it into “patriotism”, because he is hesitant about 
Zionist values: when talking about his civic engagement for the local 
immigrant youth in Natserat Illit, he mentions that he recently co-founded a  
 
“Facebook group ‘Young Zionist of Natserat Illit’, but ‘Zionist’ I would like to be 
erased, I am not (...)—I don’t think it’s something good, ok, but anyway I learn[ed?] 
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about it in school, it’s not that is an idea, that is a great idea, I don’t support it that 
much.” (Avi, p. 7)  
 
Katya, in turn, connects “love of the land of Israel” to nationalism:  
 
“I am a nationalist somehow, I also don’t want—sure, this is right necessarily because 
I basically love—what is a nationalist basically? I love my country very much, I love 
my people very much.” (Katya, p. 31) 
 
Based on what has been outlined regarding emotions, Katya here talks about 
Palestinians on two levels: on the (material) level of personal experience—
which contains emotional experience of fear, love and yearning—she states 
“[we need] to demonstrate to outside that we are not wimps”, and agrees with 
IB’s ideology of demonstrating strength (cf. Bar-Tal 2001). The tone of 
Katya’s argument is persuasive: she builds it around a you-story (“you don’t 
know whether they’ll return, and you don’t know what’s going on there, and 
you receive SMS messages”), appealing to her listeners’ imagination and 
expecting them to put themselves into her position and thus appealing to their 
sympathy and compassion. The personal story about her friend leaving for 
war makes it even more emotional and appealing. 
On the (discursive) level of argument, however, Katya is more hesitant 
and seeks confirmation with her friends who tell her about the word and the 
pistol.3 She shows the same hesitation with regard to internal affairs, i.e. how 
to deal with Palestinian citizens (“with regard to internal affairs I don’t know, 
I don’t know, internal affairs, that’s already, ehm, there are already many 
aspects”); I assume here Katya talks as a lawyer, not a lay citizen. 
However, I argue that Katya’s goal of telling the story about her friend 
leaving for war is not only to appeal to her listeners’ compassion but to 
present a justification of “showing strength”. While at first glance arguing 
for a peaceful co-existence, Katya indirectly equals Palestinian non-citizens 
with the Islamist terror organisation Hamas in Gaza. Reflecting about where 
she stands politically, Katya says:  
  
                                                             
3  “[W]hat is possible to achieve with a good word and a pistol is much more than 
[what is possible to achieve] only with a good word“ (see above).  
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“I am a nationalist somehow, I also don’t want—sure, this is right necessarily because 
I basically love—what is a nationalist basically? I love my country very much, I love 
my people very much, about my (.) religion I can’t tell, because I am not (..) 
particularly religious (..). That doesn’t mean that I don’t accept someone who (.), who 
is different, who is from another country, absolutely not! But I am, ehm, I am proud 
of what I am. So, yes, it is possible to consider me a nationalist, that’s, that’s how I 
see it.”  
Interviewer: “But can you accept someone who is different in your country or are you 
such a nationalist that you say: ‘our country is ours and not for somebody else!’?” 
Katya: “Good question (laughs)! Basically, the fact that we live (.), two people live 
here, there are Arabs in Israel (..), and basically, they also want peace, just as we do. 
I live—that is very, that is, that is, that is strange because (.)—let’s say I live on this 
side of the street and (.) there is a house where Arab live and (.)—us and them and 
(..)—there is a particular family that runs a shop and we always do our shopping there, 
so (.)—why, why should I say this country belongs to me alone or it does not (.) if in 
the end we all want peace? I (.) don’t want to bring up here my political standpoint, I 
don’t want, I (.) don’t want—whether—I don’t want to say whether I am in favour, 
ehm, a state (.) for Jews alone, or whether I am in favour, ehm, of accepting others, I 
don’t even want to start this [discussion] because basically what is important is that 
there will be, will be calmness, peace in this region already, it is enough already, it is 
enough, we fought here (..) about what? We need to find a way to live, find a way to 
live somehow—if we, we can’t—they can’t throw us into the sea, we can’t throw 
them into the sea, this will just not happen, this just must not happen, so one needs, 
we do need to live side by side. If—we don’t have a choice so we have to do this, we 
have to get along (4), I don’t have anything else, I don’t want to say (..)—yes, I do 
love my country, I am a nationalist somehow, I (...)—how far, how far I really, ehm, 
(..) identify (4)—that is simply, that is simply not right to say that I, I am ready (...)—
I don’t, don’t know—I am starting now an inner (.) dispute between me and myself, 
and I don’t want to because, because it is simply not right (..)—we need to, need to 
live in peace between the people of one state, between the people of half the state and, 
and the people and half the state and the second people, or simply as one people (..)—
let the politicians find a solution, and I (..), and we must learn (.) to live—there is 
simply no choice—the politicians will fasten [something, i.e. find a solution] 
(laughs).” (Katya, p. 31-2) 
 
Katya directly refers to slogans Hamas used as anti-Israeli propaganda (“they 
can’t throw us into the sea”). But instead of making the source of this 
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propaganda clear, a terror organisation, Katya presents it as a fact that “they”, 
“people who are on the other side of the border”, even Palestinians in general, 
would agree upon.  
 
 
11.3 ANALYSIS OF DISCURSIVE PRACTICE VIII:  
TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN 
 
In the context of presenting Palestinians as terrorists, Ilan finally connects 
Palestinians to a broader perception of threat: “Islamisation” of Western 
democracies, which he sees Israel a part of. The presentation of an existential 
threat combined with the lack of recognition of what Israel does to defend 
moral values serve as the basis to disqualify any external, particularly 
“European” critique of Israeli (foreign) policy as unqualified; Here, Ilan 
directly addresses his warning to me as a visitor from Germany, or, Europe 
in general: 
 
“[W]e are not Switzerland, we are not Denmark, people in Germany, maybe for them 
it is a little hard to catch, like, why Germany of all, from abroad, like, the situation we 
are in, and the policemen who are outside and check your bag every time, and, like, 
these things, like—in the United States this, like, now has begun a little to do this in 
this direction because of the terror that is there, it will also come to Europe, I promise 
to you that it will also come to Europe, I am also sure that in a little while it will come 
to France, to England, because there they have much Islamisation and, like—not, not 
Muslims, that’s not an evil thing, but extremists, which is an evil thing, like, like there 
is extremism in every place, I believe that the extremists also—there is Nature Karta, 
I don’t know if you know them or not, extremist ultra-orthodox, which is an evil thing, 
too, all extremism is an evil thing, so, we in this state, like, there is nothing you can 
do about it, we have to defend ourselves somehow, contribute, like, more than other 
people.” (Ilan, p. 16) 
 
Ilan repeats his justification for self-defence against the threat of Islamisation 
when talking about Israel’s role in the region, yet downplaying the country’s 
active part in the regional conflicts of the past: 
 
“We [Israel] are a little different, we are such a small pitskalle [Yidd., tiny leftover], 
we want to survive, we don’t want to do anybody wrong, not right, leave us alone, we 
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need to defend ourselves more than other–, there are sixty Muslim states around us, 
and they are not exactly our best friends.” (Ilan, p. 24) 
 
In this quote, Ilan does not even mention that there are also Palestinian, 
Christian and “Muslim”, citizens living in Israel. In his adaptation of the 
ethno-nationalist discourse of the Jewish State, but assumingly also in his 
personal experience, those citizens simply do not exist. However, he adds a 
qualification, condemning all kinds of extremism, including Jewish 
(religious) forms. Thus, in Ilan’s eyes, it is not only, but mainly Muslim 
extremism against which Israel has to defend itself. Ilan’s presents a 
connection of how he perceives existential threat at present with former 
threatening experiences; in this context he mentions in the informal part of 
the interview that he and his parents had suffered from those incidents back 
in Ukraine. Thus, Ilan constructs a double- or even triple-perception of being 
othered in his story: first as a Jew, second as a Russian-speaking Israeli, and 
third as an Israeli or “Westerner” in general. Against the background of his 
personal experience, he presents Palestinians, “Muslims” as the others who 
threaten him and his State. Against the background of the collective (Jewish) 
experience of threat, Ilan is finally able to belong.  
 
 
12 The Claim of Citizen’s Rights:  




This chapter deals with the presentation of IB. Above all, I will look at how 
the interviewees establish a notion of the Yisra’el Beitenu party as the 
political power that speaks plainly with respect to the “real problems” of 
Israeli society and is able to offer an alternative political path. In this context, 
the Yisra’el Beitenu party is presented as being in line with the Zionist 
discourse. Besides, I will analyse how the interviewees present the party’s 
political leader, Lieberman, and other people important to them. They do so 
constantly referring to the public discourse, and thus actively reproducing 
and modifying that discourse. Negative images are consequently replaced 
with positive counter-images and justified with special knowledge which is 
based on an alleged insider perspective. However, the interviewees hardly 
discuss the party’s ideological programme. When they do so, they refer to 
slogans which have circulated in Israeli public discourse, above all the 
party’s recent election campaign slogans that have already been described in 
the respective chapters about contribution and loyalty. 
 
 
12.1 ANALYSIS OF DISCURSIVE PRACTICE IX:  
“ZIONIST VALUES” 
 
Zionism is a common frame in the narratives, but not all the interviewees 
place their understanding of citizenship explicitly in this context. Vicky’s 
example is one of how motivation to serve is linked in the narratives with a 
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particular interpretation of Israeli citizenship and the role Zionism as a 
particular form of nationalism plays in it:  
 
“I became more interested in what is really going on with regard to politics during 
adolescence because I was in a youth movement called the ‚Zionist youth movement’, 
ehm, there I more considered Zionism and actions that need to be undertaken, and 
afterwards also in the army, ehm, I became more interested in why actually we fight 
so many (...) wars and what leads to what.” (Vicky, p. 16) 
 
In narratives where civic engagement is linked to citizenship in a causal 
nexus, Zionism is presented as one of the main pillars of Israeli citizenship. 
In this context, it is striking that its content is hardly elaborated but is 
presented as shared knowledge and thus does not require any further 
explanation. Another way of reading this argument is that the interviewees 
simply do not know how to fill the term; it is used to cover and to explain 
everything and nothing. The most “detailed” definition of what Zionism 
comes from Max, one of the members of the Knesset the Yisra’el Beitenu 
party had at the time of the interview with him. Max makes the statement in 
the context of describing the Yisra’el Beitenu party as a “Zionist party” and 
states that “[Zionism] consists of three basic principles: ‘repatriation, love of 
the land of Israel, security’” (Max, p. 10). This view is very much in line 
with the state ideology. 
However, in most cases the interviewees struggle to explain how they 
understand it. Ilan, for example, tries to explain what Zionism is when 
talking about why young people vote IB and only refers to official party 
slogans: 
 
“In Israel [...] young people are generally more conservative, more Zionist, and the 
older ones vote rather for Avoda [the Labour party], Meretz, like, more liberal– [...]. 
Again, like, the young generation, which is the generation that serves in the military 
or has to go to the military or is just after the military or is in reserve duty, ok, they 
know exactly what is going on in the country, like, they live this every day, they are 
at the university, they see what’s going on in the media, they, they are more active, 
like, older people who work, no idea, at the work place or pensioners, or people from 
the older generation that usually vote Avoda and so on—no idea, maybe they see the 
things a little different, like, it’s their right, I get it, simply, the young generation, like, 
those who are in reserve duty—ehm, again, those who—no idea, are more involved 
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in social life, (pause), ehm, they see the situation in Israel as—(pause) in a way similar 
or the same as the party [Yisra’el Beitenu] simply says, like, and it speaks to them 
more likely, in my opinion at least, and it’s not only the party, you also have to talk 
about the [party] leader, Avigdor Lieberman, right—we talked about this, the Zionism 
of the party, the nationalism of the party, the patriotism, all these things.” (Ilan, p. 24-
5) 
 
Ilan’s statement can be taken as a template for what the interviewees 
understand by Zionism, i.e. the version that the Yisra’el Beitenu party 
presents in its programme: “patriotism” or “love the country” (Max), and 
“nationalism” or the presentation of the State of Israel as a Jewish State in 
line with the ethno-nationalist discourse. 
 
 
12.2 ANALYSIS OF POWER RESOURCES III:  
AN IDEOLOGICAL MATCH 
 
An important aspect of the interviewees’ notion of the political party is what 
can be called a socialisation into the party, i.e. the process of adopting a 
political ideology with time spent. Katya describes an ideological match of 
her own world view and the party’s official ideology, in particular with 
regard to foreign affairs, and experiences a similar process of socialisation 
into the party the longer she works with them so closely.  
However, one can also find attempts to emphasise that one is still a self-
reflexive and critical individual being, despite being employed by the party’s 
Knesset faction. Katya claims to maintain a distance with regard to ideology, 
stating that she keeps her “real convictions” to herself because they are 
private, and they must not interfere with her work. At the same time, it should 
be of no interest to her employers what her personal convictions are as long 
as “my opinions should not interfere with my work” (Katya, p. 16f, p. 40), 
“I am not obliged to accept the ideologies, [...] I am not a representative” 
(Katya, p. 40). To stress her independent thinking, she emphasises the 
strategic reasons for her involvement with the party and implies her 
perception of a need for justification. This is reinforced by her main 
argument that she first and foremost wants to help people in need—against 
which ideological background this is done is of secondary interest:  
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“[Y]ou can actually change something—the moment I say that I am calling from an 
MK’s office [...], [a]nd that is why I chose, right for now, to accept that [being engaged 
with the Yisra’el Beitenu party], because I also want to learn the rules of the game.” 
(Katya, p. 8)  
 
Accordingly, she stresses that she also works according to her profession as 
a lawyer, but against the background of actually having the power to change 
things: “I simply want to go into a law and check where, where it is possible 
to change it the way I want it to work” (Katya, p. 3). From a backward 
perspective, the argument of “learning the rules” can be read as a post-hoc 
justification to herself and others for staying in her current position: once she 
gets the opportunity to “actually change something” through her political 
engagement, her engagement with the Yisra’el Beitenu party is justified. To 
underline this interpretation, Katya claims she had no prior interest in current 
politics: “I didn’t know the MK [members of the Knesset] at all, not 
according to their name, neither to their faces, only, ehm, only the basic(s) 
[differences] between them” (Katya, p. 2). In this context, Katya is also 
downplaying the importance of an ideological match between her own 
political convictions and the party’s ideological programme: “Yachimovich 
from Avoda [the Israeli Labour Party] is too socialist [..], although she is a 
very smart woman” (Katya, p. 6-7). 
The importance of a commonly shared cultural capital, however, is a 
minor issue and Katya is one of the few who, alongside with Ilan, makes it 
an issue. But she also mentions regarding a single, in her eyes funny incident 
when all members of a Knesset committee realised they could switch to the 
Russian language because they were all “Russians”. Above all, she makes it 
an issue in order to explain that she does not get along with her colleague, an 
Israeli-born: “maybe, again, maybe simply because we were not, (..), we did 
not come from that cultural background” (Katya, p. 21).  
In contrast, Ilan speaks about the fear of losing the asset of cultural 
capital. Interestingly, he is the only one of the participants who talks entirely 
from a personal angle. He clearly chooses his ambitions to start a political 
career as the main topic of his narrative. 
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Key story: “The fortune teller”  
Ilan starts by telling me about his dream of “becoming someone big”:  
 
“Ehm, when I was four, really little, a fortune teller came, do you know what a fortune 
teller is, like, however, enters the hairdresser’s, ok, where my mother was working, 
there were some other twenty people, and she entered, passed all of them, everyone, 
everyone, everyone, approached of all people some—she was a gipsy, a gipsy, like 
that, gipsy, like, some authentic, she came to my mother and said, like, ‘I want to, I 
want, like, to read, like, your hand, tell you the future about everything.’ Ehm, like, 
for free, for nothing, simply wanted to read her hand. (Pause) all right, (pause), ehm, 
my mother said ‘alright, gladly, what, like, great’, and she [the fortune teller] started 
to tell her, like, ‘you are three souls in the family’ (..) which is right, ‘you have a 
child’, she said, right, ‘the child is sick at the moment’, like, I was four, I had 
something, bronchitis, no idea what, I was sick, she was right, she said ‘you won’t 
live in this flat any longer’, [...] ‘you won’t live in this flat, and afterwards you won’t 
live in this country’, which was, like, long before the borders opened and everything, 
this was something very, like, unrealistic, weird, it’s, like, she said some other things, 
too, of which everything was right or came true, like, that’s it, and, like, there was one 
sentence, I don’t know, that she said, like, about when I will be grown up, then, I don’t 
know, my mother, my father behaved toward me apparently then accordingly, I don’t 
know, my grandfather, my grandmother, doesn’t matter, like, I am the only child, [...] 
she [the fortune teller] said that ‘your son will become a great man’, she said, (pause) 
that’s it, from that moment on I grew up in the way that my mother always believed 
that I (pause) will become a great man.” (Ilan, p. 17-8) 
 
Ilan’s mother was foretold two decisive moments in their family’s life: 
emigration and the chosenness of their son. While the first event is rather 
concrete (“you won’t live in this flat, and afterwards you won’t live in this 
country”), the second, the one which concerns their son’s far future (“I was 
four”), is rather blurry. The story has without doubt been retold in the family 
many times and in Ilan’s interview the “prophecy” carries a mystic element. 
As the only child of the family, Ilan may have been treated “accordingly”, in 
terms of expectations of his parents toward him, which were above his own 
toward himself. Ilan presents himself as ambitious; yet him creating this 
impression can as well be read as a way to cover the stress connected to those 
high expectations to “become a great man”, to succeed and not to fail. Ilan’s 
aspiration for a successful political career can be read in the light of 
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Bourdieu’s concept of habitus the embodied belief in his fate is inscribed 
into how he presents his expectations for the future:  
 
“I am a very ambitious person, (pause) a maximalist, I am not sure whether this is the 
right word, but ambitious, that’s for sure! Everything I do, I want to do it in the—
(pause) everything, what I do, I want to reach (pause) and to tend to reach the first 
place, like, [...] so to speak, with regard to the highest achievement, so, you can 
imagine, what is the first place from the political point of view, where I incline to, and 
what from the point of view of economics, like—I am simply afraid to speak out 
things that will sound—, like, it is a little childish from my point of view to say it 
now, because the Lord knows what will be.” (Ilan, p. 12)  
 
Ilan presents himself as someone who knows exactly what it takes to achieve 
a certain goal, in his case: to make a political career; in particular, he presents 
gaining (high) education as a chance to be better off than his parents and to 
make the prophecy come true. Again, Ilan demonstrates his ambitions: he 
tells me that in the eighth grade, he changed his local public high school for 
a prestigious boarding school “for gifted children” (Ilan, p. 2); he takes a 
special bus to get there every day.1 In contrast to the expectations Ilan has 
about his future, he admits that he has entered the political field by chance 
and that he has not got a clear strategy how to do that; he gives a post-hoc 
rationalisation for his interest in politics instead: 
 
“[...] [T]he ability to have influence on your life, on the life of the people who are 
close to you, on, ehm, on life and on, (pause) the state in general, to design it (..) the 
way you think (..) that it is more right, your ‘I believe’, like, that’s how I at least 
personally—maybe it’s too pretentious, I believe that I know how to do it in a much 
better way, like, I don’t know if the best way, but much better than it is today for sure, 
there are many things to improve, like, basically the power you have, like —I want 
power, power to change things to the better, ok, to the better for my friends, for my 
friends, for everyone, ok, like, this is very simple that there are two central powers in 
the world, and in Israel in particular, this is politics and economics, ok, which in my 
                                                             
1  The school’s website says (in its Russian version) that immigrants of the “Great 
Aliyah” revitalised the system of special schools’ villages in Israel, and with this 
also the school at hand. Either way, they stress that one of the school’s goals is to 
support pupils who really want to learn. 
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opinion—like, now to start a business I didn’t have any priority or any preference 
what do first or how to do what, nor did I have a built plan that I do a), afterwards b), 
afterwards c), I do, like, no—I know more or less the direction, ehm, it’s like a car, 
like you drive a car, ok, and you have headlamps, and you know you that you want to 
go from A to B, (pause) they light you 100 meters, and so you drive 100 meters, and 
then you see, like, something new, another turn, another crossing, and when I get there 
I see, like, what is more right, I look, like, really, like how it l—logical, I can arrange 
something.” (Ilan, p. 11-2)  
 
Ilan is insecure about how to behave correctly in a new and unfamiliar field, 
and moreover a field of activity he did not explicitly choose, but which 
opened a door to him “by chance”. However, he presents his attempt to be 
successful in the field as if it was his destiny, and yet he lacks the necessary 
resources. Ilan’s story must be read against the background of his parents’ 
process of adaptation in Israel. Ilan’s family arrived in Israel in 1992, at the 
beginning of the “Great Aliyah” from Ukraine. He only tells me two things 
about his parents: first, that his parents “were without high education” (Ilan, 
p. 1), and second, because they lacked high education “it was difficult for 
them to integrate in terms of work” (Ilan, p. 1):  
 
“My parents live in [a development town in the south], (..) ehm, (..), my parents are—
, ehm, (...), that’s just it, without high education, OK, they are not, not—usually people 
who arrived from Russia were physicians, engineers, (.), people with a high status that 
came to Israel, and for them it was, that’s how it is, the absorption was difficult with 
regard to work, and everything, so my parents, like, for them (..) the absorption was 
relatively difficult, but, like, my parents, they—like, my father was a plumber over 
there, and my mother was a hairdresser, and they started to do manual work.” (Ilan, 
p. 1) 
 
In contrast to Ilan, none of the other interviewees even mention their parents’ 
education. Ilan might be embarrassed by his parents’ lack of secondary 
education who in his eyes differ from the “people who came from Russia 
[who] were physicians, engineers, people with very high status”, (cf. also 
Glöckner 2011). This goes along with him repeating that his parents cannot 
advise him because they lack appropriate education. Let alone the 
circumstances of choosing that school, which cannot be reconstructed in the 
interview, to achieve (higher) education has an important function for Ilan: 
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it allows him to distinguish himself from his parents, to prove that he is part 
of the “Great Aliyah” and thus belongs.  
On the other hand, Ilan presents himself as experiencing disadvantages 
because of his migration background for strategic reasons. First of all, he 
applies the definition of the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) 
of who an immigrant is, a very technical definition which he emphasises does 
not fit: “I am not an immigrant, who is? The IOM says ‘people who have 
lived for five years in the country’” (Ilan, p. 20). Ilan speaks of difficulties 
to enter certain circles of power because the “ruling elite is not your elite” 
(Ilan, p. 23); he considers himself as part of an elite, yet the interesting and 
tricky question is: part of which elite. Consequently, Ilan presents the 
Yisra’el Beitenu party as a “niche for Russian-speaking political newcomers 
like me [to learn the business of politics]” (Ilan, p. 14). However, he admits 
that it is not the common way to start a political career right at the top but at 
the local level, e.g. in “student cells of parties who form the future elite” 
(Ilan, p. 22). Yet Ilan concedes: “only you don’t have connections” (Ilan, p. 
22).  
However, he presents his engagement with the Yisra’el Beitenu party as 
a decision based on an ideological match and he emphasises that the decisive 
ideological component for him is the party’s pursuit of “Zionism”. To 
emphasise the importance of the issue to him even more, he tells me about 
his previous engagement:  
 
“Ehm, I am a research associate at the Institute for Zionist Strategies, (..) ehm, who 
provide position papers on all kinds of issues, things, meet at some forums with judges 
of the Supreme Court, with politicians and these things.” (Ilan 9)  
 
Summarising the story about his engagement with the party, Ilan thinks aloud 
about whether he could also have become engaged with another political 
party and states that his engagement with the Yisra’el Beitenu party is very 
much related to his recruitment by a party representative he had met by 
chance on another occasion: 
 
“It depends, like, maybe Likud yes, Meretz, I don’t—, I believe that not, yes, a party 
(..)—again, Zionism, like, in my understanding, ehm, (..)—I couldn’t fit, simply, for 
example, I exaggerate, into a party, no idea, an Arab party or again Meretz, no idea, 
but Likud, Kadima, no idea, like, there is a little difference, but I believe it also 
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depends, and it’s, like, let’s say, since I have been with the party, so, I undergo such 
a kind of socialisation, and the longer I am with the party, that’s how it is, my opinions 
get more in line with the line of the party, like, either that I know better the basis of 
[the] party, and so I—basically the more I identify with it, by and by, I think, for now 
this is fine, if I would co—like, but generally, like, to the very party, relatively, I’d 
say, that I have come to it by chance (.), like, I don’t know.” (Ilan, p. 9-10)  
 
In contrast to Ilan, who presents himself as marginalised, most interviewees 
perceive their own position as quite close to the political centre, both in terms 
of ideology and power. This is mirrored by them referring to public discourse 
as a confirmation, as Igal does: “many think that way” (Igal, p. 3). 
Accordingly, they aim at proving the political party they are engaged with 
is—against claims in public discourse—in line with Israeli political culture. 
IB is presented not only as in line with the Zionist discourse by the 
interviewees, but also as the natural political choice of young Israelis, as Ilan 
explains: 
 
“In Israel [...] young people are generally more conservative, more Zionist, and the 
older ones vote rather for Avoda [the Labour party], Meretz, like, more liberal [...] 
Again, like, the young generation, which is the generation that serves in the military 
or has to go to the military or is just after the military or is in reserve duty, ok, they 
know exactly what is going on in the country, like, they live this every day, they are 
at the university, they see what’s going on in the media, they, they are more active, 
like, older people who work, no idea, at the work place or pensioners, or people from 
the older generation that usually vote Avoda and so on—no idea, maybe they see the 
things a little different, like, it’s their right, I get it.” (Ilan, p. 24)  
 
Accordingly, Ilan is confused when I tell him I understood—maybe wanted 
to understand in the context of the study— “extremist” ( ינוצק ) instead of 
“conservative” ( ינורמש ) and categorically denies this. Instead, he regards 
this “conservati[sm]” as absolutely in line with what is publicly wanted and 
allowed. 
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12.3 ANALYSIS OF DISCURSIVE PRACTICE X:  
CATCHY SLOGANS 
 
As it is with Zionism, so it is with IB’s ideological programme: though the 
interviewees talk at length about their engagement with the party, they hardly 
talk about the party’s political programme or concrete political acts. By and 
large, the interviewees know the technical procedures of political activity 
much better than the party’s ideology, in general the interviewees only know 
the electoral slogans about service and loyalty. However, there is a difference 
in the notion of and reference to the ideology of the Yisra’el Beitenu party, 
depending on the position of the interviewee regarding the party’s 
“ideological centre”. Interviewees at the periphery (e.g. Avi, Katya) are more 
reflective than those who are closer to core party figures (e.g. Igal) or are one 
themselves (Max). Particularly the narratives of those at the “periphery” 
mirror an inner dispute about these official ideological slogans, namely on 
two occasions: on the one hand when the interviewees talk about concrete 
experiences that they feel made or currently make them reflect their political 
viewpoint, on the other hand when they are directly asked in the interview 
situation to justify a certain ideological position.  
Katya’s narrative shall serve as an example for a certain indecision 
between claiming an ideological match and hesitating. While talking about 
foreign affairs, Katya first states “I agree with the party’s ideology very 
much”. At the same time, she feels the need to explain to me—here as a 
person not residing in Israel permanently and thus assumingly not knowing 
the conditions of everyday life in Israel—why she agrees with those 
“extremist” and “nationalist” (Katya, p. 27) views and refers to the “current 
reality” as the context of her argument in order to justify it. She tells me the 
story of a close friend she used to date and who sent her a text message from 
his mobile phone while he was on the way to the Northern border:  
 
“[We need] to demonstrate to outside that we are not wimps, and not, not, not, not 
only peace talks, in the end, which means, yes, yes, one does need to show muscles 
sometimes, peace talks are very important, right, but, ehm, (4), but not only, there is, 
there is sth. that I don’t really, ehm, love, but, ehm, (..), friends, ehm, friends simply, 
ehm, many tell me: ‘what is possible to achieve with a good word and a pistol is much 
more than only with a good word’, it’s, there is, it’s simply a translation from English, 
yes, something like that, so yes, a good word, and also (...), and also, not only a good 
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word, and also, and also you can’t ignore that, because the moment you see your 
friends go, ehm, go, ehm, to fight, im—, there in the North or the South, and you 
don’t know whether they’ll return, and you don’t know what’s going on there, and you 
receive SMS messages, ehm, ‘I am going to be not available [on the phone], ehm, I 
don’t know, I don’t know for how long, so don’t miss me, and don’t think that I, like, 
I am simply not available’, what am I supposed to feel, what, am I supposed to feel 
love for the people who are on the other side of, of, of the border, really not, really 
not, so, because of this it’s very easy for me to connect to that [part of the party’s 
ideology], with regard to internal affairs I don’t know, I don’t know, internal affairs, 
that’s already, ehm, there are already many aspects.” (Katya, p. 7) 
 
Katya is more sceptical about the methods employed by the party to gain 
votes, especially of younger voters and returns to speaking of a “brainwash” 
(Katya, p. 27) when turning to young people, and misusing fact that “young 
people [still] learn to evaluate”. Against the background of family memory, 
she hesitates to employ those methods: 
 
“I simply remember myself in school, I, I, I know that going into details (..), we were 
not up to it at all, (..) young people get the slogans, yes, now, to what extent this is 
right, to what extent this is right with regard to—from the point of view of the party 
it surely is right, because it brings her a new electorate, to what extent this is right 
with regard to, ehm (..), how is it called, ehm, to what extent this is wanted that the 
party does it, I don’t know, (4) it depends, again, we talk about the state level, if, ehm, 
if the country, country—the country needs to raise a new generation, the country 
needs to raise a new generation, it needs to prepare them already from a young age, 
so if this is, if this is to speak about youth organisations, ehm, they talk in slogans, so 
yes [...], again, I can’t tell you to what extent this is wanted because we live in that 
reality (...) and every country does this at the end of the day (laughing), it’s not that 
only we do that [...], obviously, obviously it is wanted by the state, because it has to 
continue its—it has to continue its erection [...], because if it doesn’t raise a new 
generation, it obviously will not go on to exist, so obviously it is right, [...] to what 
extent it is right to raise them [the new generation]? (5) I don’t know, also? don’t 
know, don’t know, it’s very hard for me to come to a certain opinion (2), maybe, 
maybe it’s right, maybe it’s not right, ehm, I simply, I simply remember how, ehm, 
how, ehm, my grandmother was at her time brainwashed, that? (4) my grandfather 
especially, he (2), he believed in Stalin so much, it’s simply unbelievable, (2) my 
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grandmother also believed in him, that is simply, that is simply, that is the way that I 
think it is not wanted.” (Katya, p. 27-9).  
 
One can even feel her hesitation when one reads the quote through the marks 
for pauses in her speech. Katya becomes hesitant when thinking about IB’s 
methods to catch (young) voters through slogans:  
 
“Because of that [i.e. young people’s inclination to extremism] our party can also 
allow itself to play with young people than with? because it’s very easy to carry [them] 
away with extremist opinions, extremist opinions are generally more–, ”sexier”, more 
attractive.” (Katya, p. 27).  
 
Yet I argue, against the background of her employment with “our party”, 
Katya feels she needs to add two important qualifications: first, she refers to 
“other countries” to emphasise that Israel is not special in this regard, but 
quite “normal”. Second, she adds that there are moral boundaries concerning 
the extent to which the slogans to educate or “brainwash” adolescents are 
used and refers to family memories to express her doubts in the method:  
 
“The question is to what extent we use it, if we use it in order to raise them [the new 
generation], in order to develop them—yes, but, ehm, if they go afterwards and—(..), 
disgrace a mosque or a synagoge, or draw, ehm, (..) all kinds of things that are not 
wanted on the walls, or (..)—it’s not, and there is no need to do that either, [...] to 
what extent it is right to raise them [the new generation]—(5) I don’t know, also—
don’t know, don’t know—, it’s very hard for me to come to a certain opinion (2), 
maybe, maybe it’s right, maybe it’s not right, ehm, I simply , I simply remember how, 
ehm, how, ehm, my grandmother was at her time brainwashed, that—(4) my 
grandfather especially, he (2), he believed in Stalin so much, it’s simply unbelievable, 
(2) my grandmother also believed in him, that is simply, that is simply, that is the way 
that I think it is not wanted.” (Katya, p. 28-9).  
 
As argued above, at the same time she stresses her loyalty to her employer, 
refusing to talk about her doubts about the party’s means to reach political 
goals, stating “my political opinions should not interfere with my work”. Yet 
at the same time she does not want to openly condemn the party; she wraps 
this uneasiness into the trust in the adolescents’ moral development instead. 
This is the easiest way out: to ignore one’s personal doubts. In order to stress 
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her loyalty, she also emphasises there are particular situations which allow 
to ignore those “moral boundaries”, and directly refers to the “current 
reality” as the context of the need to use simple slogans in order to catch 
votes and gain political power.  
 
 
12.4 ANALYSIS OF DISCURSIVE PRACTICE XI:  
“PAPA LIEBERMAN” 
 
The interviewees speak at large about the party’s founder and current leader, 
Lieber- man—partly because they are asked how they see him by the 
interviewer, but mainly because some of the interviewees claim to have a 
personal relationship with him. As will be shown, this claim can be 
interpreted as serving the goal of constructing a counter-image of 
Lieberman’s to the one which is perceived by the interviewees as dominant 
in the public discourse. However, there are other people in the party, too, 
presented as important persons to the interviewees, depending on their 
individual experiences with IB.  
Three main images of Lieberman can be analytically derived from the 
narratives: Lieberman as a non-fascist, Lieberman as a political leader, and 
Lieberman as “papa”. The interviewees present these images in contrast to 
the public discourse about the Yisra’el Beitenu party in their narratives—
Gutwein2 (2009) for example describes the Yisra’el Beitenu party as right-
wing populist and compares it to—at that time still a new phenomenon—
“hate parties” of European style like Haider’s FPÖ , Le Pen’s Front National 
or Wilder’s Partij voor de Vrijheid—and actively contribute to the 
construction of a counter-image. Personal encounters matter, and usually 
those encounters are much more important than ideological agreement (cf. 
Smith/ Zipp 1983); people vote IB because they know the candidates 
personally, ideology is of minor importance.  
The discursive image of the Yisra’el Beitenu party and its political 
leader, Lieberman, the interviewees construct in their narratives, is very 
much impacted by their personal encounters. In this context, Lieberman as a 
                                                             
2  Daniel Gutwein. How the left elevated Lieberman. Haaretz (English Edition), 
2009. Retrieved from: http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/how- 
the-left-elevated-lieberman-1.269990  
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person is often described as friendly, attentive or charismatic, showing leader 
qualities.  
Katya’s argument shall serve as an example.Katya speaks about 
Lieberman when speaking about her agreement with the party’s ideology on 
issues of foreign affairs. In this context, she gives the following answer to 
the interviewer’s question about whether Lieberman is a “fascist”:  
 
“He wants to show that he is an extremist, maybe because of that [people say he is a 
fascist], but (2), I don’t know, (2) fascist? He is extremist, but fascist? He is not, I 
know him personally! Ok, this is because I am now a part of his party, although (..) 
also, as an equivalent, I don’t, don’t see a fascist in him, I also—, now I also know, I 
got to know him personally from personal talking, he is far from that [being a fascist].” 
(Katya, p. 29) 
 
She realises that her first, and very emotional response to this image is 
“because I am now a part of his party”; in this context, she is personally 
involved and feels attacked. Upon, second thoughts, however, Katya thinks 
about the meaning of fascism and finally justifies Lieberman’s political 
views and actions: “rather people misunderstand him, he loves his country 
very much” (Katya, p. 30).  
In many of the narratives a blurred or distorted notion of Lieberman 
appears, very much impacted by personal flattery:  
 
“I also, now I also know, I got to know him personally from personal talking, he is 
far from that [being a fascist], there are things that I don’t connect with, but his way 
of talking, his way of behaving is, it is very clear to me, it is very, ehm, (..) it’s very 
natural for me.” (Katya, p. 29)  
 
As Katya finally states: “he talks to us” (Katya, p. 30), acknowledging that 
Lieberman, disregarding party-internal hierarchies, treats everyone equally. 
Igal also claims to know him personally from kitchen talks at home and even 
refers to Lieberman as “papa” (Igal, p. 11). In a similar vein, he states 
Lieberman’s trustworthiness: 
 
“He [Lieberman] talks the naked truth, he plans big things, I convinced many of my 
friends to vote for him, now they come and complain, saying ‘Igal, he hasn’t achieved 
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anything of what he promised’, so I tell them ‘it’s not his fault, he is bound to a 
coalition, it’s the state of the political system in Israel’.” (Igal, p. 11)  
 
 
12.5 ANALYSIS OF DISCURSIVE PRACTICE XII:  
“IT WAS CHEMISTRY” 
 
Key story: Hamad the Druze 
As mentioned above, Ilan presents his narrative based on his need for 
recognition of his attempts at being successful. This need for recognition is 
also reflected in Ilan’s story about his current involvement with the Yisra’el 
Beitenu party. Ilan tells me about the “very good work relations” with the 
MK he is working for, Hamad Am’ar, a Druze. He makes an effort to 
illustrate their relationship as special and very close, he shows his loyalty 
and gratitude. This quote might be understood better as part of the stories 
about Ilan’s disappointment with his status within and his treatment by “the 
party”. Working for Am’ar, he is still a bit of an outsider, but the Druze 
Am’ar is, too, and he, Am’ar, “knows to appraise your work” (Ilan, p. 15). 
Ilan’s relationship with the party is rather hierarchic, while that with his boss 
is characterised by co-operation and (mutual) recognition. In this regard, Ilan 
presents their relationship as a process of fraternisation and solidarity among 
ethnic minorities, here Druze and Russian-speaking Israelis, against the 
“ruling elite” (see above: key story “the fortune teller”).3 Ilan expresses 
solidarity with people in a similar marginal position but he does so rather for 
strategic reasons since it allows him to stress the of the fact that he himself 
feels being marginalised (see above: fortune teller). Ilan defends a Druze MK 
among the IB people as if there had been an internal argument about Am’ar’s 
right to represent Druze Israelis in the name of IB: “it’s like—, (...) he is 
more Yisra’el Beitenu than other people [who are with] the Yisra’el Beitenu 
party, ok?!” (Ilan, p. 7). To strengthen his argument, Ilan lists Am’ar’s 
contributions to his own (Druze) community and thus to the Israeli society 
in general:  
  
                                                             
3  In the context of this statement, the “ruling elite” includes IB’s inner circle people, 
too.  
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“He is a disabled veteran, served in the army, was injured, contributes to the state 
(pause), founded a youth movement, he leads the Druze youth movement, 8—, 
approximately, 12,000 people, kids, he helps them very much, in every regard [...] he 
contributes ‘mountains’ to the state, and I think very few people, like, at all, in the 
Knesset and so (pause) did so much for the sake of, I don’t know, for the sake of the 
people, for the sake of the rest of the State, this is what I think.” (Ilan 14)  
 
Still, Ilan may have his difficulties with this solidarity: to describe how 
marginal Druze people in the Israeli society are in his view, he tells me the 
story about how he drove to his job interview in Am’ar’s home town and that 
it was so far north that he was afraid his GPS would not find the place (Ilan, 
p. 8), while he literally puts himself and his own hometown, Ashdod, into 
the country’s centre. 
 
 
12.6 ANALYSIS OF DISCURSIVE PRACTICE XIII:  
“SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS” 
 
In contrast to the two dimensions conditioning Israeli citizenship in the eyes 
of the interviewees—contribution and loyalty—, the interviewees leave the 
issue of citizen’s rights out almost entirely. Yet, as was shown in the previous 
chapters, the interviewees construct their reading of Israeli citizenship 
completely against the background of an ethno-nationalist discourse of 
belonging to the Jewish collective and apply the presentation of Palestinians 
as the other as a discursive strategy: the Palestinians again serve as the others 
against which the interviewees discursively construct their notion of good 
citizens. On grounds of an ethno-nationalist discourse, the interviewees 
present the argument of conditional citizen’s rights as if it had a rational and 
“very logical” (Ilan, p. 13) basis—even more so since neither the Yisra’el 
Beitenu party nor the interviewees directly attack a particular social group 
but claim all Israeli citizens to be equal: those who do not fulfil their 
obligations as citizens, do not earn citizen’s rights. In order to stress this 
argument, the interviewees frequently disturb the non-Jewish minorities in 
Israel and their different statutes with regard to citizen’s duties. Having in 
mind that Druze and Bedouin citizens do serve in the IDF and besides are 
relatively silent and the legal option of doing national service for those who 
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do not serve for whatever reasons, the interviewees can claim equal duties 
for all citizens.  
However, a closer look shows that the interviewees argue against the 
background of adopting a particular reading of Israeli citizenship: the ethno-
nationalist reading of the State of Israel as a Jewish state. Non-Jewish 
minorities who contribute and show loyalty to the Jewish state, i.e. remain 
silent, are tolerated. I further argue that Jewish segments who do not 
contribute or are not loyal in the eyes of the interviewees, in turn, are 
tolerated because of their belonging to the Jewish people. This way they are 
able to present Palestinian citizens as the only part of Israeli society which 
does not contribute and is not loyal and in addition imposes an existential 
threat upon that society. The rational consequence in the interviewees’ 
opinion is to deprive those segments of Israeli society who do not contribute 
of their basic citizen’s rights. The interviewees do not openly express this 
conclusion, but there are hints between the lines of what they say. The 
interviewees connect the perception of threat with the discourse of loyalty as 
an argumentative basis to legitimise their questioning of the right of 
citizenship for Palestinian Israelis. Loyalty, in the interviewees’ 
interpretation, here becomes a means to define who is worthy of citizen’s 
rights, but also who must earn them and how. Jewish citizens are supposed 
to meet at least one condition of citizenship by being Jewish and are thus 
considered worthy of citizen’s rights. Non-Jewish citizens still have to earn 
their rights through service and loyalty. In this context, Ilan gives examples 
that individuals representing other national minorities, apart from 
Palestinians, do earn their citizen’s rights through their actions. Ilan, for 
instance, repeats how much the Druze MK he works for is in line with IB 
ideology and states:  
 
“The core of IB[’s ideology] is very simple, (..) ehm, it’s like, love of the state of 
Israel. I understand it, like, (.) at the core, ehm (.)—you have the right to get as much 
as you give, that is to say as much as you give to the state, as much you get, like, (.) 
to me that sounds very logical, right? If you are a citizen who fulfils his obligations, 
you are entitled to full rights, and if you don’t [fulfil your obligations], like, you are 
not [entitled to full rights] but part of them. If you don’t give anything to the state—
why should I who pays taxes, who serves in the army, who does everything (.)—and 
someone else [who does not give anything] gets discrimination fees (.), rights, 
pension, convalescence [fees] and all those things on my account? It doesn’t sound 
178 | Inclusion through Exclusion 
 
logical to me, like, (...) [Hamad, the Druze MK] is army veteran, served in the army, 
got wounded, served the country, (.) founded a youth movement, is the head of that 
youth movement of 12,000 members, children (..), he helps them a lot, a lot, like, from 
every point of view, like, helps them, like, [...], [Hamad] serves the country a lot.” 
(Ilan, p. 13)  
 
This reading of Israeli citizenship means two things: while Druze or Bedouin 
citizens are able to earn their citizen’s rights, it has become almost 
impossible for Palestinian citizens to do so.  
 
 
13 A Grounded Theory of Belonging:  




My initial research interest was the question of how (and why) young Israelis 
with an FSU family background become engaged with the Yisra’el Beitenu 
party. In order to find answers to this initial question, I organised the 
collection and analysis of data with the help of the grounded theory approach, 
as initially developed by Strauss and Glaser (Glaser/ Strauss 2011). Against 
the background of a theoretical sampling, I conducted in-depth interviews 
about civic engagement with interviewees engaged with the political party 
on different levels (national vs. local), in different forms (formal vs. 
informal), in different positions within the party’s structure (central vs. 
peripheral), and in different modes (active vs. passive). In the course of the 
analysis of the material, I developed more detailed questions concerning the 
material, such as: How do the interviewees contextualise their engagement 
against the background of their perceived position in Israeli society? How do 
they actively position themselves in that society and which are the resources 
and strategies they apply here? How do the interviewees develop a sense of 
their belonging and which role does their civic engagement play in that 
process? Finally, what role does their presentation of Israeli citizenship play 
in that process?  
Once belonging had emerged as the key category, I suggested applying 
Bourdieu’s concepts of social space, field, capital, and social practice as an 
integrated framework in order to be able to take the perspective of the 
interviewees in particular or that of citizens with an immigrant family 
background in general to understand how they adapt to a new social space 
and actively construct and make sense of their place. I put particular 
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emphasis on the analysis of how the interviewees a) relate toward the 
different forms of capital in their possession as resources or the perceived 
lack of them in order to pursue a particular argumentative strategy, and b) 
how they apply these power resources strategically when speaking about 
their engagement with the Yisra’el Beitenu party in particular and about the 
broader context of their engagement, that is their perception of Israeli society 
and Israeli citizenship. This means, I paid particular attention to the 
realisation of power resources in the discursive practice of the interview 
situation, i.e. how they present the power resources they have at their 
disposal in their narratives. 
With reference to Bourdieu’s statement that the existing social order can 
be challenged, one of the basic claims I made in the present study was that 
the interviewees are social actors. Within that social order or social space 
under examination, namely the Israeli society, they pursue a strategy of 
reinsuring or improving their objective and subjective positions in a 
particular field—here: the field of politics—as a social group—here: Israelis 
with an FSU family background, and thus also in Israeli society. In this 
context, Keller (2011a) points to the “emphasis on the active and 
interpretative efforts of social actors in the (re-)production and 
transformation of symbolic orders in [those] discourses” (Keller 2011a: 36). 
I was able to make statements about the interviewees’ sense of belonging 
at the moment the interview took place and in retrospective. Yet on the basis 
of interview material I was not able to make statements about the process of 
the development of their sense of belonging or, in other words, from where 
they had started. As it is often the case in qualitative empirical studies, I had 
to deal with limited resources of time and money to stay in the field and to 
get access to it and thus was not able to return to the field in order to re-
interview the participants after some time. Besides, the interviews are framed 
by the particular situation in which the interviews took place and by the fact 
that I as their interview partner was a foreigner. This has certainly played a 
role in the way the interviewees make statements explicit or explain them in 
more detail than what might have been the case with an Israeli, or even more 
so, an FSU-born interviewer. Conversely, they certainly left things out for 
the same reasons. In this context, in the process of analysis I sometimes had 
to use the help of people with knowledge of the language and the Israeli 
political culture but who were not participating in the process of carrying out 
the interviews. 
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In this final chapter, firstly, I will develop a material theory about the 
interviewees’ presentation of Israeli citizenship as a strategy of belonging, 
as it has emerged from the interview material. Secondly, I will critically 
discuss the findings of the present study with regard to the theoretical part as 






The interviewees take their talking about engagement with the Yisra’el 
Beitenu party as a starting point to speak about their reading of Israeli 
citizenship.  Citizenship is conceptualised in the context of the study as the 
“membership of a political community” (Lister/ Pia 2003:. 8), featured by 
four core dimensions in a particular relationship: (political, cultural, 
economic) rights, duties, participation and identity (Delanty 1997: 9). The 
narratives display all four dimensions, yet in a hierarchical order. 
Citizenship, as the interviewees present it, is conditional and two dimensions 
are of particular importance to them: citizen’s duties of serving the country 
and being loyal to the Jewish state and, in return, the granting of full citizen’s 
rights in the form of Israeli citizenship itself. In this context, civic 
engagement is not presented as active participation in Delanty’s sense, but 
as a duty alongside service and loyalty. Finally, identity or identification with 
the Jewish state are at the bottom line of the hierarchy.  
The interviewees base their understanding of Israeli citizenship on three 
pillars: the adaptation of the ethno-nationalist discourse, which emphasises 
the Jewish character of the Israeli state and, connected to that, the adaptation 
of the hegemonic discourse, which presents military service as a moral 
obligation in various contexts of socialisation, personal or second-hand 
experiences as Israelis with an immigrant background and ways of coping 
with those experiences as well as the adaptation of the Yisra’el Beitenu 
party’s ideology.  
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13.2 SERVING THE COUNTRY 
 
In the interviews, serving the country means first and foremost military 
service. Military service is presented as mandatory for all Israeli citizens, 
regardless of nationality. This is the interviewees’ reality and their personal 
experience; against the background of their own experience of having served 
in the IDF they claim that every citizen has to serve and serves. The 
obligation to serve is taken for granted and by referring to their own service 
they prove they have fulfilled their moral obligation. The interviewees adapt 
the hegemonic discourse of serving the country also with regard to its 
ideological basis: on the one hand they speak about the obligation with 
constant reference to a perceived security threat in the context of the ongoing 
territorial conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. On the other hand, 
they present service as an integral part of the Zionist foundations of the State. 
Yet at the same time, they know—through public discourse, less through 
personal experience—that not every Israeli citizen serves in the military; in 
particular, the interviewees speak about three social groups who do not fulfil 
their citizen’s duty: the Jewish ultra-orthodox, the so-called “mishtamtim” 
(Hebr., “dodgers”), and Palestinian citizens. Their claim must be understood 
against the background of recent developments in Israeli society: on the 
individual as well as the collective level, the link between military service as 
a civic duty has been challenged through the emergence of various civil rights 
movements (cf. Zemlinskaya 2008), political events (cf. Helman 1999) or 
increasing numbers of individuals dodging their draft (cf. Livio 2012). In the 
context of those developments, a major argument in the interviews is that 
serving the country is not only compulsory because “this is the law” but 
because “it’s a matter of fairness, [...] there are whole communities that do 
not take part, [...] but not only minorities do not take part, also an egoistic 
majority”.  
However, the interviewees put emphasis on the non-service of Israel’s 
Palestinian minority over Jewish segments which do not serve. Interestingly, 
the interviewees do not speak so much about religious or rather ultra-
orthodox Jewish Israelis who do not serve in the IDF for religious reasons1 
                                                             
1  Only after the interviews had been conducted, the High Court ruled that the Tal 
law which gave ultra-orthodox Jewish citizens the option of deferring their 
service in the IDF is unconstitutional (Ettinger/ Cohen 2012).  
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but first and foremost about secular Jewish as well as non-Jewish citizens 
who do not do military service.2 This emphasis has to be read against IB’s 
demand of equally mandatory service of all Israeli citizens, if not in the 
military, then in the form of national service in a citizen’s community. In this 
context, the interviewees stress the option of doing national service as an 
alternative to military service, in particular for those Jewish or non-Jewish 
citizens who do not want to serve in the IDF for one or another reason. Yet 
they do not accept any of those reasons, but rather present the option of an 
alternative national service as equally mandatory—as does the Yisra’el 
Beitenu party—instead of an opportunity granted to national minorities. 
Consequently, Palestinian citizens, who in their majority do not make a 
demand on that legal opportunity, are presented as a collective which does 
not serve their country and thus does not fulfil their citizen’s duties. 
 
 
13.3 LOYALTY TO THE JEWISH STATE 
 
The interviewees’ notion of loyalty to the Jewish state is constructed against 
their presentation of cleavages within the Israeli society; in particular they 
emphasise political (left-wing vs. right-wing) and national (Jewish vs. 
Palestinian) cleavages. The interviewees position themselves as Jewish, 
political right-wing, secular and middle-class. Against the background of 
discursive events in the recent past (the Lebanon war in 2006, the Gaza war 
in 2009, the Gaza flotilla raid in 2010), they claim to be loyal citizens on the 
basis that they criticise or question neither political authorities nor the IDF. 
Against the background of the same discursive events against which the 
interviewees display their loyalty, Palestinian citizens are presented as 
disloyal. Again, as it was the case with service of the country, the 
interviewees make a qualitative difference between those citizens whom they 
consider loyal and not loyal to the Jewish State. The interviewees describe a 
feeling of betrayal, again followed by the perception of an existential threat 
to Israel’s existence. The political left is accused of being disloyal because 
                                                             
2  That the interviewees rarely mention religious Jewish Israelis here can be 
explained with personal experiences they have made. In the interviews one can 
find several stories of solidarity the interviewees have encountered with Jewish 
Israelis of Mizrahi origin who were often featured as religious. 
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of their different approach to the peace process and critique of government 
and the IDF during these more recent military operations.  
As it is the case with service of the country, the interviewees talk about 
loyalty to the Jewish State with reference to one of IB’s ideological demands; 
here it is the demand to introduce a loyalty oath for all Israeli citizens, a 
pledge to Israel’s character as a Jewish State. In the last decade or so, one 
could observe the growing tendency to emphasise the Jewish aspect of Israel 
over its democratic aspect. The (Jewish) interviewees do not see any problem 
in that development, yet at the same time, they do not understand that non-
Jewish minorities and also political left-wing Jewish citizens perceive that 




13.4 PALESTINIAN CITIZENS AND  
NON-CITIZENS AS A PERCEIVED THREAT 
 
The interviewees speak about various rifts and cleavages which they 
perceive as threatening. In other words, Palestinians, citizens and non-
citizens, are not the only social group raising the concern of the interviewees. 
However, the interviewees construct a qualitative difference between the 
threat perceived from different ethnic, political or religious, but Jewish 
groups vs. the threat that national others impose on them and the Israeli state. 
I argue that the interviewees consciously target Palestinians, and they do so 
against the background of the Yisra’el Beitenu party’s electoral slogans 
about service and loyalty.  
This threat is presented as threefold: Palestinian citizens are presented as 
a symbolic threat to the Israeli culture and the Zionist project; Palestinian 
non-citizens on the regional level or as part of the “Muslim world” are 
presented as a symbolic and existential threat.  
On the local level, the interviewees from Natserat Illit come to speak 
about a symbolic threat imposed by Palestinian “villagers” who come to the 
Jewish city, which, in return, is in danger of losing its Jewish character. Their 
argument is set against the Zionist discourse of preserving Jewish hegemony 
in parts of the country with a large non-Jewish, Palestinian population.  
On the national level, Palestinian non-citizens are presented as an 
existential threat with whom Israelis are constantly at war. Additionally, the 
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interviewees claim Palestinian citizens betrayed their Jewish co-citizens in 
showing solidarity with those “people beyond the border”.  
Finally, on the global level, Israel is presented as being jeopardised by 
the broader process of “Islamisation of the Western world”.  
Against the presentation of Palestinians as a threat, the interviewees 
construct who they are themselves and where they belong. In this context, 
the interviewees also contrast their perception of Palestinians as a threat with 
their own emotions of love for their Jewish collective, and, more abstract, 
the Jewish State, as well as of hate and betrayal for the others. The 
interviewees can draw here on deeply rooted negative stereotypes of 
Palestinians as the cultural other in Israeli political culture. As a result, the 
interviewees actively engage in and reproduce the exclusionary ethno-
nationalist discourse about the non-Jewish other, against whom the Jewish 
collective is constructed. 
 
 
13.5 CITIZEN’S RIGHTS 
 
Previous empirical findings about how young (secular Jewish, religious 
Jewish and Palestinian) Israelis read citizenship display individualistic 
approaches to citizen’s rights as well as collective approaches with regard to 
citizen’s duties, e.g. mandatory military service (Pinson 2004).  
In contrast to those findings, the participants in the present study 
emphasise first and foremost the aspect of duties. In addition, they 
discursively terminate the link between those duties and (Jewish) nationality, 
which so far has determined the nature of those duties demanded of Israeli 
Jewish citizens and demand equal citizen’s duties regardless of the individual 
citizen’s nationality. However, this termination has implications, of course, 
for the arrangement of Israeli citizenship in particular for national minorities 
which so far have enjoyed particular rights. 
The dimension of citizen’s rights is hardly explicitly mentioned in the 
narratives. However, one can draw conclusions regarding the rights 
dimension from what the interviewees have explicitly said: against the 
background of arguing that Palestinian Israelis would be disloyal and would 
not serve the country they live in, the interviewees claim they have delivered 
the proof that they themselves are good citizens because they have fulfilled 
their obligations. This way, they present themselves as even better than other 
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Jewish citizens who either do not serve or are disloyal. Consequently, the 
interviewees can not only claim their rights as citizens to belong, but to 
belong to the dominant group within that Jewish State. In that position, again, 
they have the legitimate power to design Israeli citizenship; and in their 
ethno-nationalist reading of it, there is no room for non-Jewish citizens.  
The interviewees claim these rights at the expense of Palestinian Israelis. 
At a first glance, the interviewees present their reading of Israeli citizenship 
as entirely based on rationality: those who fulfil their duties are granted 
rights. Yet they terminate the agreement that national, non-Jewish, 
minorities–minorities apart from Palestinians are not even mentioned in the 
narratives–need exemptions or are entitled to particular minority rights. 




13.6 ENGAGEMENT WITH THE YISRA’EL  
BEITENU PARTY 
 
The Yisra’el Beitenu party can be understood as a political means the 
interviewees refer to enforce the power they consider legitimate for their own 
social group. The interviewees hardly refer directly to the Yisra’el Beitenu 
party’s ideology, yet their presentation of Israeli citizenship has to be read as 
a constant reference to IB’s 2009 electoral campaigns about service and 
loyalty. In this context, there are frequent references to the “Zionist character 
of the Yisra’el Beitenu party” in the narratives by which the interviewees 
aim at showing that the party’s ideological programme is in line with the 
Israeli political mainstream. In particular, service and loyalty serve as a link 
to Zionism as the foundation of the state. 
At the same time, the interviewees are aware of the public discourse 
about the party and the party’s leader. Against the background of public 
discourse, they carefully construct a counter-image of public party figures, 
above all the party leader Lieberman, in order to show that those people are 
appropriate to represent mainstream Israeli voters, again, instead of the 
extreme right-wingers in the party. The interviewees especially use the inside 
and direct knowledge they claim to have gained from several party members 
they have worked with as a discursive strategy to deconstruct public images 
of those people.   
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13.7 CITIZENSHIP AS A DISCURSIVE  
STRATEGY: THE INTERVIEWEES’  
SENSE OF BELONGING 
 
By applying the suggested framework to the interview material, I was able 
to show that the interviewees have particular power resources—particular 
forms of capital—at their disposal. On the one hand, they have gained these 
power resources especially during socialisation in early childhood, mainly in 
their families. On the other hand, the interviewees have more or less 
consciously reproduced or modified their resources over time in Israel where 
they have spent most of their lives. Further, I showed that the participants in 
the present study use their power resources strategically to actively construct 
a sense of belonging to Israeli society. The interviewees’ objective position 
has to be analysed in the context of their migration background.3 
I conceptualised their objective position as twofold: the interviewees’ 
legal and their social status. In the Israeli context, all of those individuals 
who entered the country under the Law of Return receive immediate 
citizenship. With regard to their social status, the interviewees above all talk 
about personal experiences when their Jewishness and thus their sense of 
belonging was questioned. Depending on their length of stay in Israel, they 
speak about these experiences as direct and present or past experiences. If 
these are presented as past experiences, the interviewees have developed 
strategies of coping. Usually, these strategies include a reference to personal 
suffering from anti-Semitic incidents before migration and to adopting a 
“Jewish atmosphere” at home after they had come to Israel. By doing so, the 
interviewees reproduce the “Israeli national ethos” of home-coming 
(Rapoport/ Lomsky-Feder 2002). Only individual voices present themselves 
as “Sabras”, or Israeli-born, and categorically reject any impact of their 
family’s migration background on their own sense of belonging to Israeli 
society. In the present study, those voices are represented by Igal. Yet, most 
interviewees promote a Russian-Jewish identity as a result of negotiating 
their social status of being “immigrants” and their sense of belonging, of 
being Jewish. The—quite sensitive—issue of being Jewish and, above all, 
                                                             
3  I define migration background in the present study as follows: individuals who 
themselves have immigrated to Israel from another country or have at least one 
parent who immigrated from another country. 
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being a Halakhic Jew is very relevant in the interviews. It is so essential for 
the interviewees that most of them feel the need to make this explicitly clear 
to their audience–which is not only me as their immediate partner in the 
interview situation, but also potential Israeli readers–at the very beginning 
of their stories. The emphasis on their belonging to the Jewish collective 
must be read against the background of personal experiences in the context 
of migration to Israel.  
However, the interviewees do not make a “qualitative difference” 
(Bourdieu 1985: 730) in Bourdieu’s sense between Halakhic and non-
Halakhic or non-Jewish members of the social group of Israelis with an FSU 
family background. On the contrary, the interviewees do not make this 
difference concerning the Halakhic status an issue,4 which can be read as a 
strategy to further strengthen their position as a social group in the Israeli 
society through pure numbers.  
Previous empirical studies have shown that immigrants (of the first 
generation) construct their sense of belonging to the host society in different 
modes. For the case of Israelis with an FSU family background, studies on 
belonging have revealed that they have found several ways to actively 
construct a sense of belonging. One of these ways is to adapt to the dominant 
religious discourse: Neiterman and Rapoport interviewed immigrant girls in 
religious boarding schools and they showed that, on the one hand, teachers 
at those schools “inculcate religiosity among [those] girls” (Neiterman/ 
Rapoport 2009: 173). On the other hand, the interviewees actively participate 
in this process of inculcation by presenting it as something they have actively 
chosen in the interviews. Schmidt (2006) reports a similar finding for non-
Jewish immigrant women in Israel: one empirical type of interviewees 
converted to Judaism in order to deal with the pressure of being Jewish 
according to the Halakhah they describe, in order to belong to the Jewish 
community in Israel. Yet in the interviews, these women present their 
conversion as an act of free will and a process they have actively chosen. 
Another way of developing a sense of belonging reveals Remennick’s study 
on transnationalism among FSU immigrants (Remennick 2002). She finds 
hints of a transnational or rather virtual sense of belonging across immigrant 
                                                             
4  The exception to this rule is Igal. By doing so, he adapts those voices in the ethno-
nationalist discourse that doubt the right of parts of several immigrant groups, 
here: those from the former Soviet Union, to belong to the Jewish collective.  
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networks situated in the various host countries of FSU immigration and back 
in the former Soviet Union. In her study on the political behaviour of 
Russian-speaking Jews in three different countries—Ukraine, Israel, and 
Germany—Olena Bagno shows that immigrant adaptation takes place 
against the background of a particular cultural context (Bagno 2011b; 2009). 
The participants in her study revealed some similarities with regard to 
habitual dispositions and displayed a particular understanding of political 
behaviour. However, depending on their country of residence, the 
participants highly differed with regard to that understanding.  
Against the background of previous studies, the empirical findings of the 
present study on how young people with an immigrant background construct 
a sense of belonging over time reveal the seeds of a new phenomenon. The 
interviewees as the younger generation of Israelis with an FSU family 
background (“1.5th” and second generations) who spent most of their lives in 
the country, have been able to adapt and have adopted the Israeli ethno-
nationalist discourse.  
But—in contrast to what existing theories of immigrant incorporation 
may indicate—the ethno-nationalist discourse is not “inculcate[d] [...] 
among” them (Neiterman and Rapoport 2009: 173). On the contrary, as I 
have shown, the interviewees actively construct their sense of belonging to 
Israeli society. Using the presentation of a particular reading of Israeli 
citizenship, they adapt the Israeli ethno-nationalist discourse in order to 
make sense of their personal experiences in the Israeli society as a discursive 
strategy. On the basis of that sense-making, they position themselves in a 
dominant place in the field of politics. In particular, they adopt the Israeli 
ethno-nationalist discourse in two dimensions: a) the Zionist foundations of 
the state in the form of contribution (military service) and loyalty (“love of 
the Jewish state”), and b) Palestinian citizens and non-citizens impose an 
existential security threat to that Jewish collective. Besides, against the 
background of the former two dimensions, the interviewees can claim that 
the Yisra’el Beitenu party preserves the Zionist foundations of the state, or 
rather the Jewish collective.  
The presentation of Israeli citizenship as conditional serves the 
interviewees to achieve two goals: First, they present themselves as good 
citizens who fulfil all their citizen’s duties and consequently claim their 
rights as (Jewish) Israeli citizens to belong to the Jewish collective. 
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Second, they “make qualitative distinctions” (Bourdieu 1985: 730) 
between good citizens, i.e. themselves, not-as-good citizens, i.e. other 
(Jewish) citizens who in the eyes of the interviewees only partly fulfil their 
duties, and second-class citizens, i.e. Palestinian citizens, who, again, in the 
eyes of the interviewees, do not fulfil any of their citizen’s duties.  
As shown above, the interviewees state there are several segments of 
Israeli (Jewish) society that do not fulfil their duties in one of the two 
dimensions, which condition the allocation of rights in their reading of Israeli 
citizenship. Jewish ultra-orthodox and secular dodgers of military service do 
not fulfil their duties in the dimension of serving the country; political left-
wing citizens are presented as disloyal to the Jewish state because they 
criticise the government or the policies of other official institutions. In the 
interviewees’ line of argument, Palestinian Israelis fulfil neither one of the 
dimensions presented as conditional, regardless of the reasons for (not) doing 
so. They are presented as disloyal and as not showing solidarity with their 
Jewish Israeli co-citizens. Additionally, Palestinian Israelis are presented as 
a symbolic and existential threat on different levels.  
By doing so, the interviewees challenge their own objective position in 
Israeli society—which they perceive as weak in relation to the dominant 
social group, Ashkenazi Israelis—and position themselves actively not only 
within that dominant social group, but at the top of it. In other words, the 
interviewees actively apply discursive strategies to reproduce the symbolic 
hierarchy between Jewish and non-Jewish segments of Israeli society; yet at 
the same time they challenge the symbolic hierarchy within the Jewish 
segment. They do so by reinforcing distinctions between themselves, Israelis 
with an FSU family background as a social group, and social groups in other 
objective positions within Israeli society.  
Above all, “mak[ing these] qualitative distinctions” (Bourdieu 1985: 
730) shall justify social and legal inequalities between the Jewish and 
Palestinian segments in Israeli society. In this context, the interviewees 
discursively terminate the threefold notion of Israeli citizenship Peled (2011) 
defines and do not further distinguish between different (legal) approaches 
to determine the rights and duties of Jewish and non-Jewish, in particular 
Palestinian, Israeli citizens.  
For the sake of emphasis on a shared Jewish nationality and the Jewish 
character of the Israeli state, the interviewees concentrate their argument on 
the non-Jewish segments, in particular the Palestinian minority. Concluding 
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from their line of argument about conditional Israeli citizenship, they suggest 
Palestinian Israelis should be not allowed to claim any citizen’s rights in any 
of their areas (economic cultural, political) because they do not fulfil their 
duties as Israeli citizens as presented by the interviewees. As a consequence 
of their line of argument, Palestinian Israelis cannot be regarded actual 
citizens. The interviewees openly discuss this with regard to the cultural and 
economic dimensions of citizen’s rights, i.e. Palestinians’ recognition as a 
national minority and access to social welfare. They also indicate that the 
Palestinian minority has not got any basis on which to claim political rights, 
i.e. their right to hold an Israeli passport and to settle within the borders of 
the Israeli state.  
Previous research on aspects of the Israeli political culture have already 
stated a shift in public opinion, in particular regarding anti-democratic 
tendencies, in the context of growing societal cleavages and rifts. By arguing 
this way, the interviewees are in line with the political agenda of the party 
they are engaged with. For example, they directly refer to IB’s suggestion to 
introduce a “loyalty oath” as a necessary condition to for the provision of 
basic civil, social and political rights. This oath is claimed to concern all 
Israelis but is aimed particularly at Palestinian Israelis and must be 
interpreted as an attempt to win back legitimisation on ethno-nationalist 
grounds in order to reintegrate the Jewish segments. While back in the 1980s 
right-wing extremist parties were still banned when they publicly demanded 
such an oath, more recently it has become publicly acceptable. Another 
example is the growing acceptance of an exchange of territories—for 
instance in the form of the so called “Lieberman Plan”—of parts consisting 
of significant Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Israeli core land with 
major Palestinian settlements along the Green Line of 1967 (cf. Waxman 
2012: 22).  
According to Bourdieu (2013), the political field is very close to the field 
of power and directly subordinate to the latter. One can conclude from this 
that the social group in power is legitimised to define who gains legitimate 
access to a particular social space in the form of citizenship at a given time. 
Through their claim of belonging to the dominant social group in Israeli 
society on grounds of their contribution as good citizens, the interviewees 
claim for themselves and for their social group to have the power to execute 
symbolic violence, i.e. to deprive those segments of Israel citizenship, and, 
implicitly, use physical violence against non-Jewish, or, rather Palestinian 
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citizens, i.e. to deport them. The participants in the present study do so by 
adapting central slogans of Lieberman’s Yisra’el Beitenu party, as expressed 
in the party’s 2009 electoral campaign.  
However, these slogans are no longer an extreme right political position 
in Israeli society. On the contrary, the interviewees do find several linking 
points in the Israeli ethno-nationalist discourse to which they link their 
arguments: first, in a historical perspective, they can draw on Jewish 
nationalism, Zionism, disregarding the rights of national minorities in the 
area.  
Second, in a contemporary perspective, the Israeli political culture has 
been coined by a growing mistrust in the country’s Palestinian citizens and 
its Palestinian neighbours, accompanied by negative stereotyping of that 
national minority as the others against whom a Jewish-Israeli identity has 
been constructed. Negative stereotyping of Muslim minorities, or 
“orientalism” (Lerner 2010), has also been an integral part of the (post-) 
Soviet political culture and may serve the interviewees as an additional 
linkage between their individual habitual dispositions and the ethno-
nationalist discourse.  
Third, based on the negative image of Muslims in general and 
Palestinians in particular, the interviewees can put special emphasis on the 
presentation of non-Jewish citizens, Palestinians in particular, as imposing 
an existential threat to the Jewish State and the Jewish collective in general.  
Fourth, this perceived threat, again, does not concern Israel exclusively. 
Rather, it is possible to draw parallels to recent societal developments across 
European countries, which make anti-Muslim sentiments, or, rather subtle or 
blatant racism, increasingly acceptable in the “midst of society”.  
Israel is, of course, still a particular case with regard to the Israeli (and 
Jewish) history of threat or threat perception, which Zuckermann (1999) 
refers to as the “central axes of fear”. These threats have at least partly been 
real and of an existential nature aiming at physical annihilation. The 
interviewees are aware of this basic fear and refer to a perceived threat to 
their and the country’s very existence when they emphasise the necessity of 
military service on the one hand and of recent military operations to stop that 
threat on the other hand. However, they also present Palestinian citizens as a 
social group which collectively imposes a symbolic threat on the Israeli 
(Jewish) society in terms of differences in “cultural values”, and this is where 
the Israeli case is no longer exceptional. When one compares Pedahzur’s 
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definition of a new Israeli extreme right and his description of the Yisra’el 
Beitenu party as being one of this new right’s representatives with recent 
developments in other Western democracies, Europe and the U.S. (Pehahzur 
2001), one finds similarities in both potential voters’ profile, especially with 
regard to their perception of the (symbolic) threat (to European countries, 
(e.g. Zick et al. 2011), and the respective parties’ emphasis on security 
issues. In a similar vein, Gutwein5 describes the Yisra’el Beitenu party as 
right-wing populist and compares it to “hate parties” of European style like 
the FPÖ in Austria, Le Pen’s Front National in France or Wilder’s Partij voor 
de Vrijheid in the Netherlands.  
While the political parties Gutwein lists in his article seem a bit outdated 
nowadays, the phenonomen is not. On the contrary, the so-called “refugee 
crisis”, as the major influx of Syrian civil war refugees is referred to in public 
discourse europe-wide, has added fuel to the fire, and in this context new, 
anti-immigrant, or rather “anti-Islam”-related political parties have emerged 
in various member states of the European Union. Traditional political parties 
have not found another strategy to handle the challenge those newly founded 
political parties pose to their own electorate but to adapt the anti-immigrant 
rhetoric of the latter.  
In both the Israeli and the European cases, demand and supply side meet 
in their emphasis on a perceived threat of “Islamisation”. For the Israeli case, 
however, the interviewees add a second layer by linking the notion to the 
ethno-nationalist discourse and thus present the Palestinian others as causing 
both a symbolic and an existential threat to the Jewish collective.  
Against the background of a threat of “Islamisation”, the interviewees 
can link the emergence of the Yisra’el Beitenu party to right-wing populist 
developments in those societies and present Israel as being part of a broader 
process. In times when emotions have become more important than facts, 
even mainstream democratic politicians feel obliged to respond to the 
exaggerated and uninformed fears of “worried citizens” and demand loyalty 
from national or ethnic, in particular Muslim minorities.6  
                                                             
5  Daniel Gutwein. How the left elevated Lieberman. Haaretz (English Edition), 
2009. Retrieved from: http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/how- 
the-left-elevated-lieberman-1.269990  
6  I have in mind here the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, who recently 
demanded just the same of permanent residents or German citizens whose 
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Argumentum e contrario, Israeli society cannot allow itself to regard the 
Yisra’el Beitenu party’s campaigning as well as their concrete parliamentary 
initiatives as a peripheral problem. It can also not allow itself to regard the 
party as “sectoral”, representing a very specific and relatively small 
constituency. The empirical findings of the present study analysis confirm 
major rifts and cleavages within the Israeli society with regard to national 
and political issues. Not only the rise of Naftali Bennett’s right-wing 
religious Jewish Home party is a concrete sign of a development in which 
the anti-Palestinian discourse has become dominant—a discourse, which has 
been fueled by the campaigns and parliamentary initatives of the Yisrael 
Beitenu party. At the time the manuscript for this book has been prepared for 
publication, the Netanyahu administration passes the Jewish State Bill (July 
2018), which among others removes Arabic as an official language alongside 
Hebrew. 
Against this background, it is even more worrying that to date there is no 
loud and powerful public voice reminding this society of their Jewish AND 
democratic basis, securing first and foremost the citizen’s rights of ethnic 
and national minorities in Israel over excluding those minorities first 
discursively, and legally afterwards, on grounds of their minority status. 
 
                                                             
families have arrived from Turkey (“Türkeistämmige”), i.e. Muslims in their 
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